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AB STRACT 
This thesis attempts to show that the loss of Newf ound-
land's self -gove rnment in 1933 was t he result of an historical 
process rooted in t he po l itic:al e xperience of the country 
which can be identified as having its origins in the disil-
lus ionment first exp ressed by William Coaker in 1925 . As 
leader of the Fishermen's Protective Union whose political 
career followed a parallel course of decline with that of the 
c ountry as a whole, particularly as the state failed time and 
again to effectively regulate the country's fishery, Coaker 
conceived an idea of government by commission which wou l d come 
to stand as a singular contribution to the evolution of 
Ne wfoundland's political and constitutional history. 
I n order t o establish a context in which the events of 
this period can be assessed it is necessary to consider both 
the hi storiographic reference points which reveal significant 
gaps in the treatment of the relevant issues, and the longer 
historica l patterns which gave rise to a profound political 
malaise. The country's crisis may be defined as one of 
collecti v e self-confidence in which over time, as Coaker 
c ontinued to advocate a radical proposition for po l itical 
reform, others came to adopt his views as their own, without 
i ncludi ng h i s prescript ions for retaining some measure of 
d emocratic practi c e. 
In t he end Coaker objected vigo urously to what he 
identified as an ant i-democratic distort ion of his orig inal 
proposal . But by this time the idea of a c ommission governm-
ent, wh ile bearing his imprint , had come to take on its own 
attributes deri ved from the political discourse of the period, 
which included an e xtensive process of review through the 
proceedings of the Arnulree Royal Commission. It is in the 
light of a close reading of the primary Newfound l a d sources , 
and in particular those which illuminate the course of 
Coaker's idea , that the suspension of self-government may be 
seen as the end r esult of a protracted search for a solution 
to the country 's unending struggle to move forward. 
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Introducti on 
I n the fall of 19 2 5 William Coaker a ddressed delegates t o 
the annual convention of the Fishermen's Pro t ective Uni on 
(FPU) for the last time as president of the organi zation . 1 It 
was a year and a half si nce the election of a government led 
by the self-described "p la in man of business", Walt er Monroe. 2 
In his address Coaker railed against what he called a "high -
wayman's adrnini s trat ion" which he said was doomed to be 
"destroyed " because of the hostility toward it throughout the 
country. The parti san tone was typical of the opening proceed-
ings at FPU conventions, but on this occasion the president's 
speech containe d a dramatic proposal which went much beyond 
the normal parameters. He called for the formation of a party 
that would appeal to the electorate on a single issue : 
"passing a law to place the government in the hands of nine 
men for ten years, electing the nine men somewhat on the lines 
pursued for years of selecting the Ex e cutive.") 
Eight years l ater, in the spring of 1933, Walter Monroe 
lThe convention was held on the l a st weekend of November, 
al though its p roceedings are dated December 25th in the 
sl~ary which a ppears in W.F. Coaker, ed. Twenty Years of the 
Fisher men 's Protective Union (St. John's 1932), p. 236. See 
r eports of Fishermen ' s Advocate, 4 December and 11 December, 
192 5. 
2S.J .R . Noel, Politic s in Newfoundl and (Toronto 1 971 ), p. 
179 . 
3The me t h od of election would be based on denominational 
representat ion. For an e x c erpt from Coaker ' s speech which 
clarif ie s the context and substance of the proposal, see 
Append ix A. 
2 
a ppeared before the Amulree Royal Commission and tes ti fied 
that he "hear d it said that the peop le generally we re sick of 
politics and would like nothing better than a form of commis-
sion government for ten years. ,, 4 He added that he was d o ub tfu l 
whether this was so a nd thought public opinion should be 
tested with a party formed on such a programme and a general 
election held on t he question. Monroe was being disingenuous 
in ascribing to others support for an idea which had come to 
represent the favoured political option of most of the 
merchant elite. But while there may have been demonstrably 
broad acceptance of the proposition, it is significant that 
the currency which William Coaker's idea had taken on in the 
intervening years since 1 925, was presented by a leading 
public fi gure in such tentative terms. 
Wh en the Amulree Commission presented its report in 
November 1933, a document which Neville Chamberlain, then the 
Chancellor of the Ex chequer, described as "perhaps one of the 
most remarkable and interesting ever drawn up in the history 
of (the British) Empire, ,, 5 there was no provision for popular 
sanction of its recommendations, nor was there to be a reten-
tion of any form of democratic franchise in the proposed new 
regime. The Royal Commission, which was established as a 
4Charles A. Magrath papers, Provincial Archives of 
Newfoundland and Labrador (PANL), Reel 2, 24 March. Monroe's 
t estimony was not recorded verbatim, but presented in a text 
p repared by the Commission secretary, P. A . Clutterbuck. 
SHouse of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 284 (7 
December 19 33), col. 1847. 
3 
condition of British financial assistan ce i n meeting Ne wf ound-
l a nd's debt payments due at the e nd of 19 32, was given a 
warrant with dece i vingly simple te r ms of re ference: "To 
ex amine into the future of Newfoundland and, in parti cu lar, to 
report on th~ financial situation and prospects therein. "6 
When the Royal Commission published its report, it was 
widely seen to have given voice to a popular call for the 
introduction of a new form of government. In doing so the 
Commission reflected a point of convergence in the positions 
being advanced by Coaker and Monroe, two men who otherwise had 
very different political careers and accordingly different 
points of vi ew. To the e x tent that such a commonali ty of 
opinion existed, the creation of a commission form of gov-
e r nment may truly be seen to have been an undertaking initi-
ated from within Newfoundland. But in its recommendation to 
suspend indefinitely the Letcers Patent defining the consti-
tutional authority of the country as a self-governing Domin-
ion, the Arnulree report imposed a logic of its own, and as 
such contributed an essential exogenous element to t he 
"situation and prospects" which it e xamined in Newfoundland. 
Wal ter Monroe, like most others, was enthusiastic in 
accepting without reservation the verdict of the Royal 
Commission . 7 William Coaker, standing nearly as alone as when 
6Newfoundland Royal Commission, 1933, Report (Hereinafter 
described as Amulree), p. 1. 
7Da i y Ne ws, 30 November 1933. 
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he fi r st proposed his i dea of commiss i on government, rej ec t ed 
the scheme recommended in the report as one which d if f ered 
"materially" from that which he had been p romo ti ng intermit-
tently for eight years. 8 Coaker' s ob jections rested essential-
lyon the criticism that the proposed form of government would 
amount to "despotism" wit hout any form of elected representa-
tion, and that in any case, any such fundamental change in the 
constitution of the country should not proc e ed "without first 
having the matter submitted to the people." In this, Coaker 
found himself confronting circumstances replete with multiple 
ironies and contradictions. As the primary advocate of a 
proposal which had come full circle in a form he believed 
would haunt those who accepted it as "traitors to the land 
that bore them", there was a drama in this historic moment 
which rendered his own position as that of a tragic progeni t or 
desperately t ry ing to disown a legacy. 
There are numerous important issues surrounding the 
events of this period which have either been overlooked or 
mistakenly or inadequately addressed ln the literature of 
twentieth-century Newfoundland politics. The role played by 
William Coaker is one of these, as is the genesis and course 
of the i dea of commission government and the interaction 
between publi c discourse in Newfoundland and the Amulree 
Commission, whose report was ultimately informed in a central 
3The full text of Coaker' s response to the report, as 
conta i ned in a letter to the Evening Telegram, 23 November 
1933, i s a t tac hed as Appendix B. 
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way by the testimony it received. Th is thesi s will attemp c 
first to identify the issues raised implicitly and otherwise 
by the historiography , and then proceed by way of background 
to Coaker's intervent i on in 1925 , and the subsequent evoluti o n 
of his proposa l , t o e xami n e the milieu of 1933 in which the 
Amulree process was p l ayed out and the context in which 
commission government became the preferred option. 
Chapter 1 
Issues and Non-is s ues in the Literature 
An essential point of departure for a di scuss ion of t h e 
literature on the collapse of se lf-government must be t h e 
seminal historical work of Ian McDonald. 1 While the limita-
tions of this study are apparent in its periodization, namely, 
that e x cept for a brief concluding chapter, its detailed 
analysis ends when the actual "end" begins, it is nonetheless 
McDonald who most clearly demarcates the line of continuity 
between the decline of William Coaker and the FPU and the 
general failure of the country in 1933. McDonald's central 
asserti on is t hat Newfoundland's mercantile elite had never 
accepted respons ible government as anything more than "an 
e xpensive lux ury" and that this, combined with t heir refusal 
to countenance any attempt to regulate the fishery, left the 
country with "no corrunon set of aspirations to unite the 
whole. "2 McDona ld specifically and correctly identifies the 
fiasco of merchant opposition to the 1919 fishery regulations 
introduced by Coaker as Minister of Fisheries in the first 
Government of Richard Squires as the pivotal episode which 
triggered Coaker 's personal disillusionment and generated an 
iIan McDonald, To Ea ch His Own , William Coaker and the 
Fishermen's Protective Union 1n Newf oundl and Politics, 1908-
1 92 5 ( St. John's 1 987 ) . 
2Ibid., pp. 142-145. McDonald also emphasizes the 
conservative and debilitat ing role play ed by the Catholic 
Churc h in its o pposition to Coaker . 
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ongoing crisis in the capaci t y of t he stat e to function. 3 
While McDonald's analysis is essentially unimpeachable, 
h is c onclusions vis-a-vis the loss of self-gove rnment remain 
t o be substantiated by a closer study of the years fo l lowing 
1925. His observations on the merchant disposition t oward 
r esponsible government are critical to his thesis and require 
further assessment in light of later events. 4 McDonald makes 
reference to Coaker's 1925 appeal for a commission form of 
government and notes that this was re-stated in 1929, but 
there is no substantial comment on the intervening years or 
the reception this proposal received and the impact of its 
circulation following 1929. 5 It is worth noting that in an 
essa.y e x amining what he called the FPU's balance of power 
strategy, McDonald offers a comparative assessment of Coaker's 
early ideas on politics and government with those of contem-
poraneous populist movements in western Canada. He suggests 
]Ibid., Ch, 6, pp. 86-106. 
4 I bid., for example, pp. 19 and 118. In McDonald's PhD. 
thesis, of which the monograph is an edited version, there are 
more detailed references to support this view. "William Coaker 
and the Fishermen's Protective Union in Newfoundland politics, 
1908 1925", London 1971, Centre for Newfoundland Studies 
(CNS). See for e xample, p. 126 and p. 306. 
SIbid., pp. 133-34. There is one curious reference in 
McDonald's wor k to a submission made by Coaker to the Amulree 
Commission in relation to the fishery regulations, see p. 110 
a nd footnote #21. In his PhD thesis, the footnote indicates 
t he comments on Coaker' s submission are based on a draft 
c ontained in Coaker' s papers (CNS). No such draft can be 
l ocated in these papers and whi l e there is evidence Coaker did 
make a presentation to Amulree (see Chapter 4 below), there is 
no record or ind ication of this i n the Magrath papers. 
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that although there were similarit ies ',Alith, fo r instanc e , 
Henry Wise Wood and the Non-Par tisan League , which advoca ted 
replacing political parties by organized interest groups, 
Coaker did not call for the a bol it ion of the traditional party 
system. 6 This of course stands in direct contradi ction to what 
became the eventual trajectory of Coaker's political thinking, 
and illust rates the shortcomings of any account wh ich does not 
see his career t h rough its later years. 7 
The lack of attention to Coaker's role In the events 
leading up co 1933 is evident in the two other foremost 
scholarly wo r s of Newfoundland politics in this century . 
S.J . R . Noe l , who offers the most thorough cons ideration of the 
period as seen against a backdrop which he traces to 1908 and 
the defeat of Prime Mi n ister Robe r t Bond, describes Coaker as 
s u ffering from "uncharacteristic ennui" after 1921. In a 
statement which in part must be seen to have influenced later 
wr iting he observed : "He was never again a radical force in 
politics. ,,8 To this it would not be an overstatement to reply 
that indeed , Coake r's boldest initiative was yet to come . 
°Ian McDonald, "W . F Coaker and the Balance of Power 
Strategy : The Fishermen 's Protective Union in Newfoundland 
Politics ", in ,J. Hiller and P . Neary , eds., Newfoundland in 
the Nineteenth a nd Twentieth Cent ur ies : Essays in Interpreta-
ti o n (Toron to 1980) . All further re f erences to McDonald are of 
To Each His Own, op. cit. 
An essential reference point for any comparative assess-
ment of Coaker's views with movements of the period elsewhere 
is t h e work of C . B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alber t a: Soc i a l 
Credi t a n d the Party System (To r on to 1953) . 
aNoel, Po liti cs i n Newfoundland , p. 148 
9 
While Noel's discussion of wha t he describ es as the "uncond i -
tional surrender" of self-governmen t is generally thorough, 
the re is one noteworthy error in his reflection on the 
constitutiona l issues ra i sed by the report of the Amulree 
Commission. 
Noel did not descri b e the Amu l ree report accurately when 
he suggested it would be only "a theoretica l poss i bility" to 
consider options for some form of representation which might 
have been retained . This, he claims, would be pointless, 
because "the report does not discuss any alternative constitu-
t iona l forms to the one proposed. " 9 In fact the A.rnulree report 
did contain a fairly detailed, if not satisfactory, discussion 
of precisely this kind. 10 It would appear that the report's 
d iscussion of the s e "a lternatives " was based on a memorandum 
on the subject prepared by P.A. Clutterbuck , the secretary to 
the Roya l Commission. ll What is especially interesting about 
this document is that it shows that as late as September, 
1 933, long after the Commission had heard from its many 
witnesses, there was no certain direction as to what the final 
repo rt would recommend. Furthermore, it contains the very 
relevant submission by the secretary that , in his considered 
opinion , retaining some form of representativeness in any 
change to the country's constitution was , for a variety of 
9Ib i d. , p. 220 . 
10 Amu 1 r e e, pp. 192 - 197 . 
IlThi s document is attached as Appendi x B. 
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r e a s ons, desirable. 
Peter Neary's recent work presents an indispensable 
cont ribution to our underst anding of the un fo ldi ng of t hes e 
events. 12 But unfortunately, as James Hiller has obs e rved , 
the point of view is "from Wh itehall and Government Hou se" and 
consequently neglects to give serious consideration to the 
expressed feelings and opinions, which are ample in the 
primary sources , on the momentous questions of the day as they 
were seen by the people of Newfoundland. 13 Neary's chapter on 
the period 1929 to 1934 is only a fraction of a much larger 
study of the actual period of the Commission Government and 
the count r y 's evolution toward Confederation in 1949. It is 
apparent that because of his exhaustive attention to the 
mi nutiae of diplomatic and administrative reference sources, 
his perspective privileges non-Newfoundland materia l. That 
t his approach has its limitations is made clear in the first 
chapter. One significant illustration of this is when Coaker 
is d i smissed as a non-actor who was suffering from "sene-
scence", even though the three members of the Royal Commission 
were all at least ten years his senior.14 
12p . 
192 9 -1930 
Neary , Newfoundland 
(Montrea l 1988) . 
i n the North Atlantic World , 
13J. Hiller, "Twentieth Centu ry Newfoundland Politics: 
Some Recent Literature", Ac adi ens i s , 20 (Spring 1991), p. 191. 
14Neary, Newfound l a nd, p. 42. Coaker was born in 1871 
(McDonald, p. 15) while according to Neary, p. 16, the three 
members of the Amu lree Commission were septuagenarians . During 
this period Coaker did complain of ill health and offered this 
a s the reason he was spending more time at an estate he had 
11 
Because his work generally negl e cts local sources, Near y 
e x aggerates the e x tent to which t he Arnul r ee report was a 
product of "the normal Whi tehall government machinery. ,, 15 
Without referring to the testimony heard by the Commission, 
Neary states that governme n t by commission had been advocated 
by "nearly all the witnesses". 16 This asserti on , which has 
become somewhat of an unfortunate refrain in the literature, 
cannot be reconciled with a reading of the transcripts of the 
Commission's proceedings. 17 The Arnulree report itself lS the 
most likely source for this: "That it was essential that the 
c ountry should be given a rest from politics for a period of 
years was indeed recognised by the great majority of witnesses 
who appeared before us. "l B This is not an adequate summary of 
p rchased in Jamaica. See for example, Fishermen's Advocate, 
20 February, 1931. But while continuing to travel extensively 
outside the country as he did through most of his public life, 
Coaker, in addition to being a Minister without portfolio 
until the defeat of Squires in 1932, maintained a prolific 
output of published material and thereby an important level of 
engagement and influence with the events of the day. 
lSIbid ., p. 41. 
16 Ibid., p. 31. 
17Magrath papers, reels 1 and 2. Charles A. Magrath was 
the Canadian nominee to the Royal Commission, along with 
William Stavert appointed by Newfoundland and Baron Arnulree 
a p pointed by Britain. (For biographies, see Neary, pp. 15-16.) 
In its repor t , the Commission stated it had held "about 100 
formal sittings", heard from 260 witnesses, and received "a 
large number of letters and memoranda from a ll parts of the 
c ountry." (Arnulree, p. 2) Wh ile these papers do not contain a 
complete record of all the interviews, they represent an 
immen sely under-utilized resource for the study of this 
period. 
18Arnulree, p . 195. 
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the range of the testimony, especially when t h e repo rt itself 
recognizes, in its discussion of the alternatives refer r ed to 
a b ove, that the proposals received i ncl uded vari ous sugge s -
tions for "modification s" to the country's constitution. It is 
most likely, that for the Commissioners, aside from its self-
serving value, this statement was based on a reading of one of 
the documents prepared by the seemingly ubiquitous Clutter-
buck, who presented a tally sheet of constitutional opinions 
put before the Commission. For present purposes, it will 
suffice to note that this list cannot be and should not have 
been taken at face value because its contents do not accord 
with the actual record of proceedings. 19 
The untested validity of this received characterization 
of the testimony weakens Neary's account and also serves to 
skew the logic of certain of its descriptions. The only 
reference Neary makes to the testimony before the Commission, 
lS to cite the opinions of Leonard Outerbridge who, as a 
member of a merchant's committee, advocated the publication of 
pauper lists and "the disenfranchisement at the next general 
19C1utterbuck's list shows 10 witnesses in favour of 
Confederation with Canada, 10 favouring continuation of the 
present sys t em of government, and 45 in support of Commission 
Government, Magrath papers, reel 2. The list is reproduced as 
an appendix to an unpublished paper by P. Fenwick, "Witnesses 
to the Lord" (1984) CNS. Fenwic k interprets the evidence as 
"the overwhelming majority" of witnesses wanting Commission 
Gov ernment. It must be noted that this list, which is undated, 
is in conflict with a list attached to the memo prepared by 
Clutterbuc k (Appendix C), which was prep ared at a later date 
and designed to supersede the former. See Chapter Four for 
discu ssion. 
13 
election of the persons named on t hem. ,, 20 Such evidence is 
conveniently used to support McDona ld's argument of the 
hostility of the mercantile elite t oward responsible govern -
ment. The problem with this is that with such a comment, t h e 
witness was presupposing the continuation of general elec-
tions, albeit with a limited franchise, and this could hardly 
be construed to warrant counting as an opinion in favour of 
the total suspension of self-government. 
There are also problematic aspects of Neary's interpre-
tive framewo rk , as for example, his statement that Prime 
Minister Frederick Alderdice "swallowed the bitter medicine 
served up by the Amulree Commission manfully. ,,21 In fact, 
Alderdice, as the very first witness before the Commission, 
was also che first to advocate a commission form of government 
because "the existing constitution left much to be 
des ired. ,, 22 In any event there was not a great loss for 
Alderdice personally to suffer, for as Neary clearly shows, 
the quid pro quo of his acquiescence as government leader was 
his appointment as one of the first members of the new 
regime. 23 There is certainly nothing in Alderdice's speeches 
i n the House of Assembly at the time to indicate anything 
"manfully" was required or being exhibi ted on his part. 24 A 
20Neary, Newfoundland, p. 4 2 . 
21Ibid., p. 42. 
22Magrath papers, reel 2, Marc h 2 0. 
23 Neary, Newfoundland, pp. 32 - 35 . 
24 See disc u ssion bel ow, Chapter Four. 
14 
perhaps more curious e x ample of t he 'fl e w beh ind Neary's 
narrative comes at the conclusion of t h e first c h apt er when h e 
states that at the end of the day , when Amu lree ' s report l"las 
accepted and a new era was to b eg in, Newfoundland's " s hi p o f 
state" had been "sa l v aged " . 25 It may be that t h e resu l ts of 
t he AInulree process could be described as a salvage operation, 
but to suggest the ship of state was uninterrupt ed in its 
course denies the essential fact of the loss of popular 
sovereignty, which could hardly be taken as an incidental 
aspect of the turn of events. 2 6 
There is one other important lssue in Neary's account 
which is i n need of co rreccion, in part because it relates to 
che role p l ayed by Coaker and also because it is a common 
er ro r elsewh ere in the l iterature. Neary presents the election 
of Alderdice in 1932 as though there was one campaign issue, 
namely Alderdice's pledge to appoint a commi ttee to examlne 
the feasibility of "p l acing the country under a form of 
Commission Government for a period of years. ,, 27 In the first 
25Ne ary, Newfoundland, p. 43. 
26 At t he end of his second chapter Neary describes the 
inauguration of the new regime in 1934 as the beginning of a 
"nobl e experiment". Ibid., p. 74. Su ch a view may be con-
trasted with that of Harold Innis, who in 1937, wrote: "The 
writer confesses a strong bias on t his matter and he cannot 
refra in from a profound sense of shock when he saw the 
"C o lonial Building" (House of Assemb l y) filled with office 
desks ... I s Nel(vfoundland a significant blind spot on the 
democracy of v.le s te rn civi l i za tion?" in "The Amulree Report: "'. 
Review", in The Canad ian Journa l of Economic s a nd Political 
Scienc e , 3 (1937 ) . 
27Neary , Newf o undland , p. 1 4. 
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place , Neary does not mention that it was Coake r who persua ded 
Al derdice to include this in what appears to be essen tial l y an 
addendum to an otherwi se fairly de t ai led c amp aign prog-
r amme . 28 Furthermo re , the e l ection o f 1 93 2 , cont.rary t.o Ne a ry' s 
s uggest.ion , a nd much t.o the di sappoin t men t of Coaker , was not. 
c ontested on the qu e stion or the promise of commission 
government . For a number of reasons , particularly whether any 
mandate can be seen to have existed , this is an i mp o r t a nt 
issue which bears closer examination and will be expl o r ed 
further below. 29 
James Overton has written two essays which represent a 
significant c ontribution to a consideration of the issues 
under review here , particularly as he deliberate l y sets out to 
e xa mine both the local c ondi tions of the period and the 
s bs t a n c e of political opinion in Newfoundland in relation to 
t he findings of the Amulree Commission. 3D Although he asks 
many of the most p e rtinent questions and brings a generally 
r efreshing theore tica l or ientation to the discussion , his work 
2B See William Alde r di ce , El ection Manifesto , 1932 (CNS) 
29See Chapter Four . The same description of the election 
of 1 932 is containe d in Encyclopedia of Newfoundland a nd 
Labrad o r, Vol . 1 (St . John's 19 8 1) , p . 717 . In an unpublishe d 
essay e xamining t his e l ection , James Thistle, in a survey o f 
ch e country's newspapers, clear l y shows the peripheral extent 
t o which t h e commission idea was an issue in the campaign , 
"The El e c tion of 1932 and the Suspens ion of Democracy ", 1990 . 
30J . Overton, "Economic Crisis and the End of Democracy : 
Pol itic s in Newfoundland During the Great Depressi o n ", 
Labour / Le Trava i l , 26 (Fall 1 9 90 ) and " Public Relief a n d 
Soc ia l Unre s in New f oundland in the 1930s : An Evaluation o f 
the I deas o f Pi ven and Clowa rd ", in G. S . Kealey, e d. , Clas s , 
Gender , and Reg ion: Es s ays i n Canadian Histor ical So c iology 
(St . J o n ' s 19 88) . 
16 
regr ettably perpetuates a numbe r of t h e hi storical mi s -
assertions enumerated above and in a ddition contains ve ry 
p roblematic internal inconsi s tencies. In h is essay on "The End 
of Democracy", Over ton states t hat in 1932 Alderdi ce had "but 
one election pledg e ,, ]l a nd again , that h e was elected on "the 
sole issue" of commission government. 32 This lS simply not 
the case and such a distortion is compounded by the statement 
that "most who appeared before the [ArnulreeJ Commission were 
asked about the form of government which they thought best for 
the country", which is also not borne out by the evidence. 
Overton's account is further weakened as he ci tes (from a 
secondary source) the erroneous numbers in favour of commis-
sion as i ndicated by Clutterbuck. 33 
Ov erton is, however, the only scholar to put William 
Coaker squarely in the picture during this period as he 
undertakes to e xplore "th e attitude of the working classes, 
labour leaders and labour's political representatives to the 
crisis of the early 1930s.,,]4 In the end though Overton seems 
to lose his way, and while crediting both Coaker and the young 
J.R. Smallwood with first proposing the commission government 
idea in the 1920s , he traces an eventual course in which the 
3l0vert on, "Economic Crisis", p. 109. 
32 Ib id., p. 91 . 
33 Ibid. , 
"Witnesses ". 
p . 114 . 
34 I b id., p . 86 . 
The secondary source lS Fenwic k , 
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Eveni ng Telegram of 1931 and the merchant pol it i ci an s of 1932 , 
in the wa k e of the violent riots of tha t Spr ing, pre side over 
a mood in which " t he anti-democ r atic sent iment which h ad been 
smouldering burs t i nt o flame . "JS Fr om this , Overton p r oceeds 
to argue, eviden t l y with o u t being mi ndful of his o rig inally 
stated purpose and the evidence he presents o f t he central 
role of "labour's leaders" , that "the national ru l ing class 
handed the re i n s of power to their British counterparts. ,, )6 
Th e re are at l east two significant problems with Over -
ton's account . First , he ultimately does not adequate ly 
address the nature of the tension between the e li tes and the 
poor and working classes. Part of the difficulty with this has 
to rest with t h e ambiguou s position Coaker straddles as a 
figu r e who was ostensibly a representative of one class, bu t 
who, by this time, near the end of his career, carried bona 
fide credentia ls of the other. A further area of confusion i s 
apparent in Overton's treatment of the riots of 1932 and the 
issue of their "class character " . In his essay on relief and 
public policy, Overton goes to some lengths to demonstrate the 
"pol i tical dimension" of un r est i n Newfo undland throughout the 
period: "Onc e the power of the organized unemployed had been 
demonstrated , those ruling the country were in constant fear 
35 Ibid., p. 109. An analy s is o f opinion in 1933 will s h ow 
that t h ere cou ld not have been a "flame" of such feeling in 
193 2. 
J6I b i d. , p . 1 2 3 . 
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that further violenc e might break out. " 37 On the one h a nd 
Overton mak es a persuasive case in illus t rating the manifest 
agency of the oppressed sectors of the population, but in his 
second essay, he emphasizes t h e role played by t h e merchants 
in the storming of the Colonial Buildi n g in April, who were in 
turn made "very uneasy" by the violence . 38 In t hi s c ri tical 
event, which led directly to the defeat of Richard Squi res and 
the election of Alderdice, it is as though he cannot resolve 
whether it was the "organized unemployed" or the merchants who 
were responsible for the unrest which laid the ground for 
further calls for commission government. 
Secondly, in Overton's view , it was the issue of provid-
ing relief wh ich became central to the growth of "anti-
democratic t h ought ". )9 In this he essentially ignores the 
perfor mance and corruption of the Squires regime and its 
attendant alienation from the people, particularly the working 
class a n d poor of St . John's who found themselves again, as 
they h ad been previously, in an opposition alliance with the 
coun try's merchant class. Furthermore, by focusing on one 
issue, he fails to take into his account of the emerging 
general crisis of the state, the critical factor of the 
370verton, "Public Relief ", p. 158 . There were at least 
fou r significant disturbances in 1932, in February, April, 
July and October. Overton's work represents the only serious 
cons ideration gi v en to these events . 
38 Ibid. , p. 112. 
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continuing failure of succeeding governme n ts , incl uding the 
second effort by Coaker as a Mi n ister witho t Portfolio fr om 
1928 to 19 32, to regu l at e the fishe ry. It is s imply not 
possible to articulat e a coher ent analy sis of the fail ur e of 
self-government, parti cularly one wh ich includes an assessment 
o f the role played by Coaker, without e x amin i n g t h is issue. 4o 
Finally, it must be pointed out that Overton's treatment 
of J.R. Smallwood represents an immense overstatement of his 
influence during this period, one which Smallwood himself 
would have been delighted to read, especially as it his own 
writing which provides the main source of material. During the 
1 920s Smallwood, notwithstanding his self-promotion, was 
barely a gadfly on the scene and alternately a sycophant to 
Coaker and Squires. In 1927 he published a brief hagiographic 
monograph of Coaker's life, notable for the typ ica l inventive 
descriptions of events with which he had no first hand know-
ledge, such as the elocution of Coaker's first ever public 
speech to a group of fishermen. 41 Overton should have simply 
4°De s pi te such problems wi th his account, Overton does 
ma k e a number of worthwhile points, including the observation 
t hat the Royal Commission "both re flected and helped shape a 
consensus ." Ibid., p. 115. This not insignificant dynamic is 
~ iscussed in Chapter Four. 
41J .R . Smallwood, Co a ker of Newfoundland, The Man Who Led 
the Deep -Sea Fishermen to Po l itical Power (St. John's 1927). 
It is interesting to note that t here is evidence Coaker sent 
Smallwood, who was in London, three hundred dollars to pay for 
a press run of 3,000 copies o f thi s work. Smallwood wrote 
Coaker pleading for him to wire money as he had a pub lisher 
who woul d tak e hi s manuscript, whi c h he would write if Coaker 
agreed , on a p r o ise of guaranteed distribution o f 2 ,000 
copies , for wh ich the F . P . U. would b e responsible. It is not 
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accepted the view he cites of Ri cha r d Gwyn , Sma l l wood's 
biographer, who observed that at the time J . R . S. was 
merely a "Squ ' res \ yes ' man and a Lib e ral party l a c k ey ." 42 
Overton does n ot pres e nt any conv incing evidence t ha t 
Smallwood had anything to do wi th the formulation of the idea 
of government by commission . He cites an ar ti cle Smallwood 
wrote in 1926 calling for a " special commission of i n te lligent 
me n" to overhaul t h e pub l ic service , but the connection of 
this to Coaker ' s idea is tenuous if not non-existen t . 43 More 
telling , Over ton includes a lengthy extract from Sma l lwood 's 
wr iting where he , again in characteristic fashion , retro -
actively se ts himself up as the prescient visionary who, as a 
candidate In the election of 1932 , told the voters of Bona -
vi s ta not to bother voting because " I guarantee you here and 
now t hat inside of two years the House of Assembly will be 
closed down, the government will be turned out, and Newfound-
land will be under a Royal Commission appointed by the King. 
I guarantee you this. ,, 44 Like much of Smallwood's writing, 
c lear in this episode exactly who was the student of the art 
of self- p romotion . Coaker papers , letter from J . R . Sma l lwood , 
30 December, 1926 . 
42R . Gwyn, Smallwood : The Unlikely Revolutionary (Toronto , 
1972) , p.98 . 
430verton , "Economic Crisis ", p . 101 . 
44 Ib id ., p . 11 1. The e xcerpt is from J.R . Smallwood , I 
Chos e Ca nada (To ron to 1 96 7 ) , p. 187. 
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this lS a study In counter-factual hi st o ry . 45 It is surp ris -
ing that Overton would accep t Smallwood ' s v ers i on of h i story 
when in another i nscance , he lS a bl e to point out that 
Smallwo od's detai led account o f a public meeting in St . John ' s 
In 1932 actually t ook plac e i n 1931 . 4 6 
In a review o f t he lit erature which add ress es t he 
politics of this period, t h e re is one other scho larly essay 
deserv i n g consideration . Rosa li e Elliot, in writing a b out the 
political scandals which destroyed the first government of 
Richard Squire s in 1923 , presents a very strong a rgument 
establi s h ing a causal relationship between these events and 
the collapse of ten y ears later. In reviewing the impact of 
the report of the Hollis Walker Royal Commission of Enquiry, 
Elliot states : "The profound sense of moral inferiority and 
i ~ept ~tude tha t was established in 1924 left little doubt in 
the minds of t h e co l ony's people tha t they were indeed unfit 
to govern themselves. ,, 47 Her clear exposition of the complex 
web of i nt rigue and corruption involving virtua lly all the 
major p o litical figures of the day, with the notable exception 
45Any reader of Smal lwood will be aware of his propensity 
to cla i m c r edi t for anything he can, particularly if there is 
no way o f c hallenging his account . In this case, it lS 
difficu l c to imagine Sma l lwood te ll ing voters on the campaign 
c~ail no t to vote. But ehen t h is was the only election h e ever 
l o se , and there lS s ome t h ing consistent in his attempt to 
claim credi t even for this , his own defeat. 
460 verton, "Economic Crisis", p. 103. 
q' R.M . Elliot , "Ne\'lfoundland Politics in the 192 0 s: The 
Gen es i s an d S ignificance o f the Hollis Wal er Enqui r y ", In 
Hiller and Neary , Ne wfo ' nd l and , p . 1 99. 
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of Coaker and the members o f the FPU, g o es a lo ng way to 
s etting the stage for what followed . 
However, i n her di scuss i o n of s u b s e quent event s r e l a t i ng 
t o the Amulree Corrunis s i on , Ell i ot s ta te s unreservedly the 
p roblematic notion l at er take n up by Neary , t h at the Com--
mi ssion'S conc lus i o ns wer e dra wn up in ~vhi tehal l . 4il ,;lh i le i n 
t he strict sense this may be true insofar as t h e u l t imate 
imprimat u r on the Amulree report was that of the Dominions 
Office , it lS a view which reduces a much rno re complicated 
p rocess to a terribly simpl i stic and even conspi ra torial 
l evel , and along the way negates the crucial input of those in 
Newfoundland who Elliot identified as experiencing a profound 
measure of co l lective self-doubt . For present purposes, it is 
e n ough t o no te that her account represents one approach to a 
central recurring issue in the literature, namely the extent 
t o which the suspension of self-government was a product of 
local o r e x ternal forces. <19 
Finally, by way of concluding a survey of the relevant 
48 Ib i d ., p. 198. 
'I!l For a view simi lar to Elliot's see S. McCorquodale, 
" Public Administration in Newfoundland During the Period of 
t h e Conun i s sion of Government: A Question of Political Develop-
ment", unpublished PhD thesis, Queen's Un iversity, 1973, CNS, 
p . 137. For an opposite view see J. Chadwick, Newfoundland: 
Isl and Int o Provi nc e (Toro n t o 1967) , p. 171. Two essays whi c h 
give an exc el l en t s umma ry of the issues on both sides of t he 
q uestion are: P . Hart , "The Breakdown of Democracy in Newf -
o undl a n d, 1 9 31-1934", u n p u blished paper (1987), eNS; L . B . 
Wh eele r , "Th e Lo s s o f Re s ponsible Self-Government and Domi n ion 
Status by Newfou ndl and, 1933-1934", unpublished paper (1967) , 
eNS . 
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wr iLin g , t he work of David Al exander must be conside red. As a 
h istorian whose research and ana ysis e xhib its a m lLi-
d iscipli n a ry strength of political economy , Alexander has 
cont ribu ted two e s s ays which , i nt er alia , reflect directly on 
the causes of t h e cr is is i n Newfoundl and in the ea r ly 
1 930 s . 50 In the first, Al e xander makes an e xplicitly d rawn 
argument t hat the collapse came as a result of ec onomi c , not 
pol it ical, factors . By reviewing the comparat i ve spendi ng 
pa tte r ns of Newfoundl and and Canada , he demonstrates that the 
dif fi culties arose not as a result of a "riot of spending" by 
co rrupt po l iticians , but rather from a h i storical l y driven 
t endency by Newfoundland t o " replicate the economi c perform-
ance of its continental neighbours" through imported develop-
ment strategies which were no t suited to a very narrow 
ec onomic base. 51 
Se condly, in examining the apparently intractable and 
chronic st ructural weaknesses of the Ne'itJfoundland economy , 
Al exander points to the failure of government initiative in 
t he fishe ries during the 1920s as a key factor whi c h produced 
a "steady march toward st agna ion and dependence", a process 
SO D. Alex ander , "Newfoundland's Tradi t ional Economy and 
Dev elopment to 934 ", in Hiller and Neary , Newfoundland, and 
"Development a nd Dependence in Newfoundland, 1880-1970", in 
E . W. Sager e t al ., eds., At l antic Canada and Confederation 
(Toronto 1983) . 
~l " ewfou dland's Traditional Ec onomy", pp. 34-35 . A 
var iation on this argument is made by R .A. Mackay in Newf -
oundland: Economic , Dipl omatic , and Stra teg ic Stud i es (Ot t a wa 
1 94 6 ) , p. 75 . For a longer historical view situating Newfo nd -
l and ' s deve lopment in relat ion to the emerging No r th American 
e c onomy , see H. Innis , The Cod Fi s h e r "es : T e Histo r y of an 
I LernaLional Economy (Toronto , 195 ) . 
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which was marked by its contrast with that o r Norway and 
Iceland . The explanation for this , he arg u e s, was : " t hat 
members of the government were not cl ear ly disting u ish ab l e 
fr om the mercant ile class which dominated the e conomy ; tha~ 
l eading politicians did no t see the industry as a growth po l e 
for the future ; and f i nally , whatever the pol it. ' cs of the 
matter, that government revenues whi ch might have been 
p loughed into the industry were already heavily commi tted to 
servicing an imposing external d ebt . "s2 There is an obvio s 
value here to a chorough assessment of the economic dimensions 
of what , after all , was essentially a decla r at i on of bankr -
uptcy , one which was large ly made nec e s s ary by Br i tain ' s 
r efusal to countenance any defaul t on debt payments . 53 But 
even A exander s eems co have been aware of an ultimat e ly 
unsat isfactory emphasis on matter s which do not account for 
che inescapable , though difficult to quantify , political 
exigencies of the day . 
In a final essay before his death , Al exander wrote a 
c halleng ing and , by his own disclaimer , inc omplete essay in 
52Al exander, "Development and Dependence ", p . 17 . For a 
fu rth er analysis of the historical weaknesses in the structure 
of Newf oundland ' s economy see R . Ommer, "What ' s ("'rong wi th 
Canadian Fish ? " in P. R . Sinclair , ed ., A Question of Surv i val 
( St . John's 1 988 ). 
53The argument tha c Newf oundland could have avoided 
bankr ptcy by pursu ing , in the patcern of other countries at 
t he t ime , inc l ud ing Br itain , a n honou rable course of default 
was firs t ma de by A. F . PI mtree in the "The Amulree Report 
( 193 3 ): Review" in the Canad i an Journal of EconomiC's and 
Poli c ical Sc ' pnce , No . 3 , 193 7 . 
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which he posed a number of ques t ions which r epr e senced a 
divergence from his previous wo rk . He ca l led for res e arch to 
be undertaken into wha t he cal l ed "the sources 0 l ow p r od -
uctivity " and at t empted to establish a relationsh 'p betwee:1 
the quality of labo r supp l y and " the a b i lity of the coun try 
t o mobilize its population to maximize its po t e ntia l . ,, 54 An 
excerpt from the concluding paragraph in which he re f lects 
again on the collapse of 1933 summarizes the purpose of his 
line of inquiry: 
The extent of illiteracy is not proof that labour 
productivity was less then it might have been, but 
it is good reason to suspect a li nkage. Far more 
i mportant, however , are its implications in terms 
of class social relations and the quality of public 
life and publ ic decision making . Wide di ff erences 
In educa ti onal skills and information between a 
governing el it e a nd the mass of the population can 
breed an unwarrant ed deference on the one hand and 
a selfish noblesse oblige on the other. It also 
b r e eds a sluggish intellectual life and an unim-
aginative debate about the goals of the society and 
how they might best be realized. Anyone who surveys 
c h e economic and political history of Newfoundland 
cannot escape the impression of a political cu lture 
which was sunk in a mediocrity which the country 
and i ts people did not need. Perhaps it was an 
inescapable adjunct of the country's small size , 
its relative youth and the conflict of loyalties 
generated for British people abroad of vicariously 
participating in the magnificence of the British 
Empire . We will not k.ow ntil some scholar pro-
duces an intellectual portrait of the country , for 
i n such a work 1 ie s more of the answers to the 
problems of Newfound l and ' s economic history than 
its economic historians a r e ever likely to sup-
54 0 . A exander , "Li teracy and Economic Deve lopmen t in 
Ni neteent h Cen t ury Newf oundland ", in Sager , Atlanti Canada , 
p . 1 1 3 . 
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ply. 5 5 
There are numero s i ssue s r ai sed in this passage, some of 
which are more content i ous than ot ers. s~ This thesis , 
wi t h out prete ding ~yching near so ambitious as an inte: -
lec t al portrait of the country , nonetheless in p r takes its 
cue from the precept offered by Alexander, and shared by 
others , S; t hat the history 0: ewfound1and , ies place and its 
55 Ibid . , p . 137 . I n a footno te to hi s remar ks on t he 
"mediocrity " of the p o l itical culture, Alex a nder at tr ibutes 
thi s as " the general message " in S . J.R . Noel. 
~OThat low literacy leve ls contributed to p olieical 
dec i e i s noc substant ' ally borne out by the evidence 
presented i n h is t hesi s , i n view of what may be desc r ibed as 
an e xt e nsive and not unsophist i cated public discourse in the 
fac e of overwhelming problems . See Chapter Four below . For a 
~urther dis c u ss i on of literacy and educational issues of the 
p eriod, see P . McCann , "Denominat i onal Education in the 
Twe ntieth Century in Newfound land ", in W. A . Me. im , ed ., The 
lexe d Ques eion: Denomi national Ed cat i on i n a Secular Age (St. 
J ohn ' s 19 8 8) . The q estion o f unwarranted deference ve rsus 
noblesse obl ige may be seen as t h e terrain for a v~gourous 
debate o n a r ange of issues concerning Newfoundland ' s politi-
cal C it re which h as fo l l owed the publication of G. Sider , 
C 1 re and Clas s in Ant h ropology and History : A Newfoundland 
Illustration (Ca bridge 19 86 ) . See particu arly S . Cad igan , 
"Battle Ha r bour in Transition: Me rchant s , Fisher en , and the 
State in the Strugg e for Relief in Labrador CaITlin nity 
During the 1930s " Labou r /Le Travail, 26 (1990) ; J. Overton , a 
review rc icle i n Amer ican nthropo , ogist 89 (1987) i and F .L . 
J ac k son , "The Marxist t1y stifi c ation of Newfoundland History" 
Newfoundland Stu ies , 6 , 2 , (1 990 ) . For an excellent essay 
which fal s outside t his deba e t no n ethe l ess offers very 
relevant case study evidence , see R. Ommer , "Merchan t Credit 
and the Infor 1a l Econ omy ", ' n Hi s orical PaDers 989 (Ot tawa 
199 0) . 
"As a veh ic l e -or constr cei .g h is su ary argument s on 
Coaker and the loss of self-gaveL menL , McDo .ald asks , not 
rhe ori cally : "And how loes one account for the very squalor 
of polit :'c 1 life in l'ewfoundland? " (To Eac h His O\vr., p . 142 ). 
Elliot adds to a nea~ cacophony which ri~ gs f rom t e pages of 
r ewfoundland ' 5 historians : '" Honest merch nc ad inis rat ions ' 
2-ed D~ ' pi in me!1 of b"s':':1ess ' res it i n only s uperfic~al 
· 27 
people , can o nl y be understood by paying much closer attention 
than has hitherco been shown in scholarly work co the inter-
pl ay of ideas and politics as they were manifest within the 
c ountry. c:, 
change where the standard of wholesale u nadulterated venal ity 
on the part of the ma y is s bstit ted by the equally repul-
sive one of wholesale nadul e r ated greed and exploitat~on on 
the par t of he fe ltl ", Hil le r a d Te a ry , eltfo ndland , p . 199 . 
~ Thi s approach is e ssent ia ly the basis for the argu e nt 
p re s e nt ed i n J . Webb , "Newfo ndl a n ' s Na t ional Convention , 
194 6-1 948 ", unpublished MA thes i s , Memorial University , 1990 , 
CNS . 
Chapter Two 
Prelude to t he Begi nning of h e End 
It is not necessary t o pos it a theory o f t he i ne vi t a -
b i l ity of Newfoundland ' s collapse as a s e l f governi n g Dominion 
t o observe from a rev iew of the p reviou s e ig, t y-year perio d , 
dating fr om the grant o f rep resentative i nst it utio s i n 1832, 
t hat certain unmistakeable pat terns of tenuo sness were 
c onstant ly gripping the country in its nascent forma ti on as a 
p olit i cal e n tity . His toricism aside , there is are. arkab l e 
c ontinui ty of crisis which moves from generation to generation 
t h rough t o the ear l y years of this century when things really 
di d begin to f a l apart . Th e Amulree report, in an ext ensive 
and surpr is ing l y de t ailed account of this history, noted 
" the r e was a lmost nanimous agreement among w ' tnesses tha t the 
present per iod of misfort une might be regarded as having 
o r' g inated " \.,! ith the defeat of Robert Bond as Prime Mi nister 
by Edward Mo rris in 19 08. 1 
otwithstanding the report 's propensity for hyperbole n 
a ttrib ting views to t h e witn esses , this remark indicated a 
cl e ar measur e of hi storical consciousness amongst the popula-
tion which provided i mport a nt dept h to a self -conscious 
ar t i culat'on of t .e problems facing the country . In a later 
sec t ion the Co l s i on submitt ed i t s own vielA! counterposed to 
the common o ne it heard : "We our selves would have bee n 
~nclined co plac e the commencemen t of this process [of 
. Amell r e e , p . 37 , 
# 
29 
de cerio rationJ at a much e arl ie r date , II and expressed ies 
s y mp a thy with t he wr iting of D.W . Prows e who , in -895 , a year 
a~t e r t he fa i l ure of Newfoundl and ' s two indigenous banki~g 
instit u t ions , o ffered n unambiguous indi c tment o f a po lieical 
s y s tem i n wh i c h "merchancs and pol i tician s o n b o th s · des hav e 
he lped to bring t he unfortunac e Colony ·nto disrepute by c he 
fi e rce ran cour and bitter p e r s onal hat e which c h arac teri s ed 
the ir par ty st r ugg l es . ,, 3 
Gertrude Gunn has argu ed that Newfoundl and ' s po i it i cal 
h i st o r y t o a t l east 1865 was marked fundament ally by f eatur es 
of i nherent wea kn ess and instability. The const ic u t ion 
grant ing a rep res e n t at ive Ass embly in 1832 , which gave wa y to 
s e lf -governme n t in 185 5 , "stemmed from consecucive c olon ial 
p o l icies ina pprop r ia te in the ir t imi ng to the place ." ; He r 
analy sis f o cus es on the overriding impac t of sectarianism as 
che dr i v ing f orce info rm i ng political behaviour and wh ich , 
f ollowing t h e events of 1861 that saw three people killed and 
20 wounded in a St . John 's riot , resulted in the adoption of 
the "d e nominational principle " as a permanent const i tuc ional 
_o nvenc ion . s Her conclusion, one whi ch ec h oes a theme o f the 
2I b id ., p . 81 . 
3D.W . Prowse , A Hi story of Newfoundland (London 1 8 95) , p . 
~ 34. 
~G.E . Gunn , The Pol iti c al Hi storv of Newfo undland 18 3 7-
18 64 , (Toron t o 19 61 ) , p . 188. 
5Fo r d e tailed acco n t s o f t h e 18 61 riot and t ' e e lents 
hat ed to it , see Prows e , Hi sto rv , pp. 488- 4..., 1 ar.d J. P . 
Greene , "The Infl ence o f Relig ion in t he Po it i c s of >ev-
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Amul ree report , was t hat t his principle , which nominally p "C 
an end to sec t ar ' an st r i fe ac tua l ly institutional ': z ed " c.he 
pervasio of sectarian politics through t he whole of public 
l ife . " I; 
It may be, as Noel sugges c. s , t hat thi s e arl y example of 
"consoc i ational democracy " c onverted the mercha t Protes tant 
eli te i nt o accep ance of c. h e "evils " of l ibera l democracy . ' 
B t if it appeared t hat responsible government had b een g ' v en 
a secu re lease, it was not long before the continui n g latent 
s elf-doubts of the coun try ' s population became wri t 1 re in 
the Co federat ion debates whi ch do inated the nex t decade . 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of this struggle , as 
Jame s Hiller has shown , was not so much the arguments in 
fa vour of jo in i ng wi th Canada , bu t the nature of the a- l i ance 
of hos e opposed . Irish Catholics , who resisted what they saw 
as a t h reat to "Home Ru le " joined with Protestan t merchants 
who did not want the competition of Canadian COlmnerce : "Thu s 
the anti-confedera t e party emerged as a strange coalition 0 
left a nd right, those espousing t he maintenance of respons ~ble 
government on principle , and those who hated respons i ble 
~ ove rnment b u t had to arg e for i ts . a' nt enance from a belief 
f ound land , 
Un ivers ity , 
185 0 - 18 61 ", 
19 70 , CNS . 
unpublished MA thesis , Memor' al 
°Ib id. , p . 185. For the later pract ice and effect of t: is 
principle , see G.O . Rothney , "The Denomi na tiona l Basi s of 
Representa ion in h e Newfoundland A semb ly , 1 919 -1 9 62 ", in 
Canaaian Journal of a d Poli tical Scie ce , 28 
(=-962) 
oel , Poli tics , p . 24 . 
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t hat conf edera t ion woul d bri ng catastrophe . ,, 9 At th i s !Tloment , 
whateve r t he nega ti ve mo t ivat ion, the co ntry would seem to 
hav e e s tab lished s ome measur e of sel f- con f i dence in pursuing 
a n i ndependent desti~y . 
Howe ver , the parameters were fragile . oel, in his s rve y 
of the thi r ty year period fa l owing from the elec tion of 1869 
a nd the defe a t of Con f edera tion , describes a syndrome whi ch 
af f i r ms t he observation made b y Prowse and which p r efig ure 
the genera l vi e w of the decline after 1908 : 
Therea fter t here was litt l e to disti nguis h one par ty from 
anot her . Part ies , in so far as they may be said to h ave 
ex' st ed at all , were mere ad hoc creat ions , canals of 
po lit i c i ans h ose association wi th one another si gn ~fied 
not i ng mo re than their common desi r e t o captur e the 
governmen t . n d each government in tu r n stood on a 
qu icksand of shift ing alliance s wi t hi n the Ass e bly , 
vhere the r e a l struggle for power took p lace . .. Elections 
gave t e people a hoice , went a popular aphor ism , 
\ between merchants and lav,ryers and lav,ryers and mer-
cha!1t s . ' ) 
Fo llowing the ban k crash of 1894 , "'/hi c h the Am ee 
r e port des c r ibed c.s hav i ng " a far-reac h i ng e ffe c t on the 
I sland ' s political economy " lO , a general mood of despondency 
was c har c terised by a new set of negot i ation s on Confede r -
a t ion an appeals to convert to a Crown Colony which were 
~J. Hiller , "Con f ede rat i o n De eated : The Newfoun land 
El ection o f 1869 " , ln Hi ~ ler a nd Nea r y , Newfoundland , p . 78 . 
aNoel , p . 25. For evidenc e which conf irms the validity of 
t h e aph o rism, see K . Ker r , " A Social Analy s is of the embe !'s 
of the House of As sembly, Executive Co nc i l and Legis lat ive 
Co nc i ' ~ 0 r 1 8 5 5 - 1 9 1 4 " , np 1 1 i s he d MA t h e sis , Mel 0 ri a 1 
Un i versity , 1 9 83 , C s . 
. rJT" ree , 9. 24 . 
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evident ly "put "'on."rard by ma ny pe rsons and the Oppos i t ion . " -
The s itua tion was ul t i mately puc in o rder by che entry of 
thre e Canadian banks, the first of wh i c h , the Ban of Nova 
Sc otia , was es tablished by none o ther han Wi lliam a'ler , 
who woul d later become t inan ia l adviser to the Alderd~c 
governme nt in 1932 b efore being appoint ed as Ne wfound land ' s 
r epresenc ative to the Amu r ee Commission . 12 Wit h che election 
in 19 0 0 o f Robe t Bond , che las t Prime Minister r e membe red 
fo ndly by the wit nesses in 19 33, the country reached a zenith , 
short-lived tho ugh it was , in its troubled process of mat ura -
ion . 
What is perh aps most interesting about Bond' s ten re , 
fr om t he perspect i ve of l at er events , is tha t it was br-cketed 
by t wo s e p a r ate and f ndamenta l challenges to the foundations 
of the co nt ry ' s emerg i ng sovereignty . The first was the 
in famo us 18 98 Re id rai way cont ract wh ich, a ccording to Noel , 
llp rowse , History , p. 534 . 
12Amul ree , p. 29 . It is wor th not ing that in 1894 Pri e 
Mini ste r A. F . Goodridge , who was in office less than a year , 
a ppea l ed to Britain for emergency assistance in the form o f a 
l oan of one million doll ars , the dispatch of a war shi p to deal 
with potential nrest , and the appointment of a Royal Commis-
sion to enqui re i nto the "whol e political a n d cOIT'LInercial 
p ositi on of t he colony ." Th is req est was followed up by h is 
succes sor , D. J . Gr een e , who in aski n g for assurance of co-
ope r ation, was told that the B itish government was prepared 
t o appoint a Co~nission i ~ req ested, b ut c ould not g aranc ee 
" t h e c o rse t h ey mi ght t ake " on receipt of its report . When 
Gr een e , who was i n office fo r a shorter time than Goodridge , 
was replac ed by William Wh iteway , the negotiations wi th 
Brit ai n Jere put on hold pending talks with Canada . See Ib "d ., 
p . 25. For f r the r de tail s on this period , see J. K. Hi ller , " ;:'. 
H ~ story of . e fo lnd and , 1874 -L 01 ", u npubl ishe PhD , C mb-
ridge , 197 1 , C S . 
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f orced a divisi on ln the country on a question of basic 
princip l e : "Whe the r the gove rnment or a private industria l 
empire was t o be the greatest power in the land . .. the anci ent 
b a tt le over r e sponsible goverrJrle nt f la red up aga · n. ,, _3 Bond' 
opposition to the deal provide the basis of a near sweep in 
the 1900 genera l e ect i on. 
El e c ed as a pat r iot dete r mined to defend the ount r y ' s 
integrity , t his became Bond ' s greatest liabi l i t y . Hi lnsis-
t ence 0 carry ing f orward the struggle for Newfoundland ' s 
ir dependence , fol lowi ng h is successful campaign ~o wi n 
pos sess ion of he Frenc h Shore in 190 4, brought h im ine o a 
protra cted confl i c t w 'th Br itain , the United St a tes and Canada 
ove r U.S . fis hing rights in Newfoundland waters . 14 In the 
end , Bond lost not o nly the immedi a te battle to the combined 
forc e s wei ghed agai ns t him , but al s o his standing ln the 
cou nt ry, wh ich was finally n dermi ned in the election of 1908 . 
Th is happened not by a clear vote against him , b ut by an 
int ervent ' o n by the Governor of the day who resolved a 
cons titutional crisis b rought on by a t ie election in favour 
of Bond ' s opponent, Edward Morris . is Thus , Bond ' s fal l from 
lJNoe l, Polit i cs , p. 28 . 
1,1 Fo r a de tailed accoun of this period , 
~hompson , The Fren ch Shore Prob lem in Newf o und and 
1961) . 
see F . F. 
(Toronto , 
15See Ib ' d ., chapt ers 4-6 . Regard i ng Morris , who had spl it 
wie h Bond over hi s "nat ional ist " fisheries policy fo~ no 
pparent reason than co position h~mself f o r an e lect·on , Ian 
McDonald' rote: "Morris ' party w s no more than a fraud , a 
veh i cle 0 be used by i ts leader s t o b uy the ir way into off i ce 
34 
g race r eflected a diminuti on i n h e scre ng t h of Newfoundland's 
a b i lity t o f unc ti on in t h e large r world , a corresponding 
we akening i n t he p op l ation ' s r eso v e to s pport a champion of 
their best in t erests , and an injud iciou s i n t erfer ence :!.n 
Ne wf oundland ' s a f fairs th r ough t he anomal o us a uthor i ty of t h e 
Crown ' s represen ta t ive . 
And s o, at the begi nni ng o f t h e century , Ne wfoJndland' s 
" s h ip of st at e " was ba t tered , b ut on the face o f it no t 
b eaten , and had weat hered a not i n subscantial arno nt of t i me . 
Howev er , it wou l d not tak e long before its carrying cap a city 
wo uld be p ut to muc h grea t er strain . Without e n teri ng in t o a 
d eta' led revievv' of t h e wel l c hronicled events whi ch c orrunenced 
wit h t h e birth of the FPU , followed by the war years and thei r 
a fc erma t h , t h e r e are a n umb er of i mportant features o f this 
peri od whi c h wa r r ant particu l ar reference in their relevance 
t o che i s s les at hand . These inclu de : the administration of 
t h e war effort , the position of the municipal government in 
the ci",y of St . John's, the polit ical orientation of the 
'wor king c- a ss, and fina l ly , Coaker ' s fishery regulations of 1919 . 
The first two issues bring i n to foc u s certain aspects 0_ 
the collect ive experien e dur i ng ch is era that would l ater 
rev e r b erac e and give voic e t o h e proposition that perh a ps 
pol ' tics , as s c h i c oul be a d i s p e n s ab l e part of p blic l ' fe . 
The admi i s tra tion o f the wa r effort w s exactly as it 
and further t heir ambi t i ons . I t r e presented co-operati on wi c h 
the Reids , and fo r the r a nk and f il e , it beca me a n e ff i i e nt 
channel fo r patronage an profit . " To Eac h Hi s Ol,vn , p . 3 . 
g e n erally is during war , t he v irtual takeover of the state by 
a mi litary imp e rative. Pat ri c ia O'Br i e n, ln a study or cne 
ewfoundland Patriotic Ass oc iation (NPA) , a nationa l body 
e stabl ished to mee toe exigencies of wa r, c races the ev01 -
ut ion of a process that s a w a v ir t ual c ol l apse of const i t u-
ti o n al au t hority . The col lus i o n be t l1'reen Edv-lard Morris and 
Governor Walcer Davids on produced a state of affairs in which 
the i r "di srega rd f o r t he const itutional convenc i ons of 
r e sponsib l e g ove r nment and the (Patriotic) Ass oc i at i o n 's 
c ont i nu i n g absenc e of l egal s a n ction did not worry a nyone as 
long a s the wa r effort enjoyed the support of t he th r ee 
pol it ical parties a n d major opinion leaders. ,, 16 
There are vari ous sub sidi ary issues here, incl udi n g t he 
excraor ~inary conduc t o f the Go vernor and the even~ al ly 
exposed r ampant pro f iceer i ng of t h e Wat er Street merchants , 
wh ich resul ted in leg is l at ion i n 1917 limiting the ability of 
t he Leg is lative Council to do their bidding. l ' There is also 
ch e crit ical exp erien c e of consc r iption and Coaker's u ni l at -
e ral cho i ce to sanc tion its int r o duc t ion over the prof ound 
o bj ect ions of his supporters, as an e x p ression of his deeply 
h e l loya l t y to the Empire . But ul timately what emerges in t h e 
fu nction of t h e NPA i s an i mprin t of a parallel p ubl i c 
a uthority , an orde ring structure Il'1h ich e x i sted ou t side and 
l'; p. O 'B r ien, "The New f o undland Patriotic Associa t io n : The 
Admi nist rati on of the Wa r Effo r t , 1914-1918", unpubli she d MA 
thes is , Memorial Unive rsi ty , 198 3 , CNS, p. 50 . 
Ibid ., p . 292 . 
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beyond the n o rmal p o l i t ical f ramework. Whac began as an 
excepti o n a l u nder t ak i ng ~n an effor o c onstruct a natio~al 
cons e nsus ami d an uncertain bas e o f popular support fo r the 
war e ventual ly became inst i t tionalized in the formacion of a 
Nationa l Governme nt i n 1917 . Par ty p o i tic s was f irst subsumed 
a n d essentially el imi nated wi t h in t h e ope rative mode of t he 
c o u n r y ' s a dm i n istration , and the n transfo r med by t h~ s i nt o a 
p ar li a me nt witho ut oppos it i on. ls These were the corner stones 
o f an i dea whose time wou l d c ome a gain , later . 
Coincident wi t h t h e war there existed in the city o f St . 
J o hn ' s a seco n d i mportant case of administrative a u t hori ty 
s ubstitut ' ng for elec t e d r epresenta t iveness . Melvin Bake r ha s 
shown how an i n t ernational movemen t for civic reform wa s given 
exp~ession in the capital Cl ,y in the form o f an appointed 
commission wh i ch governed fo r t wo years from 1914, an nde r-
c ak ' ng wh ich h a d an an t ecedent in the similar ten u r e of an 
appointed commiss i on f rom 1898 t o 1902 . 1 The commlSSl o n was 
installed as t he result of an initiative by merchants who were 
c oncer. ed about increas i ng insurance costs ow i ng t o inadequa t e 
wac er supp l y and fire pro t ection services , a nd conf us ion 
lS It is importan t to f r t her note that throughou t t hi s 
p e r iod t he re was a campaign on the part of Mo rris , the Rei d s , 
and fo r a wh i le at l e a t , willi m Coaker to pursue t he opt ion 
of Confedera t ' on , hus s i gni ~y ing the continuing lack o f 
con f i d ence in the value of e c o nt ry's independence . See 
Mc Do na l d , To Each Hi s Own , eh . 4 . 
l~M . Baker , "The Governme t of St . J o n ' s , Ne l.'l fo ' n and , 
00- 1 2 1 ", unpubl i shed P .D hesi s , Uni versi ty of western 
o tar ; o , 1980 . 
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ar ising from over l apping j r i sdiction with the Legislat re in 
se tting l ocal t ax rat es . 20 The commission was gi ve a mand-
at e, among o t her thi n gs , to p repare a c harter for approval 
wh i h woul d clar ify the leg ' slat ive basis o f m nicipal 
g overn ent . 21 
Bec a se of delays in rece i ving approval for chis charter, 
the counc il e lected in 19 1 6 o n an interim basis had to have 
its mandate extended by the legi slature a nnually un til 1920 . 
At t hi s time a sec ond comm i s sion was appoint e d t o govern t h e 
c ity while arrangement s were being made to meet the l e g isl a t -
Ive requirements for the first e lection to be held unde r the 
n ew c harte r . F rther de lays caused the r e placement of this 
commission by y e t another , following an interim period o f a 
mont h when the city was without a governing authority of any 
kin . 22 What s noteworthy about this experience IS t he 
manner in whi c h t h e process may b e seen to have populariz ed 
c e rtain notions about reconci ling representation with the need 
20The motivation was not e ntirely se l f-i nterested on the 
part o f some refo r mer s , part i cularly William Gosling , the 
pres ident o f the Board of Trade, who appeared genu i ely 
a larmed by the inab i lity of the city to address appal l ing 
c ondit ions affec ting m ch of ~ he popu aci on . He calculated the 
ci t y' s death rate in 19 1 3 a t nearly 19 per thousand , h igher 
t han the rest of the island and t h at of Glasgow and London . 
See M. Baker , "Municipa l Qe formers in S t . John ' s ", Urban 
Hi story Review, 9 (1 98 1) . 
21The A.mulree r e port c ontains fur ther analysis of t he 
probl ems c aused by I,Yea . munic ipal admi n istrat ion in Sc . 
Joh n ' s , and its complete absence outside the city , whic h it 
said contributed to "retardi n g t h e development o f a p bl ic 
s pi rit and a s ense of c ivi c responsibil i t y ." AInu r ee , p . 217 . 
'>' For a summary of these e ven t s , see "Mun i i al Governm -
ent " 1 the Enc(cooedia of Newf oundla nd n Labrador , Vol . 
2 . , pp . 64 9 -651 . 
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fo r strong administration. This 1S a theme wh i ch fo 'nd 
constant e xp ress ion in concerns abo u t che cou try as a whole 
in the decade whi ch followed , even among thos e who we re no 
advocat i g a wide r appl ication of t.he -:ommissi on f orm o f 
government. For t.hos e who we re , like Wil liam Coaker , it 1S 
qui te likely that. the e xpe rience in the c pita l s erved as a 
model to be drawn on in the struggle between politics and good 
government. 
The period of the First World War is also i mporcant 
politically for what it produced at the level of class 
relations , and 1n particular, what occurred within the 
movements of working - class mobilization . Specifically , there 
was a tremendous e xh ibition of strength on the part of the 
industrial wo rking class of St. J ohn's which, while cor-
responding with similar movements throughout the world , is in 
par t s ~gnificant because it was never connected 1n any 
meaningful way wi th Coaker and the FPU . 23 Barbara Neis , 1n 
her study of the regional basis of support for t h e FPU has 
argued t hat the fishermen ' s union was limited in i ts g rowth 
according to the conditions and wo rk processes in the indust r y 
a nd by t he opposition of the Catholic Church hierarchy . 24 In 
23For the extent of labour unrest in Canada , see G. S . 
Kealey , " 1919 : The Canadian Labour Revol t " , 1n Labour /Le 
Tr a v ail , 13 (1984) . 
24B. Neis , "A Sociological Analysis of the Factors 
Responsible for the Regional Distribution of the Fishermen ' s 
Pro tective U ion of Newfoundland" , unpublished MA thesis , 
Memorial Uni ve r sity , 1 980 , C. S . 
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re ference to St . John ' s , she adds that t he city 's worker were 
s ffering from an "overall l ow leve l of organization" c ombined 
wi th a genera l lack of identificat ion wi th wo rker s in t he 
o utports , with whom in certain instances , such as the coope rs , 
t h ey were in campet i t i on fo r wo r k. 25 
This view c onf li c ts wit h the demonstrabl y high leve l of 
mobi li zation and militancy which has been recorded by J e ssie 
Ch i sho l m in her researc h on s t rikes by wor k e rs in the c ity 
p rior to 191 4 and in her accoun t o f the formatio of the 
Longshoreman ' s Protec t ive Uni on . 26 Furthermore , it presents 
a one - sided view of the relations betwee n the FPU and both the 
Ca t holic Chu r ch and the c ity workers . Indeed, in the l it era-
t re o n Coaker the re i s no real attempt t o examine the ext en t 
to which, as lead er of t h e union , he was responsib l e for 
creat i ng ie s a lienation from those parts of the country where 
i t never took root . Although t he reactionary character of the 
Ca tho lic hierarchy i s indisputable , there has been little 
a ttenti on paid to Coaker's apparent lack of effort in overcom-
ing the opposition of the Church and his failure to appeal 
directly to Ca tho li c fishermen and t h e predominantly Catholi c 
.t5 Ibid . , pp . 67-69 . 
26J . Ch isho lm , ''' Ha ng Her Down ': Strikes in S t . ,John ' s , 
1890 - 191 4 ", unp blished paper presented to Atlantic Canada 
S t udi es Conf e r e nce , Edi nburgh , 1988 , and her "Organiz i ng on 
t h e Wat er f r ont: t he S t . John ' s Longshoremen ' s Pr o tective Un ion 
(LSPU ) , 189 0 - 191 4 " Labo r i L e Travai l , 26 (Fa ll 1990) . 
40 
working class of St . John ' s . 27 
Peter McI nnis , in hi s st' dy of the Newfoun land Indus-
tri al orkers Associa tion (NIWA ) makes the point that Coaker 
di d not endear h i sel f to workers in St . John' s by constantly 
denouncing import tariffs fo r their effec t on price s charged 
t o fishermen, 28 and f ur thermore , that Coaker ' s links t o the 
Rei d famil y during the war made him suspect in the eyes o f 
ra i lway workers who staged a massive and successfu l strike 
a gainst the Reid Newfoundland Company in 1918 . 2 - Eventually , 
27 See McDonald , To Each His Own , pp . 39-4 0 . In r esponse 
to a directive fr om the Archbishop forbidding Catholic 
fishe rmen to join the FPU , Coaker lifted the union' s oath of 
secrecy and loyalty but did nothing to maintain the support of 
f ishermen in Cathol i c communiti es like Ferryland. 
Subsequently , his dogma t i c insistence on campaigning for 
prohibit i on would re inforce the appearance o f his uni on as 
ded i cated to Protestan t ideal s . 
2D McInnis , "Newfoundland Labour and World War 1 : The 
Emergence of the Newfoundland Industrial Workers' Associat -
ion" , unpublished MA thesis , Me morial Universi t y , 1988 , CNS , 
p. 94 . For background t o the tariff i s sue and the rela t i onship 
b etwe e n the fishery and the city during t his period, see J . 
Joy, "T e Growth and Development of Trades and Manufacturing 
in St. John 's, 1870-1914" , unpublished MA thesis, Memorial 
University , 1977 , CNS , pp . 184 -187. In his speech t o the 
founding convention of the FPU in 1908 Coaker set the tone for 
his approach to the workers of St. John ' s: "We are not a 
sel f ish co bination , f or our a im is t o benefit the Country , as 
wel l as the fis h ermen , while the unions at St . John's exist t o 
secure advant ages for t hemse lves at the expense o f the f i s h 
catchers in the outports . Theirs is for self , wh ich of course 
is their right, o u rs l S a nob l e endeavour ... " in Coaker , 
Twenty Years , p . 5 
2 McInnis , "Newfoundl and Labour", p . 200 . Coa ke r ' s ties 
to the Reids arose from their efforts t o promote Con fed -
era tion , dur ing wh i ch t h ey paid considerabl e actention to 
recruiting his support. Fo r an account of the stri k e , see P . 
McInnis , "Al l So lid long the Line : the Reid New f ound land 
u t ri ke of 191 8 ", Labo r iLe Tra va il, 26 ( 1990) . 
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Coaker ' s antipat hy towards t h e interest s of the city's working 
class wo u ld have direct political c ons e quenc es as the NIWA 
s ponsored c a ndi dates in the e l ec tion o f 19 1 9 wit h the de li b e r-
at e purpose of of fering an alternati ve to the FPU as a general 
r epresentative of the co nt ry's workers . 30 It lS perhaps 
instructive in t h is context to note how Coaker dealt wit h the 
attacks of the Cat hol ic Chu rch during the firs t election 
contested by the F PU in 1913 when it formed an alli a n ce wi t h 
Bond and won nine of the ten seats where its candidaces ran . 
He went to great lengths to dissociate himself from char ges of 
"socia l istic tendencies": 
I have been ac cused of circulating socialistic papers. I 
have never subscribed for a socialistic paper, never 
circulated one, nor do I know anything of such circula-
tion. I h a v e not read a half dozen copies of Cotton ' s 
Weekly i n my life, and for four years I have not read a 
sentence contained i n s uch a paper ... The Union knows 
aDs olutely noth i g about any socialistic paper or papers , 
a nd have had no connection with the circulation of such 
p apers . 31 
This not entirely forthcoming statement was made to the 
annual FPU convention following a campaign that saw In 
addition to red-baiting of the union , the election of George 
Gr imes, a self-described social ist who was recognized as the 
res ident intellectual of the FPU and who was later active in 
ch e forma tion of the NI WA, "personifying the only discernable 
30See R . H. eu f f , "The Qu i 11 and the Hammer: The NH<JA in 
St . John 's, 1917-1925 " in M. Baker, et al. , eds ., Workingman's 
St . John ' s : Aspects of Social History i n the Early 19 00s (St . 
J ohn' s 1982 ) , p. 5 4 . 
J ~ oake r , Twenty Yea r , p . 24. 
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p iece of common ground " between the two unions . ~2 It i s 
l ikely here that Coaker ' s approach to politics was informed by 
the emphasis he p laced f r om the out set o n bu i lding the FP i n 
part as a cormne rc ial enterprise a nd of h a vi g the Union 
Tr ading Company i mb u ed vIi h " the a dop tion of bus i ness pr i n-
c i ples . ,, 33 It may be argued that one consequenc e of thi s 
strategy wa s to contribute to the effort s of other s to 
undermine the potential for radical political forma~ions in 
Newfoundland , although it is not clear that. the I W wa s 
disposed to function as such a vehicle . 34 In any eve t , it 
32Cuff, "NIWA", p . 5 1 . Grimes h ad been an activist since 
1906 and among othe r th ings was evidently responsi b le for 
inculcating the young J oe Smallwood with an interest in 
socialis t ideas . He a l s o managed to forge strong enough links 
with t h e fledgl ing Socia l ist Party of Canada to generate the 
q ite remarkab l e circulation figures f or i ts national publi -
cation , Co tton ' s Weekly, to a peak o f 2 6 0 c opies per week in 
1 9 1 3 . See Smallwood, I Ch ose Can ada , p. 7 4 and D. Frank and 
N. Rei lly , "The Emergence of t.he Socialist Movement in the 
Maritimes , 1899-1916 ", in R.J . Brym and R . J . Sacouman, eds ., 
Underde velopmen t and Social Movements in At lant i c Canada 
(Toronto 1979) 
33Coake r , Twenty Years, p . 4 . In the earlies t wr itten 
assessment of Coaker's career, John Feltham argues that t he 
decline of the FPU was ultimately an expression of the 
cont r adictions of i ts mission as Coaker focused on commercial 
activities and the members turned away from an organizat.ion 
which came to resemble a traditional mercantile outfit . See J . 
Feltham, "The Development of the F . P . U . in Ne wfoundland 19 08-
1923 ", unpublished MA thesis , Memorial Uni v e r sity , 195 9 , p . 
136 . 
J4There i s also a view that Newfoundland lacked a radical 
political b a se because t h ere was no "wave " of imil1igra nts 
bringing with t hem sociali st i deas , as elsewhere i n Nort h 
America . See B . Gil lesp ie, "Trade Uni on ism in Pre-Con f eder -
ation St . John ' s " in Ba ker, Worki ngman ' s , p . 15 . Al hough 
McInnis emphasises the militancy of the NI WA, it was generally 
careful not t o adop t. a radical political orientat ion . See f o r 
example , the ant i- revolutio a ry t ract from its newspaper i n J . 
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d i d not take l ong before t h e independ e n t entry into t he 
political field by St. J ohn's labour became co-opted i n an 
a l liance with the c ity's me r c ha nt s in t he name of c omb i ned 
opposition to the g ov e r nme nt of Ri c hard Squi res. 35 
This brings us t o Coa ker 's fishe ry regulations of 1919. 
The essential outl ine of what transpired be t we e n Nov ember of 
that year, when Coaker' s ini t iat i ve as the new fisheries 
minister was introduced only days after the election of 
Squires' government, and January 1921, when the regulations 
v'Jere wi thdrawn, is detailed elsewhere. 3 6 In short, the 
regulations were designed to achieve stability in European 
fish prices, particularly In the Italian market, by setting 
minimum prices that exporters we re obliged to follow and to 
achieve quality control by issuing licences with rules 
governing inspection and standardization. In addition a single 
government agen t, who was to take direction from an Exporters' 
Advisory Board, was appointed to negotiate the sale of all 
fish to the European markets. Within weeks the Daily News, 
which was primarily motivated by its political role as 
champion of the opposition forces, began a campaign of 
virulent denunciations of the programme and gave over its 
pages to all manner of invective directed toward Coaker in 
Harvey, "The Framework of Industrial Society," (St. John's 
1919), pamph l et, CNS. 
3 5 b' d ~., pp. 55-57. 
36See especially McDonald, To Each His Own, ch. 6 and 
Noel, Politics, pp. 14 2 -148. 
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parti c ular , who i t insisted was n a c onflict of int erest in 
his pos i tion as h ead of the union's trading c ompany . J7 
The regulations had t h e full support of the Boa r d o f 
Trade and all the ch i ef e xporters, particularly John Crosbie 
who, as Minister of Shipping in the previous governme nt led by 
Michael Cashin, had b een working to implement similar 
measure s . But there was a group of recalcitrant merchants led 
by A. E . Hickman who , during the fall trade, encouraged by the 
irrepressible A. B . Morine 3 8 and the unrelenting propaganda in 
the press, broke ranks and sold cargoes of fish on their own 
terms in defi ance of the regulations. This "sensational 
development " was hailed by the News as a decisive breakt-
hro ug h , wh ich it was, and the regulations were effectively 
s u spended by the Board of Trade u pon a recommendation of the 
Adv isory Board on January 6 . 39 Coaker was in Europe at the 
time superv ising the implementation of the scheme and was 
powerless to do anything to arrest the unravelling of his 
37 See for example, Daily News, St. John's, 8 and 9 Dec., 
1919 . Various contributors argued that the rules favoured 
l arger exporters at the expense of smaller ones and that 
Coaker was betraying fishermen by acting on behalf of the 
merchants . 
l8Morine was a figure whose shadow was a permanent fi x ture 
on the political scene, dating from h is nefarious role in the 
Re i d contract of 1898 to the fall of Monroe's government in 
19 2 8 . In a singular case of b lind coalition building that 
would come back to haunt him , Coaker resigned his Bonavista 
seat ' n 1913 to allow for the election of Morine as an FPU 
memb er in order to make use of his skills as a "brilliant 
orator ", Feltham , "FPU," p. 64. See also "Morine", in New-
foundland Encyclopedia. 
39 Dai l y Ne ws, 18 Dec. 192 0 , and 7 Jan . 1921 . 
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cherishe d undertaking. 
As suggested earlier, while this episode h as b e en 
recognized for its hi storic di sp lay of merchant my opia, i n the 
inability of the "Trade " to fo ll ow a disciplined course which 
was designed to safeguard it s own intere sts, there wa s a n oth er 
critica l result. On his return from Europe 1 t er in January 
Coaker filed a number of articles with the union's paper , the 
Evening Advocat e, in which he defended the regulations and 
d enounced the actions of Hickman and his "political clique" of 
Crosbie, Cashin and the News. 40 But he also went furt her and 
drew on the experience as an indication of the desperate state 
of politics, "where evil is deep rooted and far exceeding what 
is generally believed", leading him to signal his own disil-
lusionment and confess that he no longer had a desire "to 
remain a publ ic man . ,,41 One month later, when the House of 
Assembly had opened and Coaker had to speak to a pro forma 
withdrawal of the regu lations, he took up a theme which he had 
often invoked during the bitter struggle and pleaded for 
poli ti cs to be set aside in the national interest, lest the 
country 's independence be threatened: 
I say again it is time to place country first and party 
a ny where. The question of the country comes first and all 
oth er considerations must follow that. What I want done 
is that which is best for the country, and I will do all 
in my power to assist in bringing that about. If we 
persist in only debating while unemployment is increasing 
and fishermen are without supplies, we are hastening the 
40 Evening Advocate, St. John's, 28 Jan. 1921. 
41 rbid. , 2 9 Jan. 
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day when Con f ederation wil l be staring us in the face. 42 
Coaker's advocacy of a non-partisan a pproach to t he 
problems facing the c ount ry followe d the l ogic of his own 
experience in the Nat i onal g ove rnment and also r e vealed his 
di senchantment wit h t h e uneasy alliance he had entered in to ln 
joining f o rces wi t h Sq u i res. I n fact Coa ker's e n tire career to 
this point may b e seen to have revolved around a con t inuing 
series of attempts at coalition building in search of a 
coherent political s t rategy to a dvance the programme of the 
FPU . 4 3 Invariably, these efforts produced costs whi c h put in 
question the val u e of such alliances. An essential ambiguity 
i s also appare n t in Coaker's relations with the country's 
me rchant s whom he courted, ln part counting himself as one 
'12Proceedings of the Hous e of Assembly, 1921, p. 59. 
Coa ker insis t ed that with regard to the regulations he had 
only one regret, namely that there was no real "polt/er to 
punish" in the legislation and as it result it was rendered 
"utterly valueless", pp. 54-55. This session of the House was 
marked by a n umber of disturbances resulting from an organized 
camp aign by the unemployed of St. John's demanding work and 
relief, representing a clear level of hostility among the 
city's worke rs to the Squires government. For a description of 
h ese events, see E.R. Forbes, "Newfoundland Politics in 1921: 
A Canadian View" in Acadiensis, 4 (1975). 
43These attempts were generally initiated on a unilateral 
basis, as Coa ke r continuously sought and received from FPU 
conventions the authority to act alone on crucial political 
decisions. In advance of the decision to join forces with 
Squires i n 1919 he was given an ass urance that any move he 
made would be given full support, representing what Noel 
de scribed as "an interesting r e v ersal of internal democracy : 
t h e annual convention was to be bound by the decision of its 
leade r!", Politics., p. 142. Coaker's alliance with Squires 
was mar k ed wi th tension from the outset, owing to Squires' 
r ole in prolonging the conscription issue in 1917 with the 
d e l i berate i nt e n tion of embarrassing Coaker. See McDonald, To 
Ea ch Hi s Own, p. 71. For Coaker's s trained and ultimately 
u nhap py arrang emen t wi t h Bond, see Ibid., ch. 3. 
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among their number, while seeking thei r co- operation with t he 
regul ations. 4 4 On the one hand he was dete r e t o purs u e a 
course in both poli tics and cor~erce as an independent agent 
with a relatively clea r set of objectives . But at the same 
t ime he was tread i ng pat hs f raught with contradictions a n d the 
trappings of compromise . 
A year later, at the FPU convention of 1922 , Coaker 
openly indicated his dissatisfaction with Squires by an-
nouncing his intention to resign from politics because he was 
convinced he could e x ercise more in fluence outside the 
Execut i ve Council than in. 45 He a l so cont inued to discus s 
politics in general , and evidently with some reflection on his 
personal e x perience , described it as the vilest of business : 
"The life of a public man nowaday is one that few should envy, 
i t is as near Hell one can go without smel ling the brimst-
one . ~ 46 His plan to leave politics was, however, a temporary 
notion as he became increasingly obsessed with the promise of 
industrial diversification represented by the Humber pu l p and 
44 S0 that , for instance , in his speech to the House of 
Assembly he appealed to the common ground among knowl edgeable 
merchants on both sides and particularly to John Crosbi e, "as 
we have worked together and know each other's minds". Proc-
eeding s, 1921, p. 55 . 
45Coaker , Twenty Year s , p. 210. 
46I b id . MacDonald describes th i s period of Coaker's 
disenchantment with politics : "Political parties were increas-
ingly becoming mere aggregates of individuals who were, for 
the most part , unable to define Newfoundland 's interests , let 
alone serve them , a n d who had settled for maintaining their 
own se lf -interest ." To Eac h His Own, p. 121. 
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paper project In Corner Broo k. 47 It wa s for t h is reason he 
again contested the election of 19 2 3 with Squires a n d 
subsequently found himself in the mi ddle of a scandal whi c h 
produced perhaps t he most bizarre period yet witnessed in t h e 
political life of the country : 
Politicians of all parties engaged in a wild scramble for 
office, scarcely mov i ng outside the capital for fear of 
missing their place in the game of musical chairs. The 
scene was one of unprecedented confusion. Fac t ions 
mysteriously took shape and just as mysteriously evapora-
ted; the puzzling combinations of one day became the 
bitter feuds of the nex t, and vice versa. Party politics 
became mean i ngless; the party system, such as it was had 
evaporated. 4 8 
Between 1 July 1923 and 1 July 1924, five different 
administrations held office. When Squires was forced to resign 
by four of his senior ministers, William Warren formed a 
gove rnment that presided over the very publ ic and drawn-out 
proceedings of the Hollis Walker Enquiry, which reported in 
March 1924 with a damning indictment of criminal behaviour on 
the part of Squires and his Minister of Agriculture. 49 When 
47For background to this, see J. Hiller, "The Politics of 
Ne ws print", Acadiensis, 19 (1990). Hiller questions the view 
that Co a ker dese r ved most of the credit for the success of 
negotiations on the project and argues that Squires protected 
the financial position of the country as a guarantor, pp. 18-
19. 
48Noel, Pol itics, p. 173. 
49Squires was found to have been misappropriating funds 
for his personal benefit on a massive scale. The revelations 
showed him to be an unconscionably corrupt first minister . See 
Noel, Politics, pp. 1 67-17 0. Coaker had declined to s it i n 
Squires' c ab i net after the 19 2 3 election, but accepted a 
pos ition fr om Wa rren without Dortfolio. Coaker's continuing 
amb ival e nt relation ship with Squires took the form of a 
curious a nd untena b le defense at the F.P.U. convention l ater 
49 
Warren signalled his intention to prosecut e Sq uires and to 
extend the investigation to other Departments, h is ministry 
was brought down by an i nt rigue which Elliot has persuasive ly 
argued arose fr om an ext raordinary collusion between Squ ires 
a n d the opposition to limit t h e damage to only those so far 
implicated. SO Squires, who was out on bail when t h e Ho use was 
called , managed to induce four members of the government to 
break ranks and vote with the oppos ition on a measure of non-
confidence, with Squires himself casting the deciding vote. 51 
Warren then formed a second ministry by jettisoning Coaker and 
making his own alliance with the opposition. This at tempt soon 
fa iled and when Coaker declined an invitation to form a 
government , he recommended none other than A.E. Hickman, the 
e x p orter wh o had played the lead role in breaking his fishery 
r egulat ions . 52 Hickman led a party called "Liberal- Progressi-
in the year, wh ich revealed both the staying power of Squires' 
reputation and the lengths to which Coaker would go to protect 
the Liberal Party: " vJe all no doubt regret that so brilliant 
a l eader as Sir R.A. Squires, so young in years, so clever and 
r esourceful should by the wheels of the gods have to resign 
the premiership under such circumstances." Coaker, Twentv 
Years , p. 223. 
SO Ell iot, "Newfoundl a n d Pol i tics", pp. 190 -19 4. 
SlNoel, Politics, p. 170 . 
52McDonald argues that Coaker refused to assume the post 
o f Prime Minister on this and two other occasions, in 1923 and 
1 932 (in both instances following an ignominious defeat of 
Squires) , because of his pre-occupation with the commercial 
act ivities of the FPU, To Each His Own, p. 141. Coaker's 
support for Hic kman can probably be e xplained in part by a 
p ersonal relationship owing to the employment of Coaker's 
dau gh t er , Camilla, at Hic kman's firm. See Coaker papers, 
l etter from A. E . Hi c kman , 12 May 1921. 
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ve to in a campaign agains t a party wh ich had come together 
around Wa l ter Monroe and called itself "Liber al-Conser vati-
ve" .53 The election gave the appearance of p a rty l ines being 
hopelessly confused, as in p art they were , but in Monroe's 
singular focus on the evi l s of "Coakerism", at a time when 
Coaker was not a candidate, there was a fairly clear indica-
t ion of the winning party's basic disposition . 54 
Monroe's election returned the country to a point where 
political conflict could be seen to reflect genuine ideo-
logical and class divisions. It would not take long for these 
to become clearly mani f est. But in the meantime, there had 
been a relentless series of assaults on the integrity of the 
political system and the character of most of those who 
participated in it. The resulting disillusionment among the 
population needed only an articulate expression of what most 
people must have known to be true: the institutiona l fo unda-
tions of the country's public life were weak, vulnerable to 
53Noel describes Monroe's group, notwithstanding its 
moniker, as "a true merchant party of the nineteenth century 
type", Politics, p. 176. Monroe was a businessman wi th no 
p revious political involvement, which under the circumstances 
was his strongest asset. There was by this time a well-
developed history of us i ng party labels In a less than 
transparent way. The previous designation for the merchant 
party was "Liberal-Labour -Progressive" (reflecting the 
"alliance" wi th St. John's labour) in the 1 923 campaign 
agains t Squires; t h e "Liberal-Progressive" party was original-
ly the anti-Liberal merchant coalition of 1919, which included 
Hickman as a candidate. See Encyclopedia, pp. 710-714. 
54McDonald notes that Monroe was not disposed favourably 
toward the trappings of responsible government and had called 
in 1923 for reversion to Crown Co lony status. See unpublished 
PhD thesis, p. 326; the footnote in McDonald's monograph is 
incomplete. 
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a buse and for some time had not been demonstrably capable of 
meeting the country's promise as a s elf -respecting and 
confident community. 
Chapte r Three 
A Count r y on t h e Course of an Idea 
In Sep tember 924 , as part of a programme initiated by 
Co ake r for the re-or~anizacion of the FPU , the unioD ' s weekly 
paper , now ca lled The Fisherman' s Advocat e , move d its oper-
at ions f rom S t . John ' s 0 Po r t Un ion , t he home of the Trading 
Company and site of the ann al convention s . l In a nnohncing its 
ne w mi ss ion , t he paper promis ed it would henceforth be "free-
lance" a d not tied to any government . Its move fr om the 
capi tal was n e c e ssary owing to what it said were do [tinat ing 
inf uences whi c h " t o uch almost every hem of the political 
g a rment , whethe r government or opposition , and the t ruth is 
often half to l d or absol u tely concealed because t h e whe e ls 
with ' n wheels opera t ing in St . John's are powerfu l enough t o 
coae almos t a ny c rime wi t h sugar ." 2 Whi Ie the FPU was go i ng 
through a g e neral re - orientation , including the adjustmer't o f 
hav ing i ts MHAs back in opposition and its president out of 
pol i tic s and f ocus ing on comrnerc ial act i vi ties, Coaker was 
onc e aga ' n being 1 r ed back into an active role in the 
p o l iti cal game. He was prepar ing to contest a by-elect io_ 1. 
hi s o ld seat of Bonavist a wh ich had b een won by Monroe in t e 
;J . H. Scammell , an FPU MHA, became editor of the aper . 
See Coaker , Ci r c u l ars , 2 0 Sept. 1924 . Coaker ' s ef f orts to 
rege nerate F [j s tren th e vol ved over a three year per iod , 
endi ng with the appo intme nt of Sc ammell as h is s u cces s o r as 
president i n Febr ary 1926 . See Coaker , Twenty Year s pp . 22 1 -
2 43 ; also IcDonald , To Each His Own , pp . 120 - 123. 
A vocate , S Sept. 1924 . 
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g e n eral election and wh i ch t h e Prime Minister had now co re-
contest , accordi ng to t h e l aw respect ing o ffices of emolume .t 
held by me b e r s o f the Executive Council . ! 
Coake r ' s decisio to r n i n thi s by -e lection , which led 
to t he only e lectoral defeat of his career , stands as a 
notable eve n t in thac it represents a c ase ~here his pers o nal 
mo ral c onvict ions seriously i n te r fer ed wi th h is political 
j dgeme t . I c s c l ear from an a ppeal made by Hi ckman to 
~ecruie h im a s a candidate , and from Coaker ' s own analys i s 
after the e vent , t hat his pr' ma r y mot ivation was to ca pa ign 
a ga ins t - he Monro e g ove rnme nt ' s swift initia t ive ~ repeal ing 
Prohibit ion . ; Coake r's determination to invest in a n issue 
whi ch hardly r epresented a serious challenge to t he n ew 
go e rnment shows both the e xt e n t of his deeply held re lig io s 
views and his wi ll ingness to bring these to a traditional mix 
]E ICY l opedia , Vol . I, p . 714 . The regulation was 
repealed i n 1928 . Bonavista had been the main cent re of 
ag itation of t he Un ited Fi shermen's Movement , an outfit set up 
o op~ ose the FPU a n d Coaker . See McDonald , To Each His Own , 
p. 12 0 . 
. 1Coaker papers, letter from A.E. Hickman , 8 Oct . 1 924 . 
Hic an emp hasized the support that would be for t hcoming from 
the Met hodists if he were to focus on Prohibition , a n d 
promised co make a pl e dge to work for the repeal of ~onroe ' s 
leg i s a i o . Af t er the ca pa ign , Coaker engaged a publi c war 
of wo rds wi t h Me hod ' st Ie ders , w 0 h e de nounced for n ot 
de l' ver ing support t o h is campaign , which he said was lau ched 
aft er cons l : at ion wi t h em and pr i or to d ec'ding whethe r h e 
sho uld r n . See A v ocat e , 12 De c . 1 92 4 . After the elect~o , 
che Advocat e e stimated that 700 o f 800 Catholic votes in t h e 
is tr ict \~lent to Mo r oe as "party polit ics t ri umphe d m/er the 
temperance principle . " Ibid . , 31 Oct . I e i dn ' t ac '. owledg e 
chat the Cat olics were no pr y to t e no r al _e rvour t at 
went v i th he ce_ .per nce campa ign . 
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wi t h s ectar ian po l itics . It might al so be observed that in 
thi s instanc e it was as though , despit e h i s professed view of 
the decli n e of p r i cipl e in public life , Coaker was unable to 
r esist the call of partisanship himself . In this he was likely 
al so dr i ven by a sense of obligat i on to e n sure a semblance of 
debate b y prov idi ng a voice of opposition ~o the Pr i me 
Mi n is ter , even '[:; 1L it mean t s t andi ng vir tual ly alone on an 
is s u e whic h had o t herwis e gener at ed an "overwhelming consen su -
S II . 5 
I n 1 2 5 t here was a second by -e lection , or r a ther t h e 
absence of one , wh ich became a focus of attent ion for Coaker 
a nd which wou l d provide an essential context for his spee ch to 
t he FPU conve nt ion i n the f a l l , where he introduc e d the 
proposal : or gove r nment by commis s ion. Early 1n August , A. E . 
Hick an , as leader of t h e opposition , led a delega tion to see 
Gover nor Willi a , .. ll ardyce to present a petition requ e s ting 
hi s inter v ent ion to fill a vacancy which had existed f or six 
months i n the district of St . John ' s East . The governor 
responded accor ding to advice given him by Monroe ' s cabinet 
an forwa r ded a letter to Hi c kman out lini ng the constit u ional 
i mpl icat ions o f t h e req uest and advis ing t hat he had no 
aut hority to ac , as such respons ibil ity r e sted entirely with 
the gov e rnme n t . " Notwi hst an i n g the public l y issued statem-
5See No e l , Politic s , p . 1 80 . 
. See Governor f s Correspond ence f 1 25. emo ra dum from 
Commi~tee of Counci f 7 Aug . Thi s seven p ge memo s t e thaL 
:: he Cabi. et assuned full responsibil i t y Eor t h delay 1n 
calling t:le by-e_ection and .Lefute the oppo sitio .. c laim of a . 
onus co ct by the governor wi th referen e to t he definit i on 
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ent s , it wou ld appear t he gove rnment was isplaying an 
i nordina t e sensitivity to t he backlash i t had e ngende r e with 
an i ncome tax refo r that had been transpar ently designed t o 
b e n e f it merch a nts , incl ding the Prime Minis ter nd other 
member s of hi s ca b i .et , at the expe se of the general popula t -
i o n . The resignation f rom the government r anks over this ~ ssue 
by Pet er Cashin p rov i ded the opposition wi th an obvious 
ta rget , one wh i c h woul onl y g row larger as the government 
r ef us ed to call t he by -e l ect ion . ? Th e Advocate, wh ich was t h e 
country' s only oppositi o n papers , seized on the issue 0 delay 
and commenced a c a mpaign of virulent hostility directed toward 
the governor. The paper also focused its attack on A. B . Mo rine 
who , as the g overnment leader in the upper house and a , ember 
of t he cabinet , \vas publ icly explaining the govern. ent ' s 
of t h e governor 's role in the Consolidated Stat u tes (3rd 
Seri es, Ch . 4 , Sec. 4) . Th e statutes, according t o p r ecedents 
c ited going bac k to 1903, were interpreted to mean that the 
governor cou ld only ac t as governor-in - council . The memo also 
lis t ed o t he r reas ons more spurious, such a s the six month 
period ' a v ing expired before the petition , the need for a new 
voters i st to i ncl ude women a s a result of the government ' s 
rec e n t l y pa ss d s u ffrage bill , and the costs and general 
dis r ption such an n de rtaki ng wou d i nv olve. 
7Cash in , who ha d inh e r i t e d the sea t of Ferryland fro m his 
fat h e r Yli c ha e l, and was t erefore a naturally influen i al 
f igure , vvou l h ave drawn sign i fi cant attention to his action 
by acc sing Mo n r oe of havi ng e n a ted "class legislacion of the 
r a nke s t k ind ." See Noe l, Po l i tics , p . 182 . 
8Since ~ ts move t o Port Un ion , the paper was c~aiming it 
oad i ncreased i ts subscri pc ion list by " thousands " and t h at it 
IN'as "wit 0 t o u b t che o st la r ge y circu lated paper in t h e 
country ". Advocate , 8 ay 1925 . Coa ker had said h is goa l in 
movi ::he paper was [0 inc ease i s ci r cu lat i on 0 the 
previous high of 8 , 000 . Twe v Year s , p. 229 . 
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position and accordi ngly drawi ng attention to himself. ~ The 
governor was ac us ed of driving a nai l into " the loyal 
feel ing " of t he people toward the Crown , and it was said that 
h is ac ti ons wou ld give sustenance to a "spreading" f ee ling in 
f avour of annexation wit h the United States . The teno r of 
editor ial commen t ary c ontained more than the usual flair fo r 
overstatement : 
We eel sure that thou sands of the people , who are sick 
and isgusted wi th the farce of governments t hat has 
e xi st ed d uri ng the past twenty years , and who f ind e ach 
pa r y secu r ing powe r tu r ning out much worse than their 
p r edecessors , will view with alarm and indignat ion the 
act ion of the Governor , in proclaiming himsel f as the 
tool of the To ry party , the butchers of our const itu ion, 
and the upholder of an alien imposte r in his USl r ped 
posit ion a s a dict ato r of Newfoundland . The gove r nor must 
be recalled . He no longer possesses the confidence of all 
the peop l e of this country . He h as become a part of the 
To ry ma c .. ine , and there are men in this co~nt ry who will 
die b efo r e t amely submitting to such gnominy and 
out rage . I O 
Thi s passage reads like it was wr itten by Coaker , 
parti cularly in that it was the first public demand for the 
governor to be re-called , and idea he would soon champion. I n 
addi tion , the description of people ' s "disgust " wi th parties 
go ing from bad to worse was a t h eme Coaker wou ld beg in t o 
invoke regu larly. As the A v oca te continued to d e ve lop its 
campa ign a gainst the governor , it returned to the curious and 
unsubstanti ated SI ggest ion t hat suppor t fo r annexation was 
~ S ee Morine ' s exp la at i on , Eve n ing Te l egram, 8. g . 1 925 . 
· dvocate , 14 Aug. 1 92 5 . The "alien impost er " is a 
reference to Morine , who was originally from Nova S o tia. 
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growing as a resu lt of the governor' s refusal to take action . 
It warned that if a p lebiscite were to be ta en, support Eor 
joining wit h the U.S . "would exc eed t wo t hirds of the vo tes 
a st. ,, 1. The notion of annexatio may have in this case 
exis ted as a spec ' fic res lt of f r strat ion with the limita -
ti ons of Brit i sh parliamen tary institut ions , but it also 
stands a s an e xp r ession of a nascent search for a lternatives 
to t he exis ting po l it ical order and an indication of at least 
some measurab le interest in exploring all possibilit ie s . 
An East End Electors Committee was formed to mobi l ize o n 
the is sue in t h e city , and soo n organi zed a public meeting and 
demons trat ion which was described as "one of the largest and 
most representative ever witnessed in St . John's . " 12 A 
pa r ade wa s held wh ich , after being prevented entry to t he 
governor 's residence "marched around the town to the accom -
pan i ment of t hree bands , wi t h s kyrockets a nd f irevwrk s of 
every description ." Th is was followed by a n address from Sir 
Mi chael Cashin wh o , a lt ho gh reti red from politics , Coaker 
believed would like l y be the opposition candidate . lJ In a 
l ette r sent to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affa irs 
seeki ng guidance o n the iss e , Allardyce said that the c rowd 
had near l y been inci ted to vio l ence by Cashin 's speech , wh i c h 
-: I bid ., 11 Sep t. 19 25 . The no tion of annexation may have 
b een a re su lt i n th i s c ase 0 frus tration with the limitat io . . s 
of British pa rliame n ary r ule , bu t it also stands as an 
e xp ress ion o f a nascent search for alt ernatives to the 
existing order of things . 
. , :bid. , 22 Oct . 1925. 
-l See oaker , 'T'w'entv Years , p . 368. 
58 
he q uo ted : "If c h o se pre s e nt ha d the spiri o f che i r fore-
fat her s t h e ga te s wo I d have been pounded down and the re would 
have bee n a wr e c k at Governme n t House. " 14 
The morning after the parade a ~eti t ion was pre s en ed co 
t h e governo r wit h 6 , 000 n mes o Al lar dy ce d i d h is best to 
a ssure t h e deput a t i on tha t he had no wish t o a c t "o the r t han 
I n a const i t ti ona l way " and suggested they g i ve f ur ther 
c o n side r a t ion to t he matter and to his position . is Du r i ng t e 
f o l lowing weeks the governor requested but did not receive 
f rther d irect i o n from t h e government , and wrote again 0 t h e 
s e cretary of St a t e , t hi s t i me requesting advice on wh e the r he 
s h o u l d f i l e an action a gainst the Advocate for li be l . He 
i n d ' c at ed that senior ministers such as Cros b ie were urg ing 
h i t o do s o a nd that he had received the support of the Prime 
in i sce r s h o I d h e wi sh to proceed . But despite what he c al l ed 
a campa' g n of "sc rr ility and abuse , " he felt i t wou l d be 
d if f i c ult to obtain a conviction from a local j u ry in view o f 
he fai l u _e of the prosec tion against Squi res in the wake of 
the Ho l l i s Walker enqui r y . Th e a rgument in favour of such a 
ac c ion wa s the benefit to be derived ln "cleansing t he 
po itical and p bl i c life of the Colony . ,, 16 The Secretary of 
Sta t e r eplied t hat i t wa s p to the governor whether to 
';Gove r nor ' s Correspon ence , 1925 , le t ter to L . S . i\Inery , 
7 De c. 1 25 . 
' :;' Ib ' le ct er 0 Co lon ial Secretary , 23 Oct. 1 9 2 5 . 
. . b ~ d ., et er t o L . S . Amery, 7 De c . 9 25 . 
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p r oceed , but he should not g o forward without "definite and 
fo rma l advice f rom Minist ers t o do S O. ,, : 7 No such act~o _ ', ao:> 
taken , but s u c h considerations as these i ndicate tha t a very 
r eal political conflict was i n process . 
It was in fact this campaig n aga ' nst the g overnor which 
p rovided the most recognizable feat r e of Coake r ' s speech in 
November to t he annual meeting of t h e FPU and wh-=- c , unl ' ke 
his d rama t ic call for a commiss ion form of gove r nme n t , c arried 
i rrunedi ate r es o nanc e a ong h i s upport ers. As we shal _ s ee , t he 
co~missi on idea wa s not someth i ng easily p resenced and 
received i n the usual rou ti n e manner in which the president ' s 
proposa ls were normally e nd orsed . It was, howeve r , not 
incons i s tent with the at tac s against the governor , a nd 
t oget he r bo t h iss es repre s e nt ed a general cal ing into 
question of cons t i t ut ional precepts . In his speech Coaker 
returned to t he issue of the g overnor 's role a n m, er of 
t i mes, dur ing wh ich he introduced a new element in tr .e 
form of a nominee to replace Allardyce . He said he had bee 
"pressed by scores of correspondents to make the s e lection of 
a governor a live is sue and petiti on the Home Govern e nt to 
a ppoinc S' r Robert. Bo .d the nex: gov e r nor ." 18 He wen t o n to 
off er a genera l r hetor ic 1 "" arning co his listeners: " I f this 
is not done t h e re can be no protection in fut re for u l ic 
r ights and p rivi leg es from g overno rs , and i n defence o f t e 
I-Ibi d ., l ette r :: rom L. e ry , 12 Feb . 1 92 6. 
- Coa ker , T lent \( Year::. , p . 23 
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rights won near l y ninety years ago by the Fathers of Re spon -
sible Government . " Interesting l y , Coak er saw no con t radi c ion 
b etween his p roposa l fo r a commi s s ion gove rnment and tho se 
r ights and priv i l e ges o f r espons ible government wh ich h e he l 
to be sacrosanct. 
Coaker immediate l y f oll owed up on his c ommitmen t to ma k e 
t h e re-call of t he governo r and the appointment of Bond a 
"l i ve is s e ", b ut he was determined to put his own mark on 
such a campaign . In the next edition of the Advocate, which 
c ontained a tex t o f his speech , he published a letter to the 
paper's readers and attached a form which was designed as a 
ba l lot con t ai n ing three q estions. The first asked whether the 
g overnor should b e recalled by the Ki n g , the second whether 
t he Ki n g h ould be asked to appoint Sir Robert Bond as the 
n e x t governor , and the third was: "Are you prepared to support 
c andidat e s pledged to pass a law to have the country ' s public 
affairs administered for ten years by an elected commission as 
ou tlined in my recent address to the FPU convention? ,, 19 The 
i n congruity between the first two and the third question is 
apparent in Coaker ' s description of these issues in his 
accompany ing letter as "matters of lively importance ", on 
whi ch he was seeki ng guidance . Except for Coaker's c onvenie-
n ce , it is impossible to see how the question o n commission , 
wh ich ha no previous publ ic airing, could be taken as a 
19 dvo cate , 4 De c . 19 2 5 . 
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"lively " issue . 2o I n addition, Coaker des c ribe d t he p r oposed 
measures as designed to give the people "a greater cont ro l and 
vo ice in the governme nt of the country . " Th i s may h ve been 
f airly at tributed to the firs two q e st ions , but it lS not ac 
all clear t hat the app lication of the t h ird would have me t the 
test of such a descripti on . 
Coaker was in fact launching a tendentious init iative 
behind a n already rather dubious campaign in which constitu-
t ional au t hor i t y was put in ques t ion by a weak a rgument 
concerning the position o f the governor . There is not much 
doubt that he and his colleagues successfully generated a 
hos tile sentiment against the office of the Crown ' s repres -
entative 21 , but this was in large measure fuelled by a 
c lassic par tisan att ack based on a legitimate gr i evance about 
the by-e lec tion delay . It is important in this context to note 
t hat alongside Coaker ' s questionnaire , the paper ran two 
edi toria l s , one in reference to the three questions and 
20 In his speech , a ft er introducing the idea, Coaker later 
r eturned to it by way of saying that "some are enquiring " as 
to who might be best to serve on suc h a commission government , 
which indicated he must ha ve had some preliminary discussion 
a mong his FPU colleagues before going pUblic . He then ou tli n e d 
a list of 18 potential candidates who, if e lected , "would 
constitute the strongest Executive in the history of the 
country. " The list included Bond , Squires , Cashin , and other 
mostly prominent Liberal figures , none of whom could be 
di scoun t ed by Coaker ' s restriction of not being in office at 
the time . 
21 t is worth mentioning the irony of Coaker ' s involvement 
i n this campaign , in view of h is proud record of service to 
t h e Empire , parti cu larly on the c onscription question , for 
wh i ch he wa s kn ight ed in 1923 . 
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another rev iewing the FPU conventi on . Ne i ther e n d o r sed , nor 
even addressed direc t ly , the commission i d ea . In the f irst , 
the edito rial dealt only with t he governor , a n d said peop l e 
were questioning the va lue of t h e office as t h ey we re sa -
t isfied he had bro e n t h e l a w and h ad become a "too l" of 
Morine. On the convention, t h e editorial obliquely s ug gested 
Coaker h ad presented proposals on "far-reaching s ubj ects" 
which had been received enthusiastically and were c o n sidered 
"eas i ly adj us table to present day requi rements ." Th s, hi s 
speech had "given a lead to thinking men." 22 This was in 
contrast to a specific report that resolutions on the gover-
nor's re-call and the appo i n tment of Bond were carri ed 
unanimously . 
In its next edition , the Advocate reported on the first 
r esul t s of what it called "our referendum" and in response to 
these, began to flesh out the commission idea, putting forward 
a number of qualifications and e xpressing reservations about 
its practicability. All replies received, with one exception, 
had been in favour t o all three questions. An editoria l 
e xplained that a commission was an a lternative that would 
li kely have to be faced in four or five years and only then 
because it wou ld be preferabl e to "Government by Downing St. 
or Government as a province 0 f Canada. " 23 In a second e di to r-
i a l the paper c a l led Coaker's proposal a warning which had 
22Ad v o c at e , 4 Dec. 1925 . 
?3 Ibid ., 11 Dec . 1925 . 
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r endered "a signal servi ce" if it had done nothi ng more than 
c o set people th in i ng. 24 It admitted t hat not e very one would 
" see eye t o eye w ' th Sir Will iam ", and cautioned that his 
views represented op inions a nd not "positive dogmas". Su ch a 
tentative review in a paper which otherwise stood fast by 
eve rything Coaker said a nd did, represents both the extent to 
which Coaker was staki ng out ground entirely on hi s own and 
t he rel u ctance of h is colleagues to follow what was seen and 
understood to be a radical course. In a final note the paper 
insisted that Coaker was "actuated by the highest motives" and 
concl uded with an observation that carried remarkable prescie-
nce : " If his views are not at all times feasible and his plans 
c a pable of practical application, he at least supplies the 
futur e arc h i tect with the essential and basic idea of the n ew 
struct u r e." This is precisely what would transpire with the 
i ssui ng o f the Amulree report eight years later. 
In the meantime, the letters were starting to pour in. In 
i ts nex t edition, the paper report ed that hundreds of forms 
were bei n g rece i ved da ily and that the "greatest surprise" was 
the support for t he third question . 25 This was taken as 
e v idence that people seemed to have been thinking seriously 
a b out "some alternative form of State management other t han 
that of the Party", and one of the reasons for this had to be 
24There appears to have been no not ic e g i ven to Coaker's 
convention speech at t h e time by either the Da ily News o r the 
Evening Te legram , the count ry's t wo pro-gove r nme n t dailies . 
25Advocate ., 18 Dec . 1925. 
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t hat they were "staggered" by having A.B. Mo r i ne di ctating t h e 
policy of the country. It also noted that it was "not pleasa-
n t" to observe t h e amount o f disrespec t toward t h e governor, 
bu t this could als o b e e xpl ai ned by t h e "nauseating aspect" o f 
h is conduct being l ed by Mo rine's advice. In a series of 
col umns which cont i nued ove r the next two mont h s, the paper 
published sample letters which contained a variety of 
approaches a nd points of view toward the three questions. In 
general these tended to represent a kind of a u tomatic affirm-
ative on all three, in deference to the request of the 
p resident, but without demonstrating a high degree of commit-
ment to or understanding of the specific proposition of 
c ommi s sion government. This reflected a basic ambiguity and 
t he essential problematic of a programme which, while advocat-
ing the abolition of party pol itics, was at the same time 
characte r ised by partisan invective and repeated call s, by 
both Coaker and the Advocate, for the defeat of t h e government 
and its replacement at the next e l ection by the Libera l Party. 
Such inheren t tensions were illustrated i n Coaker's New 
Year's message when h e rejected appea l s that he re-enter 
p o litics to lead the Liberal party, and instead called f or a 
united opposition to defeat Mo nroe with a p l edge to establish 
a c ommission form of government. 26 This would have ob l iga t ed 
t h e new government to immediate l y call another e l ection, o n e 
whic h , according to the proposal, would be organized along 
26Ibi d ., 2 4 Dec. 1925. 
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denominational lines. In effect t h i s wou l d replace p arty 
politics with sectarian representation. Both the met h od o f 
elect ing the commis s ioners and t h e constitut i o nal bas i s of 
such an election represented t wo of the greatest "practical" 
p roblems previously refe rred to by t h e ~dvocate wh ich would 
return to haunt Coaker in 1 933. 
On this occasion Coaker also explicitly reinf o rced the 
view of his prescription as a warning: "The day is not far 
distant when the country will be forced to decide, probably 
with its back to the wall, whether it will be governed by a 
commission elected by the people, by the nominees of the 
British gove r nment governing as a Crown Colony, or as a 
pove r t y-stricken, Godforsaken province of Canada." In this he 
wa s no t only accurately anticipating the prospects that would 
be confronted by the Amulree Commission, but was also setting 
In motion an irrevocable process of delimiting the options and 
defining in advance his pre-disposed preference. If history 
was about to close in, Coaker was determined to try and give 
it shape rather than have the country molded by inexorable 
c ircumstance. The Advo c at e , in contrast, took a more optimis-
t ic view, one which more clearly reflected partisan object-
i ves, as it saw: "a day not far distant when once again 
Liberal principles wil l ru l e In government, (and) Liberal 
insti t u t ions (will be) safe from Tory marauders. 27 The 
d ifficulty of rec o n ciling in®ediate political goals with more 
27 I bi d . 
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fund amenta l reform was apparent in ma ny of the publ ished 
s ubmiss ions respo n di n g to the questionnaire . One such e x amp l e 
was i n a letter from "Observer " in Eas t port who had given t h e 
proposal for a commission government "much c onsideration " and 
came to the conclusi on that the government was "a bunch of 
bluffers and should be banished ". 28 For many of the corre -
sponden ts this clearly did not mean the banishment of party 
politics per se , as in the view of one from Trin ity who 
e xpressed agreement with the pres ident and took this to mean 
t hat "Liberals like Bond, Coaker and Hickman should replace 
Monroe. ,,2 9 Others seemed to suppor t the commission on the 
e xpectation t hat Bond or Coaker would lead it .30 Some did, 
however, address the proposa l on its own t e r ms, such as in one 
of the f irst letters printed where the writer (from Port 
Union) said he was struck by the idea, as he had conc l uded 
"for some t ime p ast that some drast ic change from our present 
system of government is necessary. ,, 31 Another, from Corner 
Brook, suggested that ten years would be too long and that 
maybe a commi ssion vJOuld not be necessary if Coaker would 
return and lead a government that "could and would do what a 
c ommissi on would do. ,, 32 
28 Ibid. , 8 Jan. 192 6 . 
29 Ibid. , 22 Jan. 1926 
30Ibid. , 1 8 Dec. 1925; 26 Feb. 1926. 
31Ibid., 18 Dec . 1925. 
32Ibid. 
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Many of the letters complained t hat more c op ies of t he 
Advoc at e were not available i n their communiti es, o r said that 
in lieu of this they were wr iting on behalf of others. On the 
8th of January, barely one month after the pUblication of the 
questionnaire, the paper reported it had received "about 
3, 000" replies, and again, on the 22nd of January, s tat ed that 
f orms were still pouring in. If this can be taken at face 
value, even with some allowance for e x aggeration, it indicates 
that Coaker had indeed succeeded in creating a "live issue", 
but exactly the nature of what had been brought to life is not 
entirely clear. 3] He had planted a proverbial seed amid an 
already blossoming constitutional conflict and used a partisan 
c ampaign as a vehicle to set people thinking about an idea, 
one which, as he had predicted, would only emerge full blown 
when the country found its back to the wall. 
There is little doubt that whatever the extent of 
informed support for Coaker's commission proposal, there was 
an immediate impact from the effort to foment opposition to 
Monroe's government. As the pressure continued to have a writ 
i ssued for the overdue by-election, Coaker himself refrained 
from promoting the commission idea beyond his original 
33 I n his letter to the readers of 4 December, Coaker 
stated the circulation of the Advoca t e vIas now "over five 
thousand", which would indicate an e x tremely high rate of 
return on the forms and either an unusually attentive and 
l oyal r e aders h ip base, or much exaggeration in the paper's 
c o un ting. In any case, the tone of many of the letters 
suggested there was a good deal of discussion in many communi-
t ies. 
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intervention a nd pushed for mobil iz ing other poli ti cal 
e nergies. Following the publica t ion of his questionn aire, he 
approached the East End co~mittee on the by -elect ion issue 
wi t h an o ffer to co-ordinate a petit i on campaign in the rest 
o f the country o ut s ide St. J ohn's. 34 He proceeded with this 
undertaking by a ppea l ing to local FPU councils to prepare for 
the possibi lity of a general election by circulating petit ions 
f o r the re-call of the governor and the appointment of Bond as 
a means of maintaining a high level of "po litical i n teres-· 
t . ,, 35 That he di d not mention the commission issue indicates 
that it would likely hav e got in the way of a more straight-
forward appeal to partisan instincts, which as events would 
s how, were moving forward on a number of fronts. 
In December he had received a report from Ken Brown, at 
t he time an FPU MHA from Grand Fa lls , who informed him of a 
conversation he h ad recently had with Peter Cashin, who was 
n ow si tti ng as an independent member. 36 Cashin indicated that 
J4 Coaker papers, letter from E.R. Chafe, 23 Jan. 1926. 
)SCi rcular l et ters, 6 Jan. 1926. In February Coaker 
appoi nt ed Scamme ll , a sitting MHA, to succeed him as president 
o f the union, even though at the fall convention where he was 
given a mandate to select his rep lacement, he insisted the 
person who followed him should not be in active politics. As 
part o f this process, it was agreed Coaker would retain 
contro l of the union's political affairs. See Advocate, 12 
Feb . 19 26 . 
36Br own, who was labour leader in Grand Falls, was 
recrui t ed by Coake r broaden the FPU's base of support and to 
st rengthen i ts caucus in the House . See McDonald, To Each His 
Own, p. 123. He would la ter run with Alderdice in 1932 a nd 
b ecome the country 's fi rs t Labour Minister. 
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he did not like the idea of a commission r unni ng t h e country, 
but on the other hand was "apparent l y right ou t fo r a Squi res-
c oaker-Cashin comb ination" as the means to defeat Monroe . )7 
The formation of exactly such a coalition would indeed 
eventually provide the basis for a successful assault on the 
government, but it would take some time before t hi s could be 
put in place. The first cracks appeared in the form of an open 
cleavage created in the spring by the resignations of no less 
t han five members of the government, including Gordon Bradley, 
who would figure prominently in the events of 1933 as leader 
of the Liberal opposition. 38 The coming together of the 
coalition r eferred to by Cashin occurred as consequence of the 
death of his father, the intended candidate for the by-
elec tion which still had not been called. 
Upon the death of the senior Cashin, Coaker, after pub-
lishing a warm tribute to his old enemy, evidently made 
ov ertures to Peter inquiring as to his political intent-
ions . 39 Cashin responded by e xpressing a keen interest as a 
"young public man" in taking advantage of any advice Coake r 
37Coaker papers, letter from K. Brown, 8 Dec. 1925. 
38For the resignations, see Noel , Politics, p. 183. The 
Advocate (28 Ma y 1926) attributed the development to hostility 
felt toward Morine by Bradley and C.E. Russell who were as ked 
by Monroe to resign if they would not co-operate. They obliged 
and were followed by the three others, leaving the government 
In a precarious position of requiring the support of an 
independent member to survive. A maj or i ty was barely made 
secure by the defection of an opposition member who took 
Brad l ey' s pl ace in Cabinet. 
39 For the eulogy , see Advocate, 3 Sept. 1926 . 
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had to o f f e r in view of a p o l itical atmo s phere which nece s si-
tated "th e vari o us chi efs" giving care f u l consideration to 
t h eir re s pect ive po si t ion s. 'ID Sh o rt ly after t his, Cashi n 
wrote a second time c. o complain about the impr e ssion he was 
getting of the app r o ach b e ing tak e n by Liberal leade r Hickma n 
in preparing for two imminent by-elections o u t side St. John's 
a nd his l ack of comm itment in pressing the issue of St. John's 
East. el l These pre liminary exchanges were taken further 
s everal months l ater as Cashi n responded to an enquiry from 
Coaker about "political rumours" of attempts by Monroe to 
c onstruct a coalition government out of his precarious 
position in t h e House. He confirmed there was "plotting" 
u n derway to dump Monroe and intrigues being planned by various 
players to attempt a coalition with che opposition. 42 Cashin 
fe lt neces sary to assure Coaker that he would never be 
p a r t y to suc h manoeuvre s : "The Standard Manufacturing Company 
could not manufacture sufficient soap to wash me clean if I 
again become associated with them." Cashin was continuing his 
dialog u e wi th Coaker whi Ie giving the appearance 0 f being 
4°Coaker papers, letter from P. Cashin, 6 Sept. 1926. 
Ca sh i n wrote to thank Coaker profusely for his sympathy and 
t h e pub l i cation of his tr ibu t e, a n d to ask for assistance in 
arrangi ng the p urc h ase of a property for his mother. Cashin 
al so reveals that he was t h e writer behind the pseudonym "Toby 
B." wh ich had been appearing for a n umber of months on the 
front p a g e of the Advocate providing re l entless and merciless 
attacks on t h e government. 
4lIbid., letter f r om P. Cashi n, 20 Sept. 1925. 
,1· Coake r papers , etter fr om P. Cas hi n, 4 Jan. 1 927 . 
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d isinter e sted in the ongoing permutati o n s a r ound h i m. 
Wh en the two by -elections outside the cap i ta l were h e ld 
i n November, returni ng one governme n t and o n e opposit ion 
member , the resu lc s p rovided t h e on l y point of r e fe ren ce for 
Coaker's commi ssion idea s i nce early 'n 192 6 . The Advoca t e, i n 
comment i ng on a lQ1.'1 vot er turnout, observed that peop le were 
si c k of party gove rnment and wou l d vote two to one in favour 
of government by c ommission for a per iod of eight or ten years 
as " t h e on l y hope of sane adminis tration of public 
affairs. " J At the e nd of the year , Coaker' s annual message 
contained no mention of commission , emphasizing the need for 
f is hery reform and p redicting Monroe was likely to "smash " in 
the spr i ng, resu l t ing in a big Libera l victory . 44 The year-
end e d i t or ial re-stated the view that people were sick of 
Monroe and "all gove rnments in general ", but did not refer to 
c ommi s sion . 45 In January the Advocate returned to this theme 
in a reflection on "the country ' s position ", and stated that 
"political l y , the people are in a wilderness." It said the 
co un t ry w s without a government , e x cept in name, and referre d 
to "wild men " outside the government , acting as "clowns of the 
lowest ca l ibre " in dictating policy . 46 
The plotting which Cashin had described to Coaker soon 
became t h e subject of open speculation which, if accounts in 
4 ~Advocate , 26 November 1926 . 
,; <lI bi d . , 3 1 Dec . 19 2 6. 
~5I bi d . 
bi d ., 2 _ Jan . 1 927 . 
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the Adv ocate were correct , represented a bizarre t w ' st on the 
commissi on idea as t h e g overnment appeared to borroltJ f rom it 
in a n actempt to save it s own l ife . The paper accus ed Monroe 
of planning to appoint a Royal Commission to "overhaul t h e 
general c onditi on of t he colony 's affairs and to give them an 
un limited period to do their work. ,, 47 A month l ater , details 
of a strange series of events were published, giv ing evidence 
of Monroe's attempts to entice members of the opposition to 
jo in wi th the government in forming something that would 
resemble t h e at ional administration o f the war years. 48 The 
Advoca te was t hen in the curious position of having to 
denounce what it called "persistent talk" of government by 
commission indulged in by members of the government, without 
a k ing any dist i nction between such scheming and the idea it 
had been trumpeting . Subsequently , any discussion of commis-
sion was d ispensed with as the by-election was finally called 
in St. John 's East and the government suffered a major defeat 
in what had been one of its strongholds . 49 This was of course 
heralded as a return to Liberalism . 
The Advocate remained silent on t he issue of commission 
4 Feb . 1927 . 
48Ibid . , 4 and 11 March 1927 . H. M. Mosdell, recently 
elected in For t 'ne Bay, indicated in a statement that a round 
of "con sul t a t ions" took place, ostensibly under Monroe's 
g u ida nce , but wh i ch showed that he was not in control of t h e 
manoeuvres and that t here were again members on his side 
at tempti g t o hav e h im overt h rown . 
. \ -Ib . d. , 20 Ap r i 1 192 7 . 
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until the end o f t h e year when it ran an edit o r i al o n "De mo -
c racy " 1n which it reviewed an address on t h e top ic by S ir 
Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary d u r ing the war. In 
an inconclusive a n d r at he r amb i valent s ummary of h is remar ,. s 
c oncerning the ne ed t o defend democratic instit t io n s , t h e 
editoria l noted that t he efficacy of such ins t i t tions was 
b eing questioned b o th at home and abroad, and in referring to 
i ts own campaign for commission, suggested the friends o f 
d emocrac y could t ake much solace in Grey's views. 50 The same 
g enera l tone carried over into the paper's review of the FPU 
convent ion, in which no ment ion was made of any need for 
constitutional changes, but rather the people were said to be 
anx ious for an opportunity at the next election "to efface 
pol itical hypocrisy fr om their midst. ,, 51 I t emphasized 
f ishery r eform and the need for governments to follow the 
wishes of the people in order for the whole "system of 
gove rnment not to be subverted." This would ensure that the 
c o u n try would not be forced to "strike her flag as a self-
supporting, progressive Comr1l.omvea l th." 
It would appear tha t the re was no longer a deliberate 
campaign to promote the commission idea simply because 
partisan imperatives we r e once a gain ascendant as Coaker 
conc entrated on che re-organization of the Liberal party and 
the r e - e ntry onto the scene of Richard Squires. The fi rst 
" 0 t · d l.2.L . , 2 Dec . 
9 De c . 
1927 . 
1 927 . 
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public indication of this work seemed to appear ou t of nowh e r e 
when Sq 'res emerged t o dis sociate the Liberal par ty from a 
movement by the government to open tal k s wi th Canada on 
Confederation. 52 In a publ ished etter to this effect , h e 
signed himself as Liberal eader and in so doing made a 
fro nta l assault on HicJ<-.man. 53 When the House of Assembly 
opened in May , nine members of the oppos i tion , including seven 
n ionis t s , with William Half yard , the senior FPU member as 
their spokesman , announced they had forme d a n e w Liberal party 
wi th Squires as their leader. 511 Peter Cashin was not a member 
of this group and e xplained that h i s non - a l i gnment was because 
"local political parties are so much n onsense . . . There lS not 
a member of this House who has not been on either side at one 
t ime or another, who has not been ei ther Liberal or Tory ." 55 
This of course was not entirely true , a s the elected FPU 
members generally remained in their place and as such cons ti-
tu ted the only real and lasting coherent p o liti c al formation 
over a long period . 56 And notwithstanding the disclaimer, 
52 J . R . Smallwood takes credi t for bringing Squ i res and 
Coaker together . He a lleges that while he was in London he 
a rranged for Coaker to meet with Helena Squires who would act 
as an intermediary in getting the two men together . There is 
no corroboration for this. I Chose Canada , p . 166 . 
53Advocate , 17 March 1928 . 
S4 Proceedin gs , 1928, p . 10 . 
55 b ' d 
.L.L ., p . 15 . 
56 hi s fact is emphasized by McDonald . While the politi c al 
vision of the FPU may have at times lacked clarity for a 
number of reasons , not the least of which was the overbear ing 
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Cashin was clearly a part of the mov e against Hic kma n and the 
a ccompanying formation of that formidab l e comb i na tion he had 
s ought t h ree years ear l ier. 
The Libera l s were not the on l y group re-orga ni z i n g i n 
a nticipation of a general e l ecti on. In July Monroe resigned 
and turned ove r the o ff ice of Prime Minister to his cous in and 
business partner , Frederick Alderdice who, li ke Monroe in 
19 24, came in to of f ice as a merchan t without any pol itical 
experience. 57 Both men were born in Ireland. 58 The election 
in Octobe r saw the return of Coaker alongside the victor ious 
Squi res , as once a ga in the FPU brought its s t rength to the aid 
o f the Liberal par ty, which In any e vent was poi sed for 
v ictory because o f t h e deep antipathy toward Monroe' s govern-
ment . 59 There was no discussion o f commis s ion during this 
campa ' gn as Coaker was determined to make another actempt to 
refo r m t he fishery and in this context was focus ed on a dvanc -
ing the Liberal cause in traditional union ist terms: "The 
experience o f t he past four years has convi nced every fair 
pres e nce o f 
dragged in to 
swi tch ing , 
i ts leader , 
the common 
the 
and 
elected members were 
unsavoury practice of 
5~ See Noel , Poli tics , p . 184 . 
58Neary , Ne wfoundland , p . 13 . 
rarely 
party 
59Noel states that Coaker and Squires ran separate 
campaign s with the un ionists running under the FPU name and 
the al liance n derplayed . Thi s may have been so f or Squires 
who did o t want t o invi te an at tack on the bogeyman o f " Coa -
k erisITl ", bu t Coake r clearly ran with an appeal to voters to 
r ally around " the Li beral b a nner unfurled by the candidat es in 
every d is crict ." Advo c t e , 1 2 Oc t . 1 928. 
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mi nded man and woma n t h a t Tory ru l e is c l ass rule . " ~G 
Perhaps the mos t in t e rest i n g fea t ure of the r e- b o rn 
alliance b e tween Coake r and Squ i re s i s t h e r a p idity wi th wh ~ ch 
i t fel apart a ! che c onseq u e nt re t urn by Co ake r t o h ° s 
p -blic dis avowa l o f t he system of party g overnment . There were 
a number of fac t ors c on tr i b u ti ng to t h i s process . Wi thin 
mon ths of taking o ff ice as a Minister without por c folio , 
Coaker wrote to the FPU co ncil s and expressed his concern 
about the dec lini ng strength of the union and parti c ipation 
a mong its members . oJ He was especial l y distressed by what he 
s aw as a "spir i t of self-seeking and self-interest " overtak ing 
the p rinc iples o f co - operation and unity . And in a reveal ing 
passage , he confessed alarm at what he found upon re-ent ering 
t h e government as a Minister : 
tl° I b i d . , 12 Oct . 1928 . It is s ignificant that Coaker 
men t i ons women voters here , fo r this was the f irst general 
election in wh i c h women had a limited franchise . During the 
campaO gn he h eld a public meeting in Bonavista with "about 300 
l ady voters" present , which the Advocate described as " t h e 
first women ' s pol itical meeting held in Newfoundland by a 
candi d a e to consider the issues of a general election ." 24 
Oct . 1928. In his tenu re during Squires' first regime , Coaker 
fa iled to follow through on a commit ment ma d e t o wome n on the 
i s sue o f su ffr a ge . See T . Bi shop , "Newfou d land ' s Struggle f or 
t h e Wome n ' s Fr anch i se" , un publ i shed p ape r , 1980 (CNS) , p . 1 2 . 
He o n l y consi d ered women ' s vot ing a pos it ive th ing ins o far as 
[ h e examp l e in England had s h own women as a "safeguar d " 
a ai ns t inst b ility beca s e they "had no use for the red flag " 
a nd would work for "mo r al uplifting ", e s pecia lly in the 
camp aign against spiri t s . Twe nty Year s , p . 277 . The hist o ry o f 
women' s s u f fr age r epr esents a major g a p in the literature . Th e 
o n ly sou r c e ot h er t han 8° s hop ' s b r ie f account i s an unsigned 
a r tic le in Smal lwo od , The Book of Newfoundland, Vol .1 (1 9 37) , 
p . 2 0 1. 
<Circu l ar , 1 5 Feb . 1 2 9 . 
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I am s h oc ked a t the spi r it which is c omi ng over our 
peopl e. Eve ryo ne is af t er a g overnment job . Me mbers tell 
me they are del g ed with appli c a t ions for jobs of one 
sort or anothe r . I have about 150 applications fo r j obs 
my sel f . Whe n we f oughc the elect i on las t Fall we fought 
it on a fi shery policy, and better and brighter indus-
tr ial and social conditions ' n t he co ntry genera lly . We 
bel i eved t hat \t.J e won our e leccion on th t platform . 
Ap parently i t was not so , fo r no everyone writes f or 
jobs and f avours. Few , if any , ever write their member 
about a fis hery p o licy o r indus t ri al deve lopment or ask 
i n what wa y and when we in ten d maki g a move to i mp rove 
o ndition s . 0 o n e writes u s on such pub l ic issues as 
c h e s e. Gre at i ssues s eem to have b een submerged beneath 
the self-seeking that is e v erywher e so prevalent . 
If Coa ker was h o cked by the self-interest of his own 
s ppor ters , he could hard l y have been impressed with the game 
of polit ic s as it con t inu ed t o be played, in and o ut side of 
parliame nt . I n April t h e Advocate offered another i ... its 
p e riodic ref lections on politics , again without any r eference 
t o t h e c omm ission idea , in wh ich it considered the politi c a l 
scene and asked : "Is eve rybody a hyp ocrite? Are all our pu blic 
men hypocrit es or simply politicians , or what?,, 62 The paper 
s gge sted the c o u n try's progress was cursed by politics and 
pol i t ica l cons idera t ions , part icularly when it came to the 
fi shery , and called for the opposition and merchants to 
d ispense wit h their partisan activities and get on wi t h 
"patr iotic a ct ion by all t h ose qua li fied by experi ence ." It 
was during t h ' s period t hat Coaker wa s consu lting once a ga i n 
ir.Ji th '0 a ter St . to prep are a new progra mme for the grading a nd 
e xport o f f ish , which woul d b e presen ted i n legislative form 
Advocace , 5 pri l 1 2 . 
78 
i n 19 30 . '; ~ In .... he s umme r of 1 9 29 increasing unemployment , 
par t 'cula rly i n s t . John ' s , b e c a me a fo c u s of co cern as the 
Advoc a t e urged t he government t o b e care ful in its app r oach so 
a s no t to "sadd le " the who l e country with the b urden of 
providing reli e- fo r the ci t y ' s wor . ers . 54 
The comb ined effect of these mac ters brought Co a ker to a 
r e newed d espond e ncy by the end of the year when he rev ' ewed 
the s i ua ' o n f a c ing the c o unt ry, and in referenc e to hi s 
a ddr ess o f 19 2 5 a n d t h e p r oposal for commission g o vernment , 
wrot e t h a t he was "more convinced than ever of the S O l nd ess 
of my c o n tent ion . ,, 65 He adrni t ted he did not know whet her the 
c ountry ""10 Id "tolerate s ch a change " but thought the p eople 
s houl b e gi ven an opportunity to say yes or no . He comp ained 
of the se rain poli ticians were under to respond to "self-
ine e re t " and t h e con stant demands being made on the treasury 
f rom a 1 sides , a ld concluded t hat the "necessary changes to 
63 Fo r acco .ts of Coaker ' s efforts at reform duri ng t h is 
period, see Coaker , Past , Presen t and Future (St . John's 
1 932) , npaginated , ch . 10 ; also Peport of t h e Commiss io 
E quiry I nve s tigating the Sea f isheries of Newfoundland 
Labrado r o ther than t ' ,e Seal p i s he ry (19 37). 
j) 4Advocare , 1 J ' n e 19 2 9 . T e government appoin ed a 
commis s io .. wh ich reported in the fall and recommended a 
va r iety of schemes for winte r work, concentrating on arrange -
ment s to s end un employed men f rom St . John's to work a t wood-
c ut ti ng in Grand Fall s a nd Corne r Brook . Ibid ., 20 Dec . 1929 . 
"SJbi d . , 27 De c . 19 2 9. I n r e erring to his earlier ~peech , 
he revi sed the n umb e r s on the propc~ ed cornn1ission . He s a id he 
had advocat ed the e l ection of s i x 11t:::. , ItJhich was actual l y down 
by t hre e f r om the o r igi nal . Al t hough h e wa s assuming only me n 
o d b e e l e c t ed , he bega n these r emarks b y suggesti n g t ha t 
"care m st be exerc ise by the wo men voters and an effort to 
ge t bac r to po l itical sanity ma d e t h r o ugh the i r e ffort~ . " 
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pol itical sani ty" co Id not be brought about.. nder the 
exi sting syst em of elect ing par ty governments , "be they 
Libera l o r To ry o r Labour ." He ended on a note that would be 
sounded again and again through 1 933 and 'n t he pages of the 
Amu lree report when he observed t hat there was a till e when 
pol iticians who offered money to voter s would " estroy t he 
t emper political l y , b ut t oday the bribing politician is the 
most sought af ter and the mos t popular for a peri od. " 
On t h is occasion , Coaker's comments were taken up by b o th 
the Daily Ne ws and the Evenina Telegram , the count ry ' s two 
n ti-Liberal papers , as a s'gnificant statement deserving of 
r esponse . The Te l egram described the New Year's message as 
"Coaker ' s Faith Destroyed" and noted that he "had abandoned 
the lase vestige of hope " that the country could administer 
ts own a r fairs . 66 The paper gave credit for Coaker's "fran-
Kness a courage " in leaving himself open to charges of 
" in fide l ity to his own colleagues ." It said that whil e h is 
c riticism of party government reflected on the administration 
o f which h e 'v'Jas a part and was , therefore , "extraordinary ", 
hi s views were "very much to the point ." It added: 
Not a few are begi nn ing to wonder whether it is not 
act 'ally t h e case t a we have ceased to show o urselves 
c apab le o f m nag' ng ou r m,m af fa irs , a.Ld whether it would 
noc be a wi se plan , e ven t ho ugh it would be a humiliat ing 
admissi on of incapaci ty, to ask f or the suspension of ou r 
const' t ut io n, and for t h e appointmen t of a commi ' on 
with power to admi nister the affa ir s of the Colony n e il 
such time as po l itical sanity had been restored . 
Eve inq ~eleqram , 2 Jan . 1930. 
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Th is e xpres s ion of sympa thy f o r Coaker' s proposal on t:he one 
hand i ndicates the s uccess of his p r omo t ional effort over a 
per iod of seve ra l years. But in escribing t he commission as 
appoin ted and not elected , the editorial illustrates chat the 
i dea was misunde rstood and mi sre presented on what for Coa er 
at least were crit i ca l and d e f ining te rms , e xposing f rther 
what may be seen to be its inherent conceptual problems . 
The Da i l y Ne s , in contrast , showed no sympathy wha s o -
e ver and u s ed the occas i on to launch a broadside against both 
Coaker and t he government. It said Coaker was e vidently 
" t ormented by a pricking conscience " and described the 
proposal as calling for "a sort of dictatorship - of which he 
wo ld, o f course, li k e to be a part . ,, 67 The paper c harged 
chat Coaker did not be l ieve what he said about one party being 
no becter than another (which was probably true) and accused 
him of at tempt ing to hide his own cowardice in not being 
fo rthcoming abou mat ters "that would shake the administration 
t o its very foundations ." Coaker's "utterances "could not be 
s incere or taken seriou s l y, i t argued , when he was fai ing in 
hi s own re sponsibili t ies i n rarely attending Cabinet meetings 
and "had not been In the city a dozen times " in the past 
y ear . 68 The New w s t hu demonstrating , as it always h ad, 
S'Daily News , 2 Ja . 1 30. 
6 Coaker h trave lled I n t h e Spring to Jamaica for his 
second v isit ther e . He was r re ly heard from 1n House o f 
Ass e mbly deba es hroughouc thi s te r m. See Proceed i gs , 1929 
through to 1932 . 
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the finer points of partisan r ealiti e s and l n doing so 
confi rmed the ri s s Coaker ran in speaking openly fr o m what 
wa s clear ly an nte abl e p o s ition to take as a iniste r . 
Throughout 1 3D , Coaker's responsibili ti es r evolved 
around the perennial ttempt at fisheri es reform . By the end 
of t he year , his exper ience caused him , not witho ut some 
a pparent e xasperat ion owing t o twenty years figh ing on the 
is sue , to believe t hat the l egislation he presented L the 
spring woul d be success f ul ln establishing the necessary 
"machi n ery " . '1" ' ~ nlS explai n s hi s cont inuing presence in the 
g overnmen ranks . But it did nothing to affect his overall 
view , be ause, as he s aw it, "a system to standardize salt 
f ish a n d regu l ate its export 1S more , in my opinion , h an 
Par ty or Party government. ,, 09 He went on to reflect on his 
c omment s of a year earlier , which he noted had "caused 
c onside rabl e conv ersation , especially amo ng politicians ", and 
s aid that now being one year older , he was "more convinced 
than ever " that his proposal was in the best interest of the 
coun try. The News resp onded to Coaker ' s message by suggesting 
that i t d~ffered materially from that of the previous year by 
f ocu ing on ~ he fishery and described the conten t as "an 
a dmiss' on of h' s own i mpotence . ,, "70 The paper was essent ially 
c orrect i observing that if t h e government wa s not proceed'ng 
apace, Coaker s hould as ser t h ' mself , but was unable to becau se 
'- 'Advocate , 2 6 Dec . 1 930 . 
Dailv News , 3 Jan . 1 9" 1. 
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of the political cons equence s of do ing s o. Coaker was clearly 
r evis iting a b in' fr om h i s batt le of ten years earl er wi _h 
t he expo r ters . And t he i ssues we r e ex c ly the same , a s he 
struggl e to devise rules with a form of self - regulat ' on t hat 
al l wo d agree o. I the face of op osi tion fr om West Coast 
expor ters who carried influence with Squ ires s a membe r 
r eprese. ti ng Corner Brook , h e proposed e xempt io s for non-
parti c ipants , wh ich only served to undermine the purpose of 
any s u c h legis la ti on . L 
Meanwhile , i n the spr i ng of 1931 , oppositi on was being 
mobi li zed aga i nst the government as St. John ' s mercha nts 
is s u ed a ca l l fo r a Royal Commiss ion to address the co nt ry ' s 
growing f inanc ial p roblems . As the depre s sion deepened , a 
co llapse in f ish Lr ices combi n ed with dramatic increases In 
rel i ef e xpendi t r es to c reate an ever-expanding deficit on 
c u r rent account . The government was fa cing an immediate crisis 
in both meeting interest payments on outstanding loans and 
negot'a ting new credit a rrangement s . 72 As a means of s t ress -
i ng the urg e ncy o f the times , and in an apparent attempt to 
re - open the discuss ion on options the count ry might have to 
consider , the Advocate repr inced the texc of Coaker ' s 1925 
! ~for a de tail e d r ev iew of the fishery issues as Coa-er 
saw t he , see A e , 22 Ma y 1931 . 
, See :-Joel , Pol i ic s , p. 188 and the rev iew o f h is p e riod 
in Arnulree , p p . 51-53 . For an ac co nt of a publi c meetin held 
by the ~erchants , 1 May 1931. 
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speech . -~ I t wa s at this time , in accordance with str~ngent 
condit ions laid out by the banks, tha the g overnmen t launched 
a syst emat ic attempt to cut exp e n i t ure , and Coaker assu ed 
t h e dut ies of directin retrenchment . 7,; 
According t o t he Advocate , Coa ke r was app ly ing a knife 
"assiduously " in the i nteres t of "nat ional stabil ity and 
advancement ", for w ich the country wou l d be for e ve r grate-
ful. 75 Th is was accompanied by an editorial with a h istor ical 
r eview o f the propensity by successive governments for 
o verspen d i ng wh ich cri t icised the two Squires reg imes as "not 
one whit less b l ame less than the Tory administrations prece -
di ng ." It followed this in a subsequent edition with a promis e 
that wh en t h e next election came , it would c a mpaign for men of 
merit a~ d not party ." To It said Coaker would no t stand at the 
next elect ion and wou d not be connected with any party . This 
wa s apparently because both Liberal and Tory parties had men 
in their rank s who "should never again presume to seek public 
s upport ." 
The most significant event in the fal l of 1931 would 
appear to have occurred in England , where pa r ty politics were 
suspe ed t o rna e way for Ramsay MacDonald ' s National Governm-
" Advocat e , 3 J uly 19 ':'~ . 
~4 For the cond itions l aid down by t h e banking syndicate , 
s e Noe l , Pol it ic s , p p . 1 90-19:". 
"' Advocate, 3 Jul y 19 31 . 
. Ib id ., 14 
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ent. This had an immediate impact In Newfo ndland as it 
p rovided a model for dealing with an intractable fi nancial 
c r isis , Be fore long Squi res was reported to be making over -
tu res t o the oppos i ion , as a result of a free and given him 
by members of his government . 1 The j\.dvocate now appealed for 
a "coun try firs t " po l icy and for ch e opposicion to f orget 
"self and party " and to "shoulder their portion of p ublic 
responsibility . ,, 7 Such advice was not likely to be heeded , 
pa rtie lar ly when it carried the familiar ring of simi~ar 
c ircumstances when t he opposition was unsuccessfully making 
t he same a ppeals in t he dying days of the Monroe gover.ment. 
Calls for the formation of a national government were now 
bein g alternated with a return to the issue of comm i ssion 
g overnme nt as Advocate editorials insisted the people were 
"fed up with the game of politics " and predicted "if a true 
a n d t ried leader" appeared on the scene advocating placing che 
coun try in the hands of "small commission for ten years " , he 
wou ld svJeep t h e country , 79 In December the paper reported 
that " the people " were discussing the commission idea and 1n 
r esponse to requests from "several correspondents " , i t 
presented a detailed outline of h ow the proposal would work 1 
77 Ibid. , 30 Oct . 1931. 
7B b' d LL" 6 Nov. 1931. 
7gIb'd. , 6 i\Jov. 1931. See also Ibid . 20 Nov . A co l mnist 
1n the paper," Zeus " , cl a imed t hat "thou sands of people ch e 
count r y over read wit h delight " the appeal for co i ssion and 
escribe a "mani es enthu siasm " for the idea , par ti cu l r l y 
i f Coake r were to be its leader . Ibid . , 27 Nov . 1 3 1 . 
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wh ich it re-s t a t ed t h e essent ial features as put forward by 
Coaker . 80 It also i n t roduced the sugg e st' on that a national 
government s hould be c onsidered as a mean s of ex t en di ng t he 
exist ing par l i amen to prepare a law for the s uspensi on of che 
E ections Act a nd to sponsor an e l ect ion of s i x c ommiss ione r s . 
I t further expressed t he vi ew that Con federation was not an 
option 'nl ess terms were "ext remely generous " and suggested 
t hat th is was not l ikely bec ause Canada had turned down a n 
o ffer o f the purchase of Labrador . 
The fi nancia l posi tion of the country continued t o worsen 
a s anot her dead l ine for loan repayment fell due a .. d the 
government was forced to accept an ultimatum from the banks 
wh ich p laced e xt raordinary restrictions on policy making , 
amount ing to a vi rtual rece' v ership . 81 The se condi t ions had 
a direc t impac on the gove rnment ' s abi 1 i ty to respond to 
growi ng dema nds f o r work and relief . In February the House of 
Assembly opened with a speech by Peter Cashin , the Fi nance 
Min i s ter who had res igned thr ee day s earl ier , in which he 
accused the Prime Minister of falsify ing minutes of Cabinet to 
conceal fees he had been paying himself out of public fund s, 
i ncl ding an ann al sum o f $5 , 000 from the War Reparations 
Cornmiss~on . S 2 One week l at er Sq i res was assau lt ed at his 
80 Ib id ., 4 Dec . 1931 . It e mphasized that Coaker '.v'oul d not 
be i nvo~ved as a leader or otherwise . 
= ~See o el , Politics , f or he conditions , pp . 193 - 1 96 . 
- Pro ceed i as , 1 93 2 , pp . 20-24 . 
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o ffice by a gro p of s e v eral hundred unemployed workers 
o r ganized as a se l f-sty l ed Citi zens ' Corrunittee. ~·: On 5 of 
April a massi ve para de which h ad proceeded to the House of 
ssemb ly to present - pe tition demand ing a fu l l enquiry i nt o 
Cashin ' s allega tion b oke into an all oue riot as Squire s and 
oc her membe rs of his government b a rely e scaped s er ' ous 
in jury . ;!' For Squires t h e "game " was over . It would not be 
l ong before it end ed for al l the country ' s politician s . 
The ri o t a n d civi l unrest ln the Spring of 1932 repre -
sented, among other things , a continuing capaci e y for 
v igourous political mobilization , particularly ln the capital 
ci ty , in the face of popular disillusionment and aliena ion . 
Sometime s, as i n the parade of 1925 demanding the issue of a 
by -e lec tion wr't , the grievances were nar row and partisan. On 
other oc ca s ions , as ln the demonstrations of unemployed 
wo r ke rs :n 1921 , o r the railway strike of 1918 , 85 the motiv-
aeion was more broadly political and direct ed toward achieving 
basic goa l s of socia l justice . In 1932 a long tradition of 
p ro test reached a cl' ma x which can only be seen to have s uited 
e .e g rav ity of both the charges against Squires , who was now 
" ~ Advocate , 12 a nd 1 9 Feb . 1932 . It was reported that 
Sq uires was struck "by di f ferent members of t h e mob at least 
twelve times", and that he bled considerably . 
":b i d" 8 Apr il 1 932. The Evening Telegram estimated the 
crowd at eighe t o ten t hou s a nd peop l e , which if true wo ,l d 
have r epr e en ted abo ut a q a rter o f the population of St . 
John ' s , 6 April 1932 ; see Census of ewfoundland and Labrador 
(1 93 5 ) . One of e mo t i n te r esting a c c ounts of t h e se even t s 
i s c on tai ne 1. W.J. Bro ,m e, Eigh tv Fou r Years a Newfou .. d-
l ander (5 John ' s 1981 ), pp . 19 5- 200 . 
·' See Chapter two for d is u s ion of these e v ent s . 
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b eing c h a sed fr o m office a second time, and t e materia l 
c ondition s of t h e per iod . The c onseque c e s of ad ing civil 
isorde r t o an a l ready unce rtain polit ica atmosphere in which 
t he i dea o f g ove rnment 
guarant eed a last ing a n 
Ri chard Squires. 
by comrniss ion wa s gaining support , 
histor ic ' rnpact of t h e revolt aga inst 
Chapt er ou r 
Th e Discou rse of a Cl o s i ng Ace 
Frederick Alder ice was elected in June 19 32 wi th a n 
overwhe lmi ng maj ority tha t s aw an 0 p osition of on ly n vo 
Liberals and one independ e nt returned . 1 s t as in 19 28 , wh en 
the single is sue f ocused on r eplacing the inc umbent governrn -
en t , the only rea l question facing the voters was , as the 
Advocacp p ut it, in rather un f riendly but still neutra l te rms, 
whecher Squires shou l d any longer "be permitted to administer 
the p ubl ic af f i rs of Newfoundland . ,, 2 As for governmen t by 
c onuni s s i on , t was at best a peripheral issue , even though 
Coaker had succeeded i n ext racting a promise of an enquiry 
into i ts feasibility from Alderdice. The Daily News reported 
a t the beg i nning of the campaign , in commenting on Alderdice 's 
pledge as contained in a letter it published from him, that 
" fo r some time e xpres sions of opinion" had been heard that 
some form of government by commission should function until 
t h e coun t ry ' s finances had been rehabilitated . 3 It said that 
IThe size of the House had been reduc ed for economy to 
~ wenty seven members from forty . Squires and his wife Helena , 
wh o h ad been the fir st woman elec ted to the legislature in a 
1 930 by-e lec ti on , were defeated in Liberal strongholds and a l l 
except on e of the FPU bas t i ons fell to Alderdice's Uni ted 
Ne wfound l and Party , as the incumbent members, including Coaker 
a n d Ha l f yard , declined to stand. See Encyclopedia, pp. 7 17-
718 . 
"Advocate , 20 May 1932 . 
JDaily e ws , 4 May 19 32 . In his lette r Alderdice said he 
wa s re s po d ing to a reques t from Coaker : "I should like t o 
make c clear that if returned to power it is my in tention 
imme d i a ely to a ppoi t a Committee o f Enquiry to consider che 
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such oplnions mayor may not have been general , "but it was 
one not infrequently offered as a s olution f or ou r economic 
dif fic lt ies . " That t e idea was more f undame ntal l y di r e c ed 
toward political reform es caped notice , as did any fur t her 
d iscussion of the q estion for the dura t ion of the c ampaign . 
The Telegram addressed Alderdice ' s prog r amme wi thout any 
reference to his promise of an enquiry . It emphasiz e ins tead 
his "so lemn pledge" to conduct the country ' s affairs in an 
"honest , efficient , economical and business - like way " and to 
p ut an end to waste and extravagance." The explicit implica -
tion was that this was a pledge Squires "could not possibly 
give " and the only way that the country could "be given its 
chance" was by returning to honesty and business-like methods . 
Meanwh i l e , the Advoca te was expressing its dismay tha t the 
commission idea was not being given a chance : "What i s strange 
a bout chis pledge of the Opposition Leader is that so far very 
f ew of his candidates have referred to the matter from the 
publ ic platform . " ~ .2\s a result, the paper went t o some lengths 
advisability of establishing a system of Government by 
Commission for a number of years. Should the proposal be 
favo urab l y reported upon it will be then submitted by referen-
dum to the electorate f or their approval . " Here Coaker had 
added t h e important element of a referendum which was designed 
as a s b stitute for his previous suggestion of simply electing 
a party committ ed to the proposit i on . With this the practical 
prob lems would be multiplied as the idea now called for an 
el ection o n the issue, a process of consultation, a referendum 
f or approval , and fi nally an election of the commission . 
~ Evening Te e qram , 1 0 June 1932 . 
"Advoc t e, 27 Ma y 1932 . 
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t o agai n review t h e proposal , with t h e by now fami l iar warning 
that t he c o nt ry f aced the greatest crisis in i ts history and 
wi th in two y e a r s woul d be forced t o choose be t ween Confedera -
tion , defau lt on i ts i terest payment s , or governmen t by 
c ommission. 6 In i t s last e di tion b e f o re the elect ion, the 
paper s uggested t hat t he r e were thousands who wo uld ot bother 
vot ing b t who v,/Ould "glad l y sweat to get to the p o l l ing 
booths if government by commission were an immediate issue. ,, 7 
It l S apparent then that Alderdice was not elected in 
1 932 with a mandate to implement commission government . He had 
a greed to adopt the promise of an enquiry as one part of his 
p lat form which would appeal to those voters who would not 
6Ibi d . It a- so added ye t another element to the mec hanism 
f or i mp leme ntati on by sugges t ing that a referendum should be 
r e q i red t o at t a i n sixty per cent approval . In its discussion 
o f h e e l e ction for six commissioners , four p r otestan sand 
t wo c athol ics, it acknowledged there might be some difficulty 
i n sel e ct i .g t h e right men, but that elected in such a manner, 
t h ey woul d be no worse than any other six " that for a quarter 
of cent r y has sat at the council table ." In all this there 
was no recognition of the problems that would be created by 
denominati o nal representation in areas with unclear major -
i ties, or for the non-representation that would result in any 
case for substantial minorities . For the changing demographics 
o f th is period and the attendant problems in applying the 
denominationa l principle , see Rothney, "The Denominational 
Basi s o f Representation ". 
7 I bid . , 3 June 1932 . The paper refused to endorse the 
Liberal party , although it did offer a mild defense of Squires 
f or h aving faced the problems of the depression "manfully ". 
Bu t b ecaus e of Alderdice ' s pledge , it was hard pressed not to 
a dvi se i t s readers to vote for the merchant party . It referred 
t o Coa ker ' s appeal for a national administration to move 
f o r ward o n commi.:3 s 'on and admitted that "hundreds " of men who 
had writt en and c lIed f or advice seemed " lost ". It then re-
st ted it s s upport f or a commissi o n and for policies of 
ret r e n c ' en and f ishe ry reform and urged readers to vote for 
the ca didates that suppo r te these policies. 
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no rma l ly vot e f o r a mercha nt's par t y but who , a s r eaders c f 
t he Fi s h e rmen ' s Ad voca te , woul d respond co a n idea clea r y 
identified with their l eader . Al t h ough it may b e t hat Al der-
di ce had persona lly c ome to v iew Coaker's idea po s i tive l~ , 
particul a rly as i t ma y ha ve rep resent e d a laten t merc h nc v i ~w 
t hat responsible governme nt was in any e vent di spensabl e, 
there is no evidence at th i s t ime that ei t her h e o r othe r 
l eading forces outside t he FPU were committed to the p r oposit-
i on. The f act is t ha t while the idea had been in c irculation 
f or some time, i t was largely within the limited purview of 
Coaker and his supporters . As such it would have been seen to 
acquire certain proprietary attributes with which others wou.. ld 
not wa n t t o b e assoc iated . Despite the years of propaga ti o n, 
the comIni ss i o n idea as yet still bel01ged to Coaker and for 
th i s reason i t would take some further time before his 
par tisa n oppo s it e s c ould comfortably embrace it as their o~n . 
And notwithstanding any predisposed tendencies of the merc-
hants, t h is would only occur with a gre at deal of reticenc e . 
As the economic crisis deepened, Alderdice's government 
wa s given no c hoice at the end o f the year but to final l y p ut 
i n p l ace that Royal Commission which the merchants had been 
c alling for in 1931 and which Monroe had considered in 19 2 7. 
T is time it was impo sed fr om t he outside as yet another of 
t he c an i nuing c ond i t i ons by which the country was able to 
s ecu r e as sis t ance t o meet its semi-annual loan obligation s. 
Th e credito rs were not t he ba n k s but the Canadian and Brit~s h 
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governments and they c ame forward to p r eve nt a d efau l t not 
o nly with the s tip u l tion of a joi n t commi ss i on wi h appoinc-
ments by all t h ree c oun tr ie s to i nvesti gate i nt o New fo und-
land ' s f uture , but wi t h the crl t ical caveat that the re c ommen-
dations forthcoming we re 0 be put immedia t ely t o t h e leg isla -
cure for approv I . ~ Thu s was the AInu ree Royal Commi s i on 
brought into exi st ence , in a fashion described by t' e l n imi-
table editorialists at the Advocate as constituting he " t erms 
of surrender " for a coun try desperately in n e ed of assistance . 
But this is not to say the game wa s yet over , or that the 
coun try , in rece iving the appointment of AInulree , had run its 
course of self-determination to an end . It remaine d fo r the 
Royal Co ission to conduct its hearings th r ough a process 
which wou ld soon wi n the confidence of eve n its detrac to rs by 
functio n ing as an e x hau stive investigat i on in pursuit of its 
BSee Neary , Newf o n dland , pp. 14 - 15 and Noel, Politics , 
p . 310 . According to these accounts , this obli g ation essen-
tial ly foreclosed on any possibility of the AInulree report 
being re j ected , al t hough it is not likely there was any 
forethough t given to the eventuality of the legislature votilg 
to suspend itself . In any case, such a provision did not 
preclude the Roya l Commission from recoIT@ending some f o rm of 
popu lar sanction for any f ar-reaching proposals. 
9Ad vocate, 17 Feb . 1933 . The negative reception was In 
part a re sponse to the anno u ncement of the make - up o f the 
Commission , which included IrJi ll iam Stavert , a Canadian b anker 
advi sing the government , as Newfound and ' s representative . 
This was the o n l y critical response to either the terms for 
assistance or h e p ersonnel . For positive reviews see Even i n g 
Telearam , 23 Fe b . a n d Dai l y News , 23 Feb . 1932 . 
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mandate. 10 The records of this enqui ry clearly show t hat 
whatever the divisi ons of opinion in the spring and summe r of 
19 33, there was no lost opportun ity for the people of Newf -
oundland, at least those e q u ipped to do so, and even those not 
s o well-equipped, to make their case before the Royal Commis-
sion and to have their concerns met with a large degree of 
equanimity. 
When the members of the Commission arrived in St. John's 
in March they took notice of an event which occurred during 
their first days of hearings and which, judging from t he line 
of questioning pursued with several of their first witnesses, 
p rovided a key point of departure for their deliberations. A 
public debate jointly sponsored by two societies, the Llewel-
l yn C]ub and the Methodist College Literary I nstitute, was 
held to consider the proposition that "Newfoundland should be 
governed by a Commission for a period of ten years." 11 This 
meeting received wide coverage in all three major papers with 
each reporting the audience deciding in favour of the question 
by a four to one majority.12 The Daily News had promoted the 
10The Advocatp eventually urged its readers and any 
"citizen of unbiased mind" to present their views to the 
COI1U1lission orally or in vIriting. 31 March 1933. Amulree's 
f irst public statement was an open invitation to the public to 
contact the Commission and come forward with submissions, 
which would be received in private and "treated with the 
strictest confidence." Ibid. 
11Daily News, 30 March 1933. 
12Ibid.; Evening Telegram, see column by "Observer", p. 
6; Advocate, 31 March 1933. 
94 
event as addressing a subject whi c h had been "wi de ly d i scussed 
at various times in the count ry ' s history " but wh ich wa s 
r ece i ving increasing attention in di fficu lt time s .lJ It once 
again mis r epresent ed the issue as a n "idea of a n appointed 
commission " which it sai d had "many proponents and a large 
n umber of opponents ." In doing so it illustrated that the idea 
di d indeed have a l ife o f its own and almost a year after 
Alderdice's election, was now much more clearly in the public 
domain, and accordingly, subject to all sorts of varia tion and 
interpretation. 
It is of course signifi c ant, and i t was certainly not 
lost on ei ther the Advocate or the members of the Royal 
Commission, that a " large " St. John's audience would give such 
a strong endo rsement of the idea. This is all the more so 
given that a previous debate on the same question one month 
earl i er attracted much less attent ion and delivered a verdict, 
by a much smaller margin, in the negative. 14 The reports 
indicated a range of issu es cons idered in both instances; in 
the fi r st the assumption was of an appointed commission, whi le 
in the second the suggest ion was for five commissioners, "four 
o f them local and one appointed by the British government . ,,15 
13Da ily Jews , 28 March 1933 . 
14Da ily News , 24 Feb. 1933. The earlier debate was 
sponsored only by the MCLI and must have been either intended 
or seen afterwards as a dry run for a more substantial 
programme . 
lS I b i d. , 30 March 193 3 . 
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I n the first debate the affirmative side gave vo ice to ma ny o f 
the themes Coaker had articulated and emphasi z ed a vi ew wh~ ch 
became somewhat of a refrain befo re Amulree, tha t a commi s sion 
would be beneficial if o n l y f o r it s size, because the country 
was overgoverned "wi th the trappings of an elephant on the 
back of a cat. ,, 16 In the s e cond debate the argument fo cused 
on the "complete des truct ion of the mora l e 0 f the people" 
which was described as "this vicious outcome of c onstitu t iona l 
government. ,, 17 
The re is no doubt t hat such a public airing of the 
question p u t it squarely on the agenda, particularly in St. 
John's, in a way not previously seen . However, the lines were 
a nyth i n g but clear and the resolution would remain open for 
much further reflection, both in pub l ic and i n front of the in 
c amera hearings before the Royal Commission. That the question 
was an unsettled, and unsettling, one was reflected in two 
r esponses to the second deba t e. Albert Perlin, who was writing 
a lead and t houghtful daily column in the Telegram, dec lared 
h is strong opposition to the proposal and suggested the debate 
16Ibid., 24 Feb. At least three different witnesses used 
t he same expression during t he hearings . It was invoked again 
by the News when the Amulree report was published, and 
attributed as an "his torical pronouncement of the late E.M. 
Jac kman during the last century" in mak i ng the argument that 
responsib l e government wa s not suited to a large country with 
a small population. Ibid., 30 Nov. 1933 . 
1 Ibid., 30 March 1933. 
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h ad been won merely as an e xpressi on of clever deb a t ing 
form. 1S Raymond Gushue, the president of t h e Board of Trad e, 
who was one of two speakers p resenting t h e negative arg ume n t , 
may have partially and inadvertently confirmed this when he 
indicated in his int e r view with the Commission on the d ay 
after the debate, that he led the side against the commission 
idea, but "not according to my own desires. ,,1 9 
It may not have been coincidental that this debate was 
scheduled during the first days of hearings before Arnulree. By 
the time Gushue appeared, the Commissioners had already heard 
from some of the most prominent people in the country a good 
deal about suspending responsible government in favour of some 
sort of commission. Although most of those appearing were not 
mak ing submissions or being questioned on constitutional 
matters, as this was not, after all, the ostensible focus of 
Arnulree's mandate, there was among the first witnesses a 
considerable amount of discussion which set much of the tone 
for the ensuing proceedings. 20 It should also be noted that 
lBTelegram, 30 March and 4 April 1933. Perlin's identity 
as the author of the column is revealed in the "Confidential 
Diary" of H .F Gurney, the British Trade Commissioner who 
visited Newfoundland in the spring and fall of 1933, see 11 
Ap r il. Domini o ns Office Records, 35/386. 
19Magrath papers, 30 March. 
20The only guide to the proceedings, a chronology taken 
directly f r om the Magrath papers, and supplemented with useful 
biographies, is contained in Fenwick , "Witnesses". This paper 
shows 157 witnesses heard and 24 letters received, which 
compares with Clutterbuc k 's list of opinions containing 65 
names . Thus, it is clear that the vast majority either were 
not as k ed or did not venture an opinion on political matters. 
The Commission spent its first three weeks i n St. John's 
before leaving to visit nine other commun ities and Halifax and 
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questions of politics and constitut ional matters o ften 
represented only a brief interlude among a variety of other 
top ics. Although it is impos sible here to provide a systematic 
revi ew of the reco rds , it is necessary to highlight certain 
themes as a means of shedd ing light on the proces s which 
informed the report o f the Commission, and in particular to 
ass ess the views of the witnesses as they were summarized by 
the secretary in his memorandum at the end of the hearings. 
Alderdice and Monroe were two of the first to bring for-
ward the Commission idea, but they each gave it a different 
e xpression . For Alderdice, the people had lost all sense of 
self -re liance, and a change to the constitution would be 
desirable, but any form of commission government should be 
c omposed of Newfoundlanders. 21 Monroe att ributed all of 
Newfoundland 's problems to responsible government and while he 
fe lt both an elec tion and a referendum should be held on the 
i dea, he believed a commission should be comprised of three or 
four men from outside the c ountry. 22 It is difficult not to 
get the impression during these early sessions that the 
Commissioners were taken by surprise by the depth of feeling 
against the political system as it operated in the country , 
and were caught struggling to ma k e sense of all the talk of 
Montreal, then returning at the end of May for three weeks in 
the city and one final hearing at Bay Bulls. 
21Magra th papers, 20 March. 
22I.bid., 24 March. 
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r a d ical changes to the machinery of government. 
This is evident in their di s c ussi on with A .A . We rlich, 
t he manager of the Ban k of Montrea l , with whom t h e y held the 
f i rs t involved pol i tical discus s ion foll owing Alderdice . 2 3 
T ime and again the Commissioners took turns probing for views 
on the commission i d ea a nd other alternative constitutional 
p ossibili t ies. Werlich said a commission for ten years was a 
g ood idea and h e believed it was being supported "even by men 
who should be In a posi t ion to know". Twice he was asked what 
the fishermen thought of such an idea, but he said it was too 
d ifficult to say and that he rea l ly did not know. When asked 
by Magrath what reaction there wou l d be to such a proposal, he 
simply said "The po l iticians say we are not competent to 
govern ourselves. " To which Stavert, Newfoundland's represent-
a t ive, o ffered the opinion that he thought "results have shown 
t hat." Amulree then wondered, without seeking a res p onse, '1= l .L. 
it could be said the people had lost the art of government 
over time or whether it was just a recent "spasm of reckle-
ssness. ,, 2 4 
Peter Cashin was the n e x t to discuss political matters 
and a l though there is no verbatim account of his testimony, 
the secretary filed a report in which Cas h in emphasized that 
the existing s y stem was t oo l arge and e l aborate for such a 
2 3 I b i d. , 2 7 Ma r c h . 
24 Thi s is one 
s peake rs f rom the 
o ften, there is no 
questi on. 
occasion i n the transcripts where the 
Commission are c l early indicated. More 
identifica t i o n of the person putting the 
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small community . 5 He felt that the Hous e of Assemb ly s hould 
b e reduced to twelve members and the Cabine t to six, bu t 
suggested that if it was recognized, as he himself had, that 
the count ry "was not fit to govern itself", a form of commis-
sion for ten years mi gh t be a "salvation." He added that he 
believed this would be resented greatly. Finally, whi le he was 
neither for nor against Confederation, he felt this option was 
preferable to a reversion to Crown Colony status. The range of 
opinion soon broadened during an interview with J.E. Taylor, 
from the Bank of Commerce. 26 He was asked if he thought the 
system of administration was too expensive for a small 
communi ty and when he said yes, adding that it was too 
elaborate, he was then as k ed what new form of government he 
would suggest. His answer was that the form of government 
shoul d stay the same with representation by districts as they 
e xisted, but fi nanc ial controls should be strengthened. Coming 
f rom a banker, this clearly indicated that not everyone in 
commercial circles was committed to radical constitutional 
changes. 
Bennett Stafford, the manager of the Newfoundland Hotel, 
at first resisted the Commissioners' pol i tical enquiries. 27 
When asked his views of the s i tuation, he replied that he had 
no opinion: "That is what you people are here for, to tell us 
25 Ibid., 23 March. 
26 Ibid. , 2 4 March. 
r ' Ibi d. 
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what we are going to do." But then he volunteered t h e opini o n 
that doing away wi th elections would be a good thing, and the 
Commissioners pursued t h e issue almost rel entlessly . They 
a sked what sort o f government, and he said it should b e 
composed of ou t s i ders. Did he mean to close the House of 
Assembly? Certainly, because nasty feelings would not die down 
after elections. And what about Confederation? He said people 
were talking about it, but would never vote for it. Finally, 
h e offered the view that it would be a great pity if after the 
Commissioners left, something was not done. The House should 
b e closed so the people cou ld look forward to the next ten 
y ears. He didn't know how many people were in favour of that 
idea, but noted that William Coaker had it "in his mind" and 
i f it was put to a plebiscite to have a commission government 
for t e n years, "you'd win." And what about colonial status? 
Ninety five per cent of the people did not know the difference 
between a Dominion and a Colony . 
Eric Bowring, a leading merchant who had organi z ed 
meetings in opposition to Squires in 1931, did not think very 
much o f "the people" or of responsible government: "The 
a verage person here is such that we ought never to hav e had 
s elf-government, we are not fit for self-government. ,, 2 8 
Accordingly, a commission for ten years would be the best 
thing. Again, the Commissi oners wanted to know how such a 
proposal would be received, would there b e objections? Bowring 
28 Ibid . , 27 Ma rch. 
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thought that because of sent imental r e asons , "you mi ght get 
through government by commission", because it would only b e 
temporary a nd people could see t he end of it, "whereas you 
would never get t hrough a reversion to a Crown Colony." 
Magrath asked if the situation could be saved with three or 
four aggressive men in the House of Assembly, but was told 
that they would never get in if they told the truth. This was 
followed by the submission from Raymond Gushue, who said he 
had led the debate against commission but without wanting to 
take that side. 29 What was his view of getting the consent of 
t h e people for commission ; could the government pass it 
through the House of Assembly? He felt that it could without 
going before the country because in any case, you could not 
e xp ect an intelligen t response from the electorate. But 
ultimately, he believed that the country would at some time 
b ecome a part of Canada. 
Just when it may have seemed to the Commissioners that 
t hey were uncovering a certain degree of commonality, if not 
in detail, then in approach, their line o f questioning was 
challenged. R.F. Horwood, another leading merchant, was not 
quite so flip or gratuitous in the face of weighty matters. 3D 
One of the commissioners asked whether, with two Houses of 
parliament and all that went with them, he had considered if 
2 9 b id ., 30 Ma rch. 
)° 31 March . Horwood was the owner of a large lumber 
company. 
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such a large administration was necessar y . He answered that h e 
failed to see how you could have democratic gover nmen t withou t 
sufficient representation. He was then as ked if the country 
might no t be better served as part of a larger community . 
"That is a very broad q est ion my Lord." Would there not be 
brighter oppor t uni ties? "I do not say t hat. All the advantages 
we would have then we have now ." He did venture though, that 
if political life was going to be killed off, it would likely 
take fifty years and not ten, his view being formed partly 
from e x perience as a defeated candidate. 
It was not uncommon for contradictory opinions to be 
quite literally drawn out from the witnesses. Marmaduke 
Wi nter, a businessman and member of the upper House, was all 
over the political map, perhaps as a result of attending the 
public debate on commission. 31 He said he was not a politic-
i an, and that politics had been reserved mostly for a f ew 
lawyers. Consequently, the more t hat control of the country 
was taken out of the hands of local people the better. But 
when asked how the people felt about Confederation or com-
mission, he said they would not be in favour of Confederation 
and that he agreed with the view that "we should have our own 
government", even t hough people were sick of the polit i cians. 
He was followed by J . Ayre, another merchant, who was forth-
right in the view, wh ich he thought was "gaining ground more 
and more" that a corrunission wo u ld be the best thing. He was 
3l Ibid. 
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asked for details and said three men wo Id be bes t . Outs i ders ? 
Yes, definitely. Businessmen? Why not. It was put to him then 
(by Magrath) that in the s pi rit of democracy, it would be 
difficult to have out siders brought in and for public men to 
agree to be ruled by t hem. His view of that was simple and by 
now, becoming familiar, at least from certain quarters : "We're 
not fit to govern ourselves ... what we want is very stiff 
handling ." 
Al though the process was s till at only a prel iminary 
stage, certain unmistakable themes were beginning to emerge, 
albeit from a limited pool of intervenors. But many of these 
would find echoes and be reinforced as the Commission made its 
way across the island and upon its return for a second round 
in St. J ohn's, where it would hear from broader sections of 
the population. Unfortunately, when it visited the outports 
and spoke to fishermen, it did nothing to pursue with them the 
questions on which it had previously seemed so anxious to get 
a reading. Twenty fishermen were interviewed in small groups 
in four di f ferent communi ties, Carbonear, Heart's Content, 
Bonavista and Catalina. 32 Not once, during many long hours of 
discussion, was there a question raised about political or 
constitutional matters. 33 The testimonies of the fishermen 
32Magrath missed these hearings and did not rejoin the 
Commission until its return to St. John's. 
33 In Carbonear two fishermen were asked if there was not 
at one time a union that looked after their interests, and 
whether it had been effective. One replied simply that Sir 
~lJ illiam Co aker had gone into politics. And before that? "He 
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of our men do and some will not. We do not believe i n c u tt i ng 
men ' s wages." Thus, politics was about getting paid a fa ir 
wage. James Power of the Cooper s ' Union said he had no 
politica l opinions of his own, but when as ked about Confede ra-
ti on, volunteered that it should not be left to ordinary 
people. "There should be a body of intelligent men to consider 
that. They know what is good for the country, not the ordinary 
man, they do not know ... You could then put it to a vote when 
the peop le unders tood it." 36 
But not a ll the union representatives were without 
opinions on political matters. In Grand Falls, the delegation 
was divided. 37 Cater, from the Papermakers, had an interest-
ing e x change in which he first ventured that the people were 
overtaxed because "our system of government as we have known 
it for the last twenty five years is a wash out." And in what 
way was the government a washout? Perhaps, he said, he should 
noc have put it that way. "There is something wrong. There may 
not be anything wrong with the form of government, but there 
something wrong wi t h the way it is carried out." The 
delegation was asked whether they all shared this opinion. 
Scott, from the Amalgamated Trades, said yes. But ~"lall, from 
the same union, begged to differ by putting a f ine point on 
the issue: "The trouble with Newfoundland is that she has got 
the trappings of an elephant on the back of a cat ... what 
36 Ibid., 12 June. 
17 I bid., 22 Apri l . 
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did , however, contain a systematic cata logue of c r i ti cism 
about the structure of the fi s hery and the e xp loitation b eing 
suffered at the hands of the merch ants and e xporters. Much of 
this evidence fo und its way d irectly into the Amulree repo r t 
and provided the basis for its most enlightened analysis and 
informed recommendations. 
The Commission did put political questions to a number of 
other representatives of non-elite sectors of the popUlation, 
namely from four of the most important union organizations in 
che country. 311 In these interviews there was a tremendous 
variety of opinion, with endorsements covering the full range 
of political options. There was also a reluctance exhibited to 
be drawn into politics, and this stands in clear contrast to 
a more prima ry concern with bread and butter issues. Michael 
Coady, f o r instan ce, of the Longshoremen's Union, was asked if 
his union had formed an opinion on the difficulties facing the 
country. He said no. He was then asked what he thought 
personally and said he could not say, he "cou l d not deal with 
anything 1 ike that. ,, 3 5 When he was asked what his men were 
saying or whether they were saying anything, he replied: "Some 
was a great help to the fishermen. .. if Sir William had 
continued it would have been of great bene f it to the fishermen 
o f the country." Ibid. , 17 April. 
34The groups included five mill workers at Grand Falls, 
toget her representing three unions, three mill workers at 
Corner Brook (only one of whom was represented as a union 
representative) and one person each represent i ng the Coopers' 
Uni on a nd the Longshoreman's Prot ective Union in St. John's. 
35Ma grat h pape rs, 8 June. 
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Newfoundland wants is a commission of t en honest men a nd pay 
them . " 
On to Corner Brook . There, George Smith, a worke r 
representative, was also forthc oming. 38 His group was as ked 
if they gave any attention to the general governmen t of the 
c ountry. He said nat urally they thought about it. Did they 
have any conclusions? He said, personally, he did not see any 
objection to the present form of government, providing the 
right men could be found to represent the country, which 
seemed to h im to be the difficulty. He was asked what com-
p laint he had against the class of men elected from time to 
time. "I imagine they have too many outside interests. To my 
mind a ma n who represents people should be a person who is not 
t ied up with outside interests. He should be free lance." Did 
h e and his friends take any steps to make their opinions felt? 
"No, I cannot say tha t we have. We a re very tolerable in 
Newfoundland." 
The members of the Royal Cormnission were quite obviously 
on a bit of a fishing expedition. At times they coaxed with 
gently placed suggestions. In other places they seem to cajole 
with near harassment in pursuit of a line of logic. The 
direction was toward a definition of how far they could push 
the question of change to the constitution, and in particular, 
the idea of a commission. To what extent was it a viable 
38Ibid. , 
indicated. 
26 April. There was no unlon affiliation 
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al ternative? Was it not maybe the only alter native ? What di d 
people think other people would think ? Was a re f erendum r e ally 
nec e ssary? What shape would a commission government take? 
There was a veritable Pandora's box of constitutional options 
on the tab l e. And the untested and nebulously defi ne d idea of 
commission was a t antalizing window, one as yet still wide 
open, and in need of a handle . 
In their strugg l e to achieve clarity the Commissioners 
may even have created some c onverts to the idea. It may be 
generous to suggest this was a case of unintended conse-
quences, but it is based on two assumptions from reading the 
t ranscripts. One is that the Commissioners were not, at least 
at this time, working with any kind of hidden agenda. The 
other is that they were genuinely challenged by both t he 
despondent mood of the people and the intellectual problems 
posed by an ill-defined proposal for constitutional change. 
The commission idea clearly seemed to be doing something to 
c apture people's imagination, however unattractive it might 
appear on the surface because of its prima facie undemocratic 
nature. 
One prominent example may be cited of the Commissioners' 
rather zealous technique. During a long session, Charles 
Jeffrey, the editor of the Evening Telegram, appeared to be 
virtually browbeaten into giving up his efforts to argue for 
Confederat ion and conceding that commission was an option. 39 
39 Ibid., 2 J une. 
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It is quite likely that by this t ime , h a ving just r eturned 
from Canada where there was no interest be i ng shown t owa r d 
Newfoundl a nd, and as a result of the g eneral hostility 
e xpressed toward the i dea of Confederation (especially by t h e 
many people who seemed to think nobody else would support it), 
the Commissioners were persuaded t hat it was not worth 
pursuing. Amulree, in an uncharacteristic outburst which came 
during a rambling discussion about the merits of democracy , 
s uggested that there could be no "real check on good governm-
ent " and demanded to know: "That is the reason why some people 
have been writing to the press a n d speaking out at public 
meetings In favour of commission government. Is that not 
right ? " Sounding very much defeated, the editor replied: "Yes 
quite . I feel it would do us no harm, if for a period it were 
pos sible to s u spend the present form of government and to have 
t his country placed under a commission." As an afterthought, 
Jef frey insisted that such an action cou ld never be carried 
out without t a k ing the opinion of the people. 4 0 
There are two fi nal interviews which may be considered 
instructive i n reading the Commission's hearings as the 
vehic le which set up the findings of the Amulree report. Both 
offer a reference for an assessment of the Clutterbuck 
memorandum (Appendi x C). Albert Perlin was not dissuaded from 
40It is worth noting that dur ing this int erview, St a vert 
re sponded to Jeff r ey 's suggestion that Canadian poli t ic i ans 
were no more honest than those in Newfoundland by saying, "Let 
us leave hon es t y out and say more e xperienced. " 
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his resistance toward the commission idea, at least not yet 
and not during the course of his hearing. 41 (He did c ome 
round to the proposition, only a month later in his columns a s 
"Observer" in the Tel egram, but maintained to the end that he 
did not think this would be recommended. See below.) He 
suggested to the Commission a range of ideas that he felt 
would wo r k toward rehabi I i tat ion, wi thout having to take 
drastic measures . These included a small body of e xperts that 
would prepare a written constitution which would contain 
severe penalties for graft 42 , a progressive system of educa-
tion to improve the "attitude " of the people, and the use of 
broadcast educational programmes to inform people about the 
country's serious problems. In a summary review of his 
proposa l s , one of the Commiss ioners said he had suggested 
commi ss ion government. He said he did not. 
His name, however, appeared on Clutterbuck's first list 
among the reputed forty-five people in favour of commission. 
There are numerous other instances of names appearing without 
corresponding opinions e x isting in the recorded testimony, but 
the best proof of the unreliability of this list rests with 
the existence of the second list attached to the September 
memorandum. This second list, like the memorandum, was in all 
li ke lihood prepared for consideration at a meeting of the 
4L lb id., 8 June. 
42Por a detailed summary of Newfoundland's constitutional 
st a tus, both written and unwr itten, see Clutterbuck's memo, 
Append · x C . 
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Commissioners in September when t hey re -conv ened in St. J ohn' s 
for final preparation of their report. 43 It s c hart of "p r o " 
and "anti" commission is much more modest and h as elimina ted 
most of the questionable and inco r rect categorizations wh i c h 
were contained in the first, including that of Perlin's na me . 
It shows fourteen for commission and eight aga i n st, wi th 
comments attached to those favouring commission, indicating a 
variety of approaches. Some of these, such as Winter, who saw 
parliament continuing, and Lake, who saw it as a means of 
getting to Confederation, may still be questionable entries in 
this column. And one misrepresentation remains, that of J.E. 
Taylor o f the Bank of Commerce who, as we have seen, was not 
"for" commission. If Taylor was mov ed to the other camp, and 
Perlin's name a dded, it would not t ake much for the majority 
in favour to be reduced to a bare margin. The point is, not 
that there was not a great deal of support for the commission 
idea, whatever its incarnation, but that not all the witnesses 
were in favour. The would-be consensus was not all there. 
Harris Mosdell was the only independent Member of the 
House in 1933 and his interview with the Commissioners must 
have given them pause for thought . 44 He told them Newfound-
l and's problems were caused by an absolute lack of organiz-
at ion combined wi th being a country "on the fringe of BNA 
Confederacy trying to duplicate the whole panoply of govern-
43 0aily Ne ws, 15 Sept. 1933. 
4" Magrath papers, 31 May. 
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ment." In his view Confederation would pass out s ide St. J ohn's 
and as a resul t carry the country . When they a sked wh a t 
alternatives he would have in mind , he replied, "What oth e r 
alternative can there be, if you'll pardon my Irish way o f 
answering. This Commission c annot s a y we've looked yo u over 
and find you're un fi t f or se l f - g overnment." Th e Commissioners 
t r ied to play to h is obviou s disdain for commi ss ion by 
sugges t ing that any amendment to the Let ters Patent would 
probably be strongly resisted. He said he did not know that it 
would, but his own reaction was hostile "because yo u are 
maintaining the old order, not doing anything in the way of 
radical change." He believed once a commission had re-organ-
ized the c o un try, it would just be handed back to the same 
"insular bunch". But rvIosdell's views were perhaps most 
c hallenging and relevant when he concluded by putting his own 
op inions In the background and spea k ing directly to the 
Commis sioners about their work and the process yet ahead of 
them : 
We are rather shocked at our position. Tremendous 
importance is attached to the work you gentlemen are 
doing and the anticipation of the report you are expected 
to ma ke , and I do not think you wi 11 find anybody 
standing out against the adoption of the report so long 
as it is reasonable, and it would be a great mistake in 
my opinion ... to delay any material part of the programme. 
That is necessary for the rehabilitation of Newfoundland, 
whether it is to take the line of Confederation and 
d irect action of the legislature, or as the result of a 
plebiscite, or whether a commission form of government. 
Whatever i s in your minds a def ini te plan should be 
a d o p ted, t he c ountry should be told i t, and the coun t r y 
s h o u l be urged and recommended to adopt it immediate l y . 
We a r e fri ght ful people in Newfoundland for looking 
f orward to t h e future and hoping the best is going to 
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turn up without doing a great deal to r e a li ze our hopes . 
I n this Mosde ll was giving the Commissi on its marching 
orders. His remarks embodied a numb er of key p rinciples t h a t 
we re r e f lected in t h e substance of the memorandum prepared for 
the Commissioners l ater in the fall. One, that despite al l t h e 
p u ffed up confidenc e of many of the leadi ng merchants, t he r e 
were real long term problems with the commission idea. Two, 
n obody was certain, not even those with definite opinion s, 
what was the best thing to do. Three, the people were depend-
ing on the Commission for a decisive result that would provide 
di rection and clarity. And finally, the Commission should not 
d ither. Whatever the mechanism for implementing its programme, 
it had to be initiated immediately. 
memorandum, ic lS remarkable the 
In reading the September 
extent to which these 
el ement s were combined in a coherent presentation of the 
options facing the Commissioners. Perhaps more remarkable, is 
that Clutterbuck came down on the side of a minimalist 
definition of what shape a commission should take, suggesting 
that it was necessary to avoid the suppression of the legisla-
ture In order to prevent a violent reaction. Although there is 
no record of a submission that was apparently made by Coaker 
to the Commission, it is very likely that it was his appeal to 
preserve some form of democratic process combined with a 
warning about the cons equences of not doing so which resulted 
in the e mphasis on antic ipating what the memo referred to as 
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parti san "s tampeding " . 45 The A...rnu l re e report r ej e cted t his 
advice in f avour of acc epting Mosde ll's a dmonitions to ac t 
with haste and to get the job done. 
While the Amu lree hearings were underway a nd continuing 
through to their conclusion on 23 June, the country was left 
in a state of suspense until the report was p ublished and 
del i vered on 21 November. In the interim the debat e was 
carried forward in the pages of the press, with the Advocate 
carrying the commission banner and insisting that no action be 
taken without the consent of the people, as though it feared 
a losing battle on this principle. 46 Perlin's columns as 
"Observer" in the Telegram were filled with analysis of the 
possible constitutional options facing the country and which, 
until he changed his mind, argued strongly for rejection of 
the idea of government by commission. 47 The Daily News ran 
comparative commentaries on fascism, socialism and democracy 
and the relevance of changing world conditions to Newfound-
land ' s situation, noting that the "political student" would be 
45Coaker received a telegram from Clutterbuck on 24 June 
requesting that he meet with the Commission. The next day he 
received a second telegram say i ng the Commission was "grate-
ful" for his of fer, presumably to forward a wri t ten sub-
mission. In August he received a telegram thanking him for a 
memorandum he submitted, but there is no other indication of 
the contents of this submission. See Coaker's papers. Coaker's 
views on the prospect of a violent response were contained in 
a telegram h e sent to the Dominions Office immediately after 
t h e Amu lree report was published, see Appendix B. 
46 Advocat e , 7 Ap ril 1933. 
47See for e xample , Evening Teleg ram, 6 April 1933. 
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struc k by "the way in which democracy is fading from the 
earth". 4' It observed that the dictatorship s of Russ ia, I t aly 
and Germany were being joined by Britain and the Unit e d States 
where the peop l e had consented to the "semi-dictatorship of 
national administrat ions", which begged t he question that was 
being asked in Newfoundland of whether democracy was doomed to 
yield to "some form of autocracy", namely a government by 
commission. 
All such rather academic , if not somnolent, activities 
were rudely awakened by a report in the middle of July that 
J.H. Thomas, the British Secretary of State for the Dominions, 
had s tat ed in the House of Co~mons that the Royal Commission 
was continuing its work and would be reporting soon whether 
Newfoundl and was to rema i n a Dominion or become a Crown 
Colony. Al l three papers jumped on the suggestion that 
Amulree's mandate included the possibility of such reversion, 
ignoring the scope of constitutional change which was other-
wise evident in the options being widely debated. The Advocate 
said that to entertain the idea "would mean confusion worse 
confounded. .. a humiliation of the worst type ever adminis-
tered to a Briti s h people" and also that it was pointless to 
discuss such a poss ibility because it would be "resisted by 
the united strength of the whole people."Q 9 It insisted that 
only the commission it had been promoting for so l ong would be 
<
18Dail y News, 5 May 1933. 
49Advoc ate, 1 4 July 1933. 
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accep table, bu t this time it recommended t he compositi on of 
such a body to be three members and the Governor , with the 
same power and authority as t hat normally resting with t he 
legislature. 
Perlin in the Teleg r am questioned whether this was 
another "slip of t he t ongue " for whi c h the Secretary of State 
was so celebrated, or if in fact this was within the Commis-
sion's terms of reference. 5o Such a question of reversion was 
"too ridiculous" and had to be considered "definitely out of 
court." Despite such a dismissal, and this may very well have 
been the desired effect of the "slip " , over the next several 
days, the columnist was provok ed to re-consider t .he commission 
idea as an alternative to Crown Colony status. He reviewed 
Coaker's proposal and while insisting he did not believe this 
would be recommended by Arnulree, began articulating the 
positive aspects of a political control which would not 
abrogate democratic rights, but would nevertheless mean 
delegating to an appointed committee the task of overhauling 
the country's administrative system. 51 He eventually arrived 
at the position, which would be maintained in future columns, 
that "If it be necessary to limit the responsibility of our 
p eople in connection with their government, a cowmission is 
unques t ionably the bes t way out." S2 In so do ing he was 
50Telegram, 11 July 1933. 
51 Ib id., 14 and 15 July 1933. 
52 Ib i d., 18 Ju y 1933. 
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engaged in a k ind of catch up with Coaker and a pursuit of 
precisely the issues confronting the Royal Comm i ssion . 
Shortly therea ft er, reports a ppeared from London that the 
Commission had submi t ted its repo rt and its recommendations 
included the suspension of the constitution with the country's 
a dminist r a tion to be han ded over to a nomi nated commi ssion 
wi th fu ll powers. 53 The Advocate described this a "b o lt from 
t he blue" and noting that Stavert had categorically denied 
that any part of the report had been completed, called on 
Alderdice to make a statement wi thout delay on the issue. 
Perl in greeted the "rumours" as an indication that the country 
must be prepared for proposals that would place "very definite 
restrictions on our political independence."54 And this, he 
was now convinced , wou l d be a very good thing. Indeed as the 
country l itera l ly drifted into the fa l l, a kind of consensus 
was pretty much in full f light, suspended though it may have 
been in anxious anticipation. 
Coa ker intervened directly for the last time in the 
debate before the report was delivered by writing a column in 
which he said he was responding to requests from numerous 
people who had a s ked his opinion of the situation facing the 
country . 55 He addressed at some length the financial crisis 
and offered a number of suggestions focusing on the fishery 
5JAdvocate, 4 Aug. 1933. 
54 Evening Telegram , S August 1933 . 
55Advocate, 22 Sept. 1933. 
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a n d calling for the Royal Commission to recommend r educi ng t he 
rate of interest being paid on debt charge s as means of 
overcoming the critical problem of defaulting o n payment s. He 
concluded his review by ret urning to the poli.tical issues 
facing the country a d sou nded a clarion call which the 
Commissioners, and their superiors in London, could only have 
found persuasive in the midst of their own final delibera-
tions: 
Party government must be dispensed wi th for at 
least ten years and provi.sion made for Government 
by an elected commission presided over by the 
Governor. The country is generally sick and dis-
gusted with Party Government and the present gen-
eration would gladly agree to a suspension of both 
Chambers of the Legislature for the next ten years, 
if not longer. The greatest curse that could be 
inflicted on a suffering and agonized people would 
be to bring about a general election and replace 
the ins by the outs ... The future welfare of this 
country depends largely upon the recommendations of 
the Royal Commission. If it is a milk-and-water 
scribble it will damn the country and sour feelings 
toward the Home Government and if recommendations 
are not possible that will be certain of fulfilment 
and provide means for the rehabil i tation of the 
fisheries, a forty per cent reduction of the inter-
est on the public debt, and a suspension of the 
animosities, intrigues, patronage and boodle of 
political office seekers, then all our sufferings 
will have been in vain and a gloom deeper and 
blacker than any hitherto expe r ienced will envelop 
the country and the people. 
The Adv ocate continued to campaign aggressively for 
commission by promoting the idea as one which was continuing 
to gain favour with the population. It re-emphasized the 
c oro llary that a plebiscite was necessary to confirm and 
validate such opinion, but i n doing so was caught in a basic 
c ontra di ction wherein the certainty of such sentiment would 
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a ppear to obviate the necessi ty o f taking a vote on t h e 
question. 5 6 This was not l os t on t h e Telegram's Perlin , who 
continued to c arry fo rward t hat paper 's e ndo rsement of the 
idea. In a discus s ion of whe ther a p l ebiscite wou ld be 
app ropriate , he reported on a conversation he had wi th a 
member of the House of Assembly who had said he could not 
support a proposal for commission without a vote first being 
held. 57 The columnist insisted that he did not believe a 
commission would be recommended, but then proceeded to argue 
t hat if it were, it would reflect a reality that democracy, as 
evidenced especially by events in Europe, was in fact becoming 
an anachronism. 
In Newfoundland 's case, he argued, governments were only 
democratic to t h e ex t en t they were elected and all decisions 
were accord ing l y taken in the name of the people without any 
need fo r recourse to further consultation. Consequently, if 
the existing Parliament voted to take drastic action, particu-
56For example, see Advocate , 29 Sept. 1933. It cited as 
a n important sample of opinion that of Captain Samuel Roberts 
of Wesleyvil l e, who told the paper that if the matter were 
s ubmitted to a vote, " .. . as far as the North is concerned , we 
need not worry over the outcome or wait for the returns. " See 
also , Ibid . , 2 Oct ., in the report of support for commission 
from an unnamed "prominent clergyman ." 
57Te legram , 16 Sept. 1933. The paper's editorials did not 
put fo r ward a specific position in advance of the report and 
only clearly stated its full endorsement of the commission 
proposal after the fact . In reference to the columnist's 
repo r ted conversati o n , if it is assumed that the politician 
was a member of the government side, this indicates a process 
h ad to occur within t h e government to ensure that any such 
views were e vent ua l ly silenced . 
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larly to alter the country's constitu tion, it had a r i gh t to 
do so consistent with normal prac tice. He argued that in an 
emergency, "actions othe rwise unconstituti onal may , in a 
period of crisis, be sanctioned by the constitution ," which, 
he pointed out, was not wri t ten and therefore "open to 
n umerous constructions a nd wi de liberties." He ci ted the 
example of the United States which was at the time gran ting 
e x traordinary powers to the presidential office of Fran klin 
Roosevelt with the assistance of court rulings validating the 
principle of emergency power. In addition to arguing t h at a 
plebiscite would be costly and a waste of time, he warned 
against "unpatriotic politicians" attempting to persuade the 
people to vote against their own best interests, and offered 
a view which was in direct conflict with that of Coaker and 
the Advocate : "In the circumstances, whatever drastic changes 
may be recommended by the Royal Commission, always pro vided 
that they are acceptable to well-informed and patriotic 
opinion, ought to be made effective by the Legislature without 
recourse to that doubtful medium of e xpressing sound opinion, 
the plebiscite." 
This debate on the merits of seeking popular sanction for 
any radical changes occurred as the members of the Royal 
Commi s s ion returned to St. John's, for consul tat ion wi th 
Alderdice and to consolidate their findings. 58 As news was 
58Te l egra m, 14 Sept. 1933. See Neary, Newfoundland, for 
further d e t ails of events as they transpired through the fall 
months, pp.29-32. 
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received that i t would be some time yet before t he report wa s 
simultaneously re l eased in London and St. John's, it is 
difficult to imagine the nature of the suspense and the 
accompanying tension as rumou r s supplied the only game in town 
and people busied themselves with speculation as to who would 
f ill the seats on the e xp ec ted commissi on government. 59 The 
British Trade Commissioner obse r ved t he scene and confirmed 
that while the anticipation of some form of commission may 
have been well founded, nobody could be certain as to the 
s ubstantive content of the Commission's recommendations: 
Al most everyone I met speculated as to their find-
ings and the effect they would have on business. 
Many conjectures were made but the Commission and 
the officials attached to it have wisely given no 
indica tion whatsoever as to their intentions. They 
have ac complished an extremely difficult task in a 
sma l l place where rumour and conjecture are rife, 
and ha ve gained the respect of the business com-
muni t y because of the manner in wh ich they have 
conducted their enquiries and their ability in 
preventing any information leaking out concerning 
their report. 60 
Notwithstanding t h e variety of opinion ln favour of some 
form of commission, it is clear that right up to the moment 
the report was released on 21 November, 61 there was not a 
general e xpectat ion that it would recommend the complete 
~9I bid., 4 November 1933. 
6Q H . F. Gurney, "Confidential Diary," 
Dominions Office Records, 35 / 386. 
25 Oct. 1933. 
61Noel, Poli t i c s, states , without reference or e xplanat-
ion , that the report was "del ivered" to the Brit i sh House of 
Commons on 4 October, p.212. If this was the case, there is no 
e vidence that whoever received it did anything to make its 
content s p Ub l i c . 
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suspension of the institutions of respons ib le government . Thi s 
is borne out by commentary in the p ress , 62 and by remarks 
made by Gordon Bradley , the leader of the Liberal opposition 
in the House of Assembly . Upon the release of the report, the 
Te legram and the Dai ly News embraced its recommendations 
without reservation . During the course of the nex t several 
days, in advance of the debate in the Assembly, both urged its 
immediate adoption , without a referendum, and reported on the 
support the report was receiving, particularly from the St. 
John's Board of Trade , the Great War Veterans Association, and 
others. 63 When the Assembly opened on 17 November, it moved 
with remarkable haste and lack of ce~emony to accept in full 
t he recommendations of the Royal Commission . 54 
Bradley's intervention is notable in a number of 
respects. First, he admitted that he had "no knowledge 
whatsoever" as to the report's contents and though he had made 
62 See for example the Teleg ram editorial of 20 Nov., in 
which the paper suggested merely that the fiscal policy of the 
country should be thoroughly re-organized, and if this 
required supervision b y independent experts, it was "not 
unl ikely that such a stipulation might even be welcomed ." 
Perlin wrote on the day of the report 's release, before having 
seen its contents , that he did not believe responsible 
government would be abolished, but that the e x isting parlia-
ment might be e x tended to prevent any interruption in imple-
menting the recommendations , Ibid ., 21 Nov. 
6JTeleg ram, 22 and 24 Nov . ; Daily News , 22 and 24 Nov. 
64The proceedings of the House debates, as with those of 
1932, we re never published but are contained in transcript 
f o rm in the Prov i ncial Archives. Edi ted e x cerpts from the 
speeches made by Bradley and Alderdice are contained in P. 
Ne ary, The Po l itical Economy of Newfoundland (Toronto 1973) . 
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a guess, he was "many, many miles from the tru t h ."6s Second , 
in introducing the debate, he articulated a de f ense of what he 
ca l led the "sovereign rights" of a people under natural l aw , 
and said the popu l a t i o n had "never dreamed" when electing the 
members to the House that they would take away such rights 
without the consent o f the peop l e. 66 Third, he e xpressed the 
v i ew tha t the essentia l prob lem with the report was in the 
failure of the c orrunissioners to penetrate "the company manner 
of witnesses" and to "get inside the skins of the great mass 
of individuals. ,, 57 As a r esult, he saw the greatest danger 
lying in the effect the report wou l d have on the peop l e and 
the reaction that woul d result i n time with the absence of 
direct representation. In this he echoed the main thrust of 
t he argume nt put f orward by Coaker, which was an insistence 
that the p roposals were doomed because of the potential for 
popu lar revolt against the abrogation of the right of se l f-
government. 68 Finally, it is clear that it was Coaker who 
provided the basis f o r the series of amendments proposed by 
6S House of Assembly, Proc eedin g s , 1933, transcript, 28 
Nov. Bradley accused members of the government of indicating 
to some people in St. John's two months earlier what the 
report was l i kely to recorrunend. The day before the report's 
release, the Daily News columnist "Scriba" rejected rumours to 
the s ame effect and insisted that Alderdice had been in normal 
rece ipt of "corrunun i cat ions" concerning the schedule of events, 
22 Nov. See also Neary , Newfoundland, pp.29-32. 
65 Proceedi ngs, 2 7 Nov. 
67 Ib id. 
68 See Coa ker's letter, Appendix C. 
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Bradley to establish a further p rocess of r ev iew of t he report 
by sendi n g a delegation to London to seek terms which wou ld 
not invo lve the loss of repre s e ntativ e insti t u tions. 69 Co a ker 
had issued an uns u ccessful appeal to communiti es to organ iz e 
meetings and to pet i tion f o r such action. 70 Bradley referred 
to the letter from Coaker published in the Telegram and 
reprinted in the Advocate , and demanded some account a b i li t y on 
Alderdice's campaign promise to investigate the commission 
i dea, and to take action only upon the results of a plebi-
scit e. 71 
Alderdice responded by insisting that the Commissioners 
had indeed captured t h e essential sentiments of the people: 
"It seems to be almost uncanny how (they) ... were able to enter 
into the minds of our people and paint such a truthful picture 
of ou r affairs . ,,72 He took strong objection to Coaker's 
p ublished analysis, and in particular, to the view that the 
country's status would be reduced to that of a Crown Colony, 
or in Coaker 's words, the same type of government reserved for 
"color ed races". In a rather uninspired turn of phrase, the 
69The amendments are contained in Neary, Political 
Economy, p. 53, and appear to be borrowed direct ly from 
Coaker's p ublished letter to the Telegram . J. R. Smallwood 
claims t o have been the source of Bradley ' s ideas, an asser-
tion whi ch is challenged by J.K. Hiller, "The Career of F. 
Gordon Bradley," Newfoundl and Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1988). 
7°Advocate, 24 Nov. 1 933. 
71 Pro ceedings, 28 Nov . 
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Prime Minister indicated the Gove r n or would no t b e given a ny 
more authority than to follow the advice of t he commissioners, 
and that t his wou l d place the count ry "betwi xt a nd between a 
Crown Colony and a Dominion. ,, 7) He did, however, manage a 
certain amoun t of rhetorical flou r ish in his conclud i ng 
remark s as he invoked a long list o f those f or wh om he s poke, 
emphasizing the desperate plight of fishermen , loggers, 
miners, "worke rs of all classes" who were unemployed, and 
women and children "suffering from the pangs of hunger and 
cold." All such condi t ions, along wi th the uncertaint ies 
facing civil servants, teachers, and businessmen, could only 
be ameliorated by accepting the new regime as proposed. He 
ended by t hanki ng the British Government for a generous offer 
and proclaiming that on behalf of all Newfoundlanders, the 
government accep ted the report "fully, frankly and freely." 
Bradley's amendments were clearly presented in the spirit 
of mak ing final arguments in a case already lost. He indicated 
that the Liberal party, at least what remained of it, would 
assi st in the new scheme of government, and would not counten-
ance a total rejection of the British offer. When his amend-
ments we re defeated, he and his colleague, R.J. Starkes, left 
their seats in the Assembly and the resolution to accept the 
report was thus adopted unanimously. 7 4 Bradley returned to 
the Hous e two days later to participate in its indefinite 
7] r bid. 
7 Daily ews, 29 Nov. 1933. 
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s u spension by seconding a motion put forward by Alderd i ce 
formally thanking the British Cr own and a s sur i ng it of " t he 
grateful and hearty co-operat ion of all patriotic citi ze -
ns. ,,75 It was not insignificant that these measures were 
approved without a recorded cont rary vote, for this made t h e 
task of t he British gove rnment that much easier in pushing its 
resolutions through the House of Commons. There the debate was 
much more seriously engaged, though the outcome was never in 
question, as many of England's most senior politicians 
participated in a number of sessions on an omnibus "Newfound-
land Bill", including one all night sitting which set a post-
war record of 23 continuous hours of debate. 76 
The Labour opposition to Ramsay MacDonald's National 
government raised a number of issues in its critique of the 
report, which Clement At t lee read as descr ibing "an ut ter 
failure of competitive capitalism. " In addition to placing 
unreasonable burdens on British taxpayers who had their own 
shar e of suffering, the report was seen to offer nothing that 
would address the "fundamental viciousness of the economic 
s y stem" and was merely proposing to bailout bondholders and 
hand the country "back to the capitalists." T? Stafford Cripps 
spoke most directly to the question of the loss of democratic 
institutions and denounced the proposals as reflecting a 
75 Proceedings , Dec. 1. 
76See Pol it ica l Deba te s , House of Commons (London 1933). 
Also Advocate, 22 Dec. 1933. 
77 Pol i ical Debates , 19 Dec., pp.224-231. See also Neary, 
Politi ca l Economy, f or excerpts from these debates. 
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"tendency to accuse democracy of a cr ime for which it i s not 
responsible. ,, 78 He particularly emphas ized that the wo rd i ng 
of the government's legislation p rov ided for Newfoundland 's 
Letters Patent to be "revoked" without any provision for t he ir 
re-instatement, and t h a t this was an unacceptable affront to 
any pretence of preserving the dignity of the population. As 
a result of this intervention, J.H. Thomas, the Secretary of 
State, conceded that the government would amend the wording to 
read "suspend" when the legislation was sent for final 
approval to the House of Lords. The Advocate, which had 
continued to vigourous l y denounce the entire exercise as it 
was played out in the Legislatures of both countries, offered 
a sarcastic reflection on the semantic debate, an opinion 
which ultimately spoke to b oth the failure of the country and 
the perceived distortion of a constitutional prescription the 
paper had for so long championed: 
Our main point in referring to this is to draw our 
readers' attention to the fact that there is another word 
in the English Dictionaries spelt 'renege'. In a particu-
lar sense the word is used in reference to a player in a 
game of cards who does not 'play the game'. It can be 
used in a general sense as well, and one standard 
Dictionary e xplaining it in this sense says it can be 
used in referring to 'one who fails to comply with one's 
promise or obligation'. The constitution of Newfoundland 
is dead. The game is played and the people know who 
reneged . His name is F.C. Alderdice. 79 
The Advoca te and Coaker were among the very few voices 
78 Ib l'd. , 18 0 939 ec ., p. . 
7 Advocare, 29 December 1933. 
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raised in opposition to the proposals In Newf ound land . 80 
While such interventions resonated wi th ri gh t e ous patriot ism 
i n the face of what was seen as a "huge piec e of treachery " 
carried out "in an i gnoble fashion wi th indecent haste, ,,8 1 
these objeccions could not have constituted a serious chal-
lenge c omi ng as the y did from the long-time leading proponents 
of commission government. The Telegram ignored what it must 
have seen as c ap tious complain ts from these sources when it 
trumpeted the broad support the report was receiving and noted 
that there was no "cavilling" in response. 8 2 The Daily News 
charged Coaker with hypocrisy as one who had "made the welkin 
ring" for several years promoting the commission idea and who 
was now being ungrateful and intemperate in his criticism. B] 
The game was played and the constitution, for a time at least, 
was indeed dead for all meaningful purposes. In their rush to 
assign blame for what they saw as selling out the country, 
Coaker and the Advocat e appeared entirely oblivious to the 
80 As if there was not enough irony in the position of the 
leading proponents of commission denouncing the report, they 
were joined in doing so by Coaker's old nemesis, A.B. Morine, 
who wr ote two e x tremely critical letters to the Toronto Globe, 
and copied them for publication in the Advocate, 1 Dec. 1933. 
Richard Squires, who had not been heard from in public for 
some time, sent a telegram opposing the report to the Domin-
ions Office, see Neary, Newfoundland, p.37. Coaker believed 
that it was the prospect of Squ i res leading t h e opposition to 
the report which persuaded the Commissioners from proceeding 
with a referendum, see Advocate, 15 December 1933. 
81Ibid. 
82Te l e g r a m, 27 Nov . 1933. 
830ai ly News, 2 9 Nov. 1 933. 
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essential contribution they had made in s e ttin g the stag e f or 
the final act. 
Throughout the course of this d rama , it is t h e role of 
the Amulree Royal Commission which emerges front and centre as 
the primary vehicle for the acting out of the c ou ntry ' s 
conflicted political personality. It was as though in the 
image of the Royal Commission, the country was able to see a 
projection of its own futu re . Indeed the real impact of the 
Amulree Commission may have been that by its very existence it 
offered a model of that elusive new arrangement which Coaker 
had been trying to define for several years. In the process of 
the country's dialogue with Amulree, there emerged a paradigm 
that would simply call for the transfer of authority from one 
Commission to another. After all, it would not require much in 
the way of a departure to go from entrusting a body of experts 
with the troublesome task of charting a course for the future, 
to handing over the entire administration of the country to a 
similar body charged with the same essential mandate, extended 
indefinitely. It is perhaps fitting then that it was Coaker, 
the one who had most clearly articulated a certain vision of 
the fut ure, who was also the most adamant in rejecting the 
work of its harbinger. 
Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to show that the loss of New-
foundland 's responsible government in 1933 cannot be seen 
merely as an act of treachery by the government of the day, 
nor simply as the result of a dictate imposed by outsiders, 
nor even as a desperate response to a crisis brought about by 
the specific conditions of the time. Although it was arguably 
more or less a function of each and all of these factors, it 
was, more important ly, the end resul t of a process wi th a 
clear historical gestation that carried an unmistakable 
Newfoundland character. William Coaker was wrong when he 
predicted that the population would not stand for the unilat-
eral suspension of the country's political institutions. That 
the people did not respond to his appeals for mobilization nor 
spontaneously move to register any discernible protest, may be 
seen as a vindication of the decision taken by the Royal 
Commission to recommend proceeding without any provision for 
consultation to establish a regime that itself would have no 
pretence of representativeness. This was hardly a difficult 
risk to calculate in view of the enormous opinion that had 
converged around the bas ic proposi tion that the pol i tical 
p r ocess itself had to be usurped as a pre-condition for moving 
the count ry forward. 
In the e nd, Coaker f ound himself in a familiar position 
o f denouncing a merchant government for selling out the 
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country. It was precisely such a vantage point which in 192 5 
led him t o call for abolishing the party s y st em of government. 
It was then that he articulated a v iew which was i n fo rmed by 
his own e xperience and that of the country as a whole whe re 
t he future seemed t o hol d only an i nescapabl e pat tern of 
replacing the pol itica l "ins" with the "outs", a syndrome that 
would eventually produce a c r isis of pro f ound proportions. If 
the Liberals, who were the only group willing to sponsor 
reform of the fishery but were otherwise incapable of govern-
ing responsib ly , were to be replaced at regular intervals by 
a merchan t party dedicated f irst to the principle of self-
interest, then the country was bound to be held back by a 
continuous struggle to achieve a minimum level of political 
stability. (It is worth noting that for twenty years following 
the r e -elect ion of the Morris government in 1913, there was no 
political forma ti on successful in winning a second term in 
office.) Positioning himself somewhere between a warning and 
a prediction, Coaker, in a characteristic far-sighted fashion, 
seized the initiative to offer a prescriptive remedy that was 
designed with the best of intentions to reconcile a virtually 
unresol veable tension between preserving democratic practice 
o n the one hand and transforming traditional institutions into 
a n e xperimental and who lly unrecogni zable form o n the other. 
It is to Coaker's credit that as his proposal entered the 
realm of p ublic consideration and became the property of 
whoever a t t ached t h emselves to it, he a nd the editorialists at 
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the Advocate maintained a determi n ed c ommitmen t to insist as 
best they could on the inviolable principle of representation 
as a necessar y fea ture of political reform. But there was an 
inherent weakness in the st r ucture and practicability of t h e 
idea which constituted a formidable obstacle in the way of any 
clear vision toward its implementation. This was apparent even 
as its formulation evolved f rom an initial suggestion of a 
commission composed of ten to one comprising nine and then si x 
and finally three representatives. These were to be elected on 
denominational lines, which may have been a valid attempt to 
construct a new formula rooted in historical practice, but was 
nonetheless hardly a programme that would guarantee either 
representative or effective government. It also remained 
enti rely unclear how such a system could be efficiently 
introduced on the promise of a party coming to power with an 
intention to implement such a platfor m. A new government would 
first have to hold a referendum, on the assumption that it had 
no mandate to move unilaterally, and if the results were 
favourable, it would pass legislation to govern the holding of 
new elections which would then be contested by candidates 
running according to their religious affiliation. For an idea 
which was supposed to minimize and eventually to eliminate 
partisan conflict, it is difficult to see how such a process 
could have been carried out, particularly within a condensed 
time frame, without engendering a great deal of conflict in 
which sectar i an and other interests substituted for political 
divisions, 
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with no fewer compl icating and debilitat ing 
consequences. 
As it turned ou t , t h e a s cension to power of Al derdice's 
party in 1932 and the subsequent appointment of the Amulree 
Commission, with its process or broad consultation, was as 
close to being true to Coaker 's progra mme as could be real-
istically expected. It was here that the ultimate weakness of 
the proposal was revealed, as the essential problem of 
implementation was entrusted , and quite consciously so as 
Coaker's recruitment of Alderdice to the idea indicates, to a 
merchant regime that was not likely to approach the issue with 
any clear commitment to democratic values. The limitation of 
Coaker's proposal was not just chat its implementation was 
dependent on politicians, but that given the turns of the 
political wheel of fortune, it was almost inevitably going to 
c ome to rest on the good offices of representatives who had an 
entirely different conception of the nature of politics and 
who were accordingly motivated by an interest in restricting 
the perceived evils of popular rule. It is clear that, after 
the election of Alderdice, as the commission idea gained 
support beyond the F. P. U., through publ ic debates In the 
capital city, in many of t he submissions made to the Royal 
Commission by leading merchants, in much of the pro-government 
press commentary, and by the closing speech of Alderdice in 
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the House of Assembly l , t hat in none of the se p laces was there 
a professed commitment to de mocratic princip les approaching 
anythi ng like that articulated by Coaker . While he was 
advoca t ing a change, albeit a drastic and radical one, to the 
political system, others took the idea as an opportunity to 
replace electoral accountability by some f o rm of an appointed 
committee. All that was needed to give t h e proposal further 
momencum was the perception of an existing consensus on the 
question of eliminating politics from representation. And for 
t he c r eation of this , Coaker was absolutely instrumental. 2 
In this light it is instructive to read the analysis of 
t h e Amulree repor t as it went to great lengths to describe and 
l I n h is speech Alderdice e xpressed the view that the 
arguments made about the sanctity of representative institu-
tions di d not stand up against the historical rea li ty of 
experience which had shown the practice of politics to be not 
worth de fending and that in any case, the right to vote was 
"only a theoreti c al thing." 
2 It must be noted that, de spite his protests after the 
fact, Coaker was not entirely consistent in putting forward a 
democrat i c point of view, and this may be seen both in the 
very idea of a commission as a substitute for parliament, and 
in his own autocratic stewardship of the F.P.U. over such a 
long period. A specific instance in which he betrayed his own 
non-democrat ic impulses and embraced such a variation on his 
proposal was apparent when he wrote in 1932: "Newfoundland 
canno t c ome int o her own under Party government. We have too 
few s ui table men for the Parliamentary conduct of public 
business in t hi s country. What is required for Newfoundland 
and what is most essential for p r esent conditions is a 
Mussolini. If a man with a sou l encased in steel, experienced 
and not under forty y ears old, appeared on the pol it ica l 
h orizon i n thi s count r y today as a Mussolini I wou l d support 
h im with all my strength." Past , Present and Future , Ch. 10. 
This s ent iment, however, must b e understood in the contex t it 
wa s p r esented, namely that of a furious critique o f the 
re lent l e ss failure by merchants to move forward on fishery 
re fo r . 
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explain the contributing factors wh i ch defined what it called 
a general demoralisation of the pe ople . It i dentified a "vi s 
inertiae" e x isting throughout the country) which wa s 
attributed by the Commis sion as largely resulting fr om the 
iniquitous credit system in the fishery and the "far-reaching 
p sychological effects" it produced among the population. 4 The 
account of the workings of this system was detailed and 
merciless in its indictment of the role of the merchants. s It 
followed this with a report on the evidence it had received 
concerning the political system, and concluded there could be 
no doubt that "a continuing process of greed, craft and 
corruption ... [had] left few classes of the community untouched 
by its insidious influences. ,, 6 The combined effects of self-
interest in politics and the fishery had put the country in a 
vu lnerable position, unprepared for the disruption and 
devastation that would arrive with the years of the depressi-
on. 
By 1932, the report stated that "no less than 70,000 
persons, or 25 per cent of the population were in receipt of 
)Amulree Report, p.78. 
4 I bid ., pp.79 ~ 81. 
SIn a later section the report made reference to the 
"salutary measures" introduced by Coaker in 1919 to reform the 
fishery, and castigated the merchants again for their failure 
to supp ort an initiative it said was in their own best 
interest, t h e results of which had severe long term conse-
quences for the country . I b id., p.109. 
6Ibid. , pp . 8 1 - 81. 
1 35 
p ublic relief, ot h e r tha n poor relie f o r re l i ef f o r the a ged 
poor. ,, 7 Then in 1933, any prospects for e v e n a tempora ry 
r e c ov e ry were destroyed as the shore f i she r y c ollapsed , 
affecting "nearly t hr e e quarters of the population. ,,8 Final l y, 
the Commissioners ventured to "emphasiz e " c ertain aspe c ts of 
po l itical l ife whi ch deserv ed consideration and focused on two 
in par t icular. Th e first c oncerned the issue of "job farming " 
and the effects of the "spoils system" on the country's 
administrati on and its civil servants. It noted that the 
capital city had an approximate populat i on of 40,000, which 
was a very small base from which to recruit an educated class 
for public serv i c e: " . . . t he members of it are all known, if 
not re l ated, to each other: everyone knows everyone else's 
business a nd it is a simp l e matter to ascertain which way a ny 
parti c u l ar civil servant voted .,, 9 Secondly , it examined the 
consequences of denominationalism on t he workings of govern-
ment and drew the conclusion that i nstead of the churches 
playi ng a posi t ive role as a "check to political malpractice", 
t he divisions only se r v ed to contribute to the "general de-
morali zation. ,, 1 0 
Al l of this, and more besides, was used to construct a 
7 I bi d ., p. 8 3. 
8I b id., p. 8 5. 
9I b i d ., p. 87. Such a p i c ture may appear patronizing, but 
t his doe s not mea n i t wasn't a ccura t e. 
lO rb id. , pp. 8 8 -8 9 . 
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background analysis which was designed to establish a case for 
dismantling the country's political machinery as a means o f 
securing it s so l vency. I t may be, as Peter Neary h as argued in 
presenting evidenc e o f the secretive final machinations, t hat 
t he choice of structure for the commission regi me wa s give n to 
the Royal Commission by the Dominions Office a s a c o ndu i t for 
t h e British government's refusal to entertain any scenarios 
that would see a delay or partial default of debt p ayments . 11 
But this was only done at the eleventh hour, following a 
critical refusal by Canada to co-operate in providing assist-
ance t o meet payments falling due at the end of the year, and 
after a protracted and systematic review of innumerable 
op tions short of the one recommended . It is also clear that 
even then this choice was not the preferred solution of all 
the Commi ssioners, particularly Magrath who, as the Canadian 
appo int ee, publicly indicated his disagreement and dissatisf-
action . 12 On the one hand, this vacillation In formulating 
the rec ommendations indicates the tenuous nature of the 
perceived political basis for advancing such a proposal. At 
the same t ime, however, it points to the reality that such a 
programme would not likely have seen the light of day if it 
had not first been presented to the Commission, and as such to 
the British authorities, as a bona f i de proposition with tan-
gible s u pport in Newfoundland. 
1lSee Neary , New foundl and , pp. 23-27. 
12 I bi d ., pp. 31-32. 
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In the Royal Commission ' s repor t , t h e r e were three 
options put forward for political reform which allegedly 
represented the range of views submitted by witnesses. (This 
followed a discussion o f two other options , the sale o f 
Labrador and the possibil ity of Confederation , which were both 
rejected o n the grounds of not being v i a b le , and in the case 
of Confederation , not receiving support from the population .) 
These options we re introduced with the Commissioners' state-
ment of a g u iding principle whereby rehabilitation had to 
proceed in a "tvvo fold character": financial assistance would 
have to be coupled with political changes that would advance 
not only "material prosperity ", but also allow the country to 
"win free from the malign influences" that would otherwise 
threaten any prospects for ameliorative progress. 13 The 
repor t outlined the political options as falling wi thin three 
categories: a continuation of the e x isting form of government 
with modifications to ensure the permanence of some form of 
expenditure con tro l; alterations to the system of government 
withou t modifying the constitution ; and finally, a "radical 
change of system ." 
Th ese categories reflect those out lined in the memorandum 
prepared by Clutterbuc k , but in the report the first two were 
rejected in a perfunctory fashion as not meeting the test of 
provi d ing for a new political machinery that would "ensure the 
e x e cuti o n of a const ructive forward policy designed to improve 
l.J Amulree Report, p . 192 . 
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the condition of the people. ,, 1 4 The Commissioners s e t up a 
circular logic in which the outcome was alrea dy de termi n ed by 
a condition which precluded certain po t ential opt i ons : "We a re 
sati sfied that such m chinery cou ld not be created wit hout a 
modification of the e x isting constitution." The Commissioners 
concluded that the y wo uld no t be justified in enlisting the 
financial as sistance of Lh e British government, "wh ile the 
f undament al cau s e s o f the present difficulties we r e t o b e 
neglected. ,,15 Finally, the report made the case explicit in 
a manner which reflects on both the self-conscious uncertainty 
of its own position and the weight of arguments, presumably 
from both the wi tnesses and British authorities, recommending 
a nti-democrati c measures : 
Af ter much anx ious consideration, therefore, and in spite 
of a strong pre-disposition in favour of the maintenance 
of established institutions, we have been forced to the 
conc l usion that only by a radical change of regime for a 
l imited period of years can the island be assisted to 
effective recovery. 16 
The report then gave consideration to two final possi-
bilities in either the formation of a National government or 
an exten sion of the existing parliament. Both of these were 
seen to be inadequate in responding to the desires of that 
"great majority of witnesses" who had called for a rest from 
politi cs , differing only as to the form that rest might ta ke: 
14 rbid., p. 194. 
l S b id. 
1b lb d., p. 195 . 
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The desiderat um was not that the count ry should be freed 
for the time bei n g from the prospect of a general 
election, and fr om the demoralising influen ces of pa r ty 
poli tic s, but that ... the exist i ng Leg i slative machine 
shou l d be temporarily suspended and the gove rnment of t he 
country placed for a period o f years in the hands o f a 
' Commission I • ! 7 
This passage rep r esents t he formal introduct ion o f the 
language which Coaker had been using for eight years into the 
lexicon o f constitu t ional discourse , and it is made cl ear that 
the concept whi ch gave i t definition was taken from the people 
who had appeared before the Royal Commission. This thesis has 
attempted , in part, to qualify the received wisdom concerning 
the extent to which this idea was embraced by the population, 
insofar as avai lable sources indicate. But the evidence also 
shows that at the same time, the general formu lation, with 
importan t d is tinguishing features according to who was 
advocaci ng it and when, was not only in wide circulation, but 
in a real s ense can be seen to have constituted an actually 
exis ti ng consensus. In the end, the obj ections regarding 
process and form were shown to be a limited liability where 
disagreement amounted to an insignificant, albeit resonant, 
challenge . For, despi t e the absence of any provision for 
accoun t abili t y, and the lac k of a plebiscite on the recommend-
ations , the substantial content of the Commission's political 
analysis could have been written by William Coaker at any time 
b etween 1 92 5 and 1933. The response by t he Royal COIT@ission to 
t h e mala ise it discovered in Newfoundland reflected a manifest 
l- I b id ., p . 196 . 
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crisis in wh ich all sense of political e f fic acy had bee n 
thoroughly undermined. In the final analysis , t he arti cul ati on 
of its solution may be seen to have been an indirect expre s s-
ion of self-determinat ion on behalf of a peop l e who had f or 
some time been willing to yield their own voice. 
E. H. Car r h as wr i t ten, i n a di scu ssion of h ow h istor i cal 
interpretation of po lit ical ev ents tends toward a skewe d 
analysis accordi n g to a certain view of progress, that it is 
necessary in regardi n g the past to pursue a neutral course in 
passing judgement: "Nothing is more radically false t han to 
set up some supposedly abstract standard of the desirable and 
condemn t he past in light of it . ,, 1 8 In the case of Newfound-
l and ' s loss of self -government in 1933, a loss which not 
incidental ly inc luded the abdication of the country's full 
status a s a Dominion within the Empire 19 , there is not much 
point in assigning blame, or for that matter , questioning the 
validity of the findings of the Arnulree Commission or the 
wisdom of the government of the day in acceding to a recommen-
dation from the outside. For, as James Overton has suggested, 
in considering the attributes of what Antonio Gramsci called 
the Caesarist solution of political forces conv erging in 
response to crisis, it is an open question whether the idea of 
lB E .H . Ca r r , Wha t i s History? (London 1961), p. 128. 
19 Fo r a t ho rough legal i s ti c treatment of the complex 
questi ons s u rro undi ng the h i story of Newfoundland's interna-
t i onal c o nst it ut ional sta tus, See William Gilmore, Newfound-
l and a d Domin i on Status (Toront o 19 88) . 
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commission government was progressiv e or reactionary in 
character. 2o What lS clear is that the idea eme rged as a 
result of an intervention by William Coaker who carried it 
forward over a peri od of time as a l egitimate political agenda 
which eventually came to dominate the country ' s public 
discourse . As s uch , while it may have prepared t e ground for 
a k ind of interregnum which had not originally been envis-
ioned , the proposition was one nonetheless authent ically 
rooted in the Newfoundland political experience . 
2iiOverton, " Ec onomic Crisis ", pp . 123 - 124 . 
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App endix A 
Excerpts from Ad ress to FPU Conv enti on by Wi l liam Coa ker, 
November 1925 1 
Th e f ut ' re depends mo re upon the ri gh t type of men elected 
than the policy t he y advocate . I may not b e included in the 
next l ist of candida tes a ppea l ing to t h e elec t orate . I have 
fought for certain ideal s s i nc e 19 09 . These ideals were 
supported by a p o rtion of t h e el ectorate and opposed by t he 
other portion . I st ill bel ieve in these i deals, but I see very 
l ittle hope of p utting t hem into effec t a nd I wou ld no t aga in 
willingly undertake to car r y political burdens and thei r 
i nces sant worries unles s absol u t ely as s ured cha t t he po l itical 
i deals I have entertained for a lifetime would form a part of 
the political c reed of a new government. I see many b reaker s 
a ead, a n d mo untainous s eas whi ch will engul f the ship of 
State un less cormnanded by the best crew procurable in the 
land. Ma ny big a nd far-reaching problems await to be solved . .. 
but whi ch will never be solved satisfactorily under the 
peculiar conditions which for the last thirty years have 
guided the electorate in the choice of its rulers . The chief 
aim of some political leaders has been to attain power or 
defeat t he ir opponents rega r dless of the bluff and insincerity 
p ractised to attain the end . What I would like to see is a 
party appealing to the electorate on the single issu e of 
passing a law t o place the government of the country in the 
hands of nine men for ten years , electing the nine men 
somewhat o n t h e li nes pursued for years of s e lecting the 
Execut ive, t hat is to ensure denominational representation . I 
woul d li k e to see Catholic districts selecting three members 
o f t he Government of nine , the West Coast and Conception Bay 
selecting three more and the North three more, fi l ling 
vacancies as they occur in each section and permitting the 
nine elected Cormnissioners to elect their own Chairman , who 
't.lOuld be Prime [ i nister . The Deputy heads would administer the 
Departments . All legislation to be published prior to enact-
ment to enable t h e public to discuss such or memorialize the 
Government in connection therewith. Such a policy pursued for 
t en years would produce reforms , establish industries , procure 
r etrenc hment and place the fishing industry on a soun d 
businesslike basis . It wou ld c u t 0 t graft , reduce the Civil 
Service list to i ts proper proportion , dispense , for a period, 
with the a nimos it ies and bitterness of party strife and permit 
the co nt ry to concentrate upon vital matters that await 
soluti o n withou t having before its eyes day by day, as now , 
t he spectre of the voters tu-ning them out of office , because 
graft was limited, or jobs and pic k ings were unobtainable , o r 
what the owners of inferior f i sh would do with their vote and 
i n f l u e n c e in the event of being graded inferior by the proper 
i nspecti on. Pe r sona l ly , af t er very considerable experience , I 
lAs pub l~shed in Coake r , Twenty Yea rs , p . 236 ff . 
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am convi nc ed that t h e f u ture of the count ry c a n be s t be s e rved 
and attained nder a Commission somewhat on t h e l ine s I have 
ou tlined. There wo u ld be no limit to t h e number of Candidat es 
nominated for each division and the e l ecti ons woul d be unde r 
the Election Law as far as applicable . The Party favour ing 
such an issue, if elected to p ower , would have to convene t h e 
Legislat ure immed iately after it b ecame the Gove r nmen and 
enact the necessary legi s l ation. I f the Upper House refused to 
pass such legislation i t s ref u sal would be overcome by the law 
of 191 7 which enables the House of Assembly to e nact laws 
without the concur rence of the Upper House . Foll owing such an 
enactme nt di ssolution would follow and an e lec tion take place 
to select the nine commissioners in three sections of three 
for each. Th e Catholic people would select their own repres-
entatives , the Church o f England and Methodist would do the 
arne . St. John ' s , Trepassey, Placentia, St. Mary's, Harbor 
Main and Bell Island would elect the three Catholic represent-
atives , because the population is Catholic by a heavy major-
ity. Con ception Bay, Burin, Fortune Bay , Burgeo and the West 
Coast woul d elect three. The districts from St. Barbe to 
Tr i nity would elect three , which being largely Protestants 
would permit Protestants to be elected and there would be no 
trouble experienced in selecting three Methodist and three 
Angli cans . After ten years the Commission would issue a 
proclamation to elect members for the House of Assemb ly and 
Par t y po li t i cs would agai n dominate the elections and re turn 
a Party Government . I have given much though to the future 
development and progress of the country and I repeat, I am 
convinced that unless s ome such arrangement is made there can 
be no escape from the breakers nor can there be stable 
busine s s progress . More progress would be made under such a 
Commission in ten years t han would be possible in fifty years 
of Par ty government . 
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Appendi x B 
Letter by Wi lli am Coaker to Even i ng Telegram, 2 3 Nov ember 1933 
Dear Sir - You reque st my views on the Report o f t h e Royal 
Commission : but I f ee l sure yo u appreciate the dif fi cul ty , if 
not the i mpossi b ility , of for ing a cons idered op in i on or 
coming to any definite conc l usion within a few days i n 
r e ference to s u ch a compre h ens ive, comp lex a nd importan t 
d ocument, the preparati on o f which required t h e concent r ated 
a ttenti on of its compilers ext ended over a period of severa l 
months . 
However the who le appears to b e summed up in the despatch 
da ted the 19th., inst ., from the Rt . Hon . the Secretary of 
State for the Dominions , t o t he Hon. the Prime Mi n is ter of 
Newfoundland i n reply to the latter ' s request for an indica -
tion of the attitude of the Brit i sh Government to the recom-
mendat ions of the Commissi on . Perusing that Despatch, it is 
quite obvious t hat the immediate we l fare of Newfound l and and 
e wfound landers is not its main theme . Its text is based on , 
(1 ) the political situation facing the country , and (2) the 
neces sity of protecting the bond holders and financial 
creditors of Newfoundland ; wherea s our pressing and i mperative 
needs are the feeding and clo t h i ng of our starving and 
destit u te p eople du ring the coming winter ; and the finding of 
r emunerative employment in productive labour for over twenty 
thousand of our male population , in order to enable them to 
resume the support of themselves and their families before 
another year pa ss es . These are the questions with which the 
country is concerned - of even paramount importance of outside 
i nterests , financial or otherwise ; but these questions the 
Report fails t o effectively answer. 
What remedi a l suggestions have the Commissioners offered in so 
f ar as t h e development of our fisheries i s concerned? They 
make no de finite recommendation only , namely , the spending of 
$16 5 , 000 to provide four schooners to t est out the possibil-
ities of t he fishing grounds and the e s tablishment of six bai t 
d epots as an experimenta l step toward the provi s ion of bait 
sup p lies : and the only help the Report contemplates giving to 
the rehab ilitation of o ur main industry is the suggestion to 
create a new department of natural resources embracing the 
fisheries , fores ts , agric u lture and mines , pres i ded over by a 
Commis sioner , noc from Newfoundland, but from England . Is that 
assi sting our staple industry as was e xpected? Does that 
afford Newfoundland the aid so urgently required to man her 
fis h ing f lee ts , f ina nce their o ut fitt ing , and assure to those 
who prosec te t h e voyage , r easonab le hope of obtain i ng 
suitab le ret u rn s 0 main a in t h eir families and themse l ves? It 
i s t r ue t _e Report con ta ins many references to t he necessity 
o f res toring t he f ishing i n u stry o f the coun ry , but it 
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lamentably ai l s t o solve our problems in that respecti and 
many o f t h e proposals '-"/hich the Report i ndicates In my 
opinion , if given effect, would only make mat ters wo r s e . They 
may sou nd well in the t h eory , but in the main t h ey a re 
impracticable a n d of fe r no remedy fo r the ills f rom which this 
industry has been suffe r ing for the past f ew y e ars . 
The ma in princ i p le underlying t . e Repor t i s the e stablishment 
of a Commission f o rm o f gov ernme nt for t hi s country . I approv e 
of Gove rnment by Commiss ion - p r ovided prope r saf e guards are 
afforded our people. My i d eas as to the creation o f t hi s new 
s ystem of gove rn ent and it s operation in the admini stration 
of the country ' s af f airs differ materially however fr om those 
of the Commissioners. I a m absolutely opposed to the s h eme of 
government as out 1 ined i n the Report . Not alone does it 
involve t he comp lete abrogation of our r ' ghts of self-govern -
ment , b t proposes to set up a governing body vested with the 
wi dest a n d mos autocratic powers, uncontrolled and uncontrol-
lable so f ar as the people of Newfoundland are concerned who 
are denied even the right of selection of those to whom they 
a re asked to surrender their liberties. That would not be 
governmen t ! That would be sheer despotism and contrary to 
eve ry p rinc ip l e upon which government within the Br itish 
Empi re is fo unded . It is humiliating enough to have to witness 
t h e givin g p of responsible government, but to be pl unged 
from the statu s , theoretical though it may have been, of a 
self-go erning Dominion of the Crown to a position below that 
of the ordin ary Crown Colony , is degrading . We s hould be put 
on a par wi th one of the subject races an intolerable 
situat i on to even contemplate. A Commission selected by, and 
p roperly representative of, the people, to govern the country 
f or a de fi e term of years , freed from the disturbances and 
d isadvantages of party politics , might very well prove the 
sal vation of Newfoundland; but there is a vast difference 
b etween that system of government and the plan proposed by the 
Royal Commission . Greatly as default by this country in its 
f inancial obl iga tions is to be deplored , I think it is 
p referable to the acceptance of the proposals as contained in 
the Repo rt. 
o r Legis ature has been called together for Monday next to 
d eal wi th the report . I cannot for a moment bring myself to 
b elieve t ha t there will be any hasty decision reached on what 
i s perhaps the most moment ous question ever submitted to the 
c ons iderat ion of the people ' s representatives - i nvolv ing not 
al one h e pol i tical destinies of our country , but the intimate 
in t ere ts of e v ery man , woman and child in Newfoundland . 
Ob vious l y it is n o t a matter for any snap judgement , and 
r ealiz ing the inte r ests at stak e, appreciating the fact that 
n o only is the protection of the creditors of Newfo ndl a d 
c oncer. e o , b ut the most sacred righ ts and l iberties as well , 
i t must be p resume that the most ma tur e tho g h t wi l l e given 
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to the Report and the recoITIDendations i t concains, before any 
action is taken . Every precaution ho u 1d be observed to see 
that every phase of the subject is e xhau s tively consi ered 
before a ny definit e c onc lusion is r eached . To rush a mat ter o f 
such i mp ortance t h r ough the Legi s lature may ve r y we ll i nvo lved 
a disas te r to t he people of t his c ountry I even more far 
r eachi ng than that conjectured by the Co mmiss ioners . 
I n my opi n ion the Legislature wou l d be unwise if it accep t ed 
t he recommenda t ions in the ir present f o r m; b u it wo ld b e 
false to i t s trust and i ts memb ers recrean t in eir d1 t y to 
the peop l e they represent if they tolerat e d any attemp t to 
rush the matter . It is noc too much to say tha t t h ose wh o 
has tily or inadvisably or for any unworthy motive vot e for t h e 
accepta nce of the Re p ort in its present form , will be remem -
bered in t h e h istory of t h is c ountry as traitors to the land 
t hat bore them. 
There are c erta i n ac c e ptable phases in the Report , but there 
are many objectionable feat u res . The latter may be remov ed if 
time is glven c o ana l yse and properly consider the recom -
menda t ion s and suggest some counter-proposals . An opportu n ity 
for this shoul d b e a f forded , and it is only fair, not a lone to 
the members of t h e Legislat re , but to the public at l arge , 
that time sho d be gi ven in o rder to properly asse s s the 
value and effec t of the document upon which the destinies of 
th is cou t ry depen d . The suggestion which I venture to make is 
that, f ollowing the discuss ion on the Report , to take place on 
Monday n e xt , t he House should rise for an interva l sufficient-
l y long t o enable the Report to be exhaustively studied, as 
well by the representatives of the people , as by the public 
it self; and in so far as objections to the recommendations may 
be disclo s ed , an opport nity should also be afforded for the 
submission of coun t er-proposals to the British Government; and 
to that end a Commission should be appointed to proceed if 
necessary , to England, to confer with the representatives of 
the British Government to see whether some more acceptable 
plan could be evolved , and some better method devised to 
safeguard our national obligations and assure the recovery of 
ou r count r y at the same time , protecting us against the i l l -
effects wh ich are bound a fol low if the proposals in their 
p r e sent fo rm are carried o ut . 
I do not t hin it is too much to as k that this country be 
allowed at leas t a few weeks to properly consider a Report 
whi ch has take n mont hs to prepare . In that the recommendations 
invol v e the s urr ende r o f 0 r right s of self-Govern ent, I 
seriously question t h e p ower of the Legislature to assent to 
t h e a b r o g a tion of the s e ri ghts withou t fi r st having the matter 
s bmit ed t o t h e p e opl e , a nd I feel confident tha t were a y 
other cou t ry wi thi n t he Bri ti sh Empire faced with a decision 
wh i ch we are now asked t o ma ke , nothi ng ",lOuld be do ne by t he 
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representatives of the people unless and unti l t h e quest ion 
was first s ubmi t ted at least by way of a p lebisc i te to the 
determi nation of t he people themselves . 
Yours t ru l y, 
W.F . Coaker 
St. John's , Novembe r 23rd. 
Cable despatch by Will iam Coaker t o the Secretary of St at e for 
Dominion Affairs , Novembe r 25th , 1933 ( "Saturday las t " , as 
p rinted in Fisherma n ' s Advoca e , 1 December ) 
"Government intends force through Legislature meet i g Monday 
next acceptance recommendations Royal Commission Repor t 
without allowing time for proper consideration vital issues 
involved . Such procedure bound to have disastrous effects . In 
h is Mani festo last year Prime Minister gave solemn pledge 
nothing would be d one altering constitutional position unless 
approved by electorate . I n view this undertaking and supreme 
i mport ance mat ter , if measure rushed through over heads of 
p eople , as now c ontemplated by Government, immediate agitation 
f or repeal will result, j ustified on grounds of treachery and 
surrender country ' s rights without peopl e being given time 
properly study question . Have advised Gove rno r in best 
interest country to implore Government to allow time people 
c onsid e r issue and t ke plebiscite , otherwis e f e ar tranqui l -
l ity country 1I',ill be endangered , authority undermined and 
w 'desp r ead turmoil and unrest follow . Be lieve country if 
p roperly consulted will endorse Commission Government , on 
r easonab le condi t ions , for period of year s, but if present 
r~oposa l s brought into effect grave dissatisfaction , intense 
_cterness and lasting antagonisms will r e sult ." 
Appendi x C2 
Notes on Commis sion Government (p resented by P . A. Clut cerbuck, 
Sepc . 193 3) 
Of the wi tnesses who have appear ed before t h e Commis sion to 
d ace , 15 have b een in favo r of "Commiss ion Gove rnment" fo r a 
pe riod of years and 8 ag inst. It wil l be seen from the 
attached list tha t chose i fa v o u r are made up o f 3 memb ers 
and 1 ex -member o f the present Cabinet , 1 ex - Prime Min i ster , 
one member of t he Upper Hous e , 1 Minis t er in the last Go ver -
ment , 2 Civ il Servants , 1 Bank Ma n ager , 2 Mer c h a nt s , 1 l awyer 
and 2 commercia l me n. Tho se against comp ris e 4 embers of t h e 
present Cab i net , t h e la te Prime Miniscer and hi s F i n ance 
Hinis te r , 1 merchant and 1 c ommercial man . 
The advocates of Commission Government h ave in the main been 
actuat e d by t he gen ine belief that in no othe r way wil l 't b e 
possible t o satisfy c h e ess entia l needs of the co ' n try , name l y 
t o stamp 0 c gra ft and cor r uption , get rid of the professional 
politic i an , and l ead the people back to a sense of inde pen -
ence and s elf-reliance . They are u n ited in the ide a that it 
is 2S year s of politics that has led to the breakdown o f 
r espons ible gov ernment , a n d that , the crash having come , it 
would be suici"a l to a tt empt to rebuild on the same founda-
t ion . It is on l y by Ilrm cont rol and a prolonged political 
h o l i a y, t h ey c la im , t hat the c ountry can be saved . 
Those who o ppo s e Comm i ssion Government do so f o r four reasons : 
(a) On accoun t of the humiliation involved ; Commission 
Governme nt wou l d mean Newfound land i s not fit to gove r n 
h e r self . (b) It ight necessitate reversion to the status of 
a Colony a n d this would mean putting the clock b a ck . (c) While 
the people might accept it today they would soon be dissat -
i sfied and the p o sition of the Commissione rs would become 
in tolerable. (d) The composition of the Commis sion woul d in 
any case present s e ri o us difficulties . 
It wi ll b e observed from the attached list that the oppon ents 
of this f orm of government are mostly politicians . Th i s is 
on ly na tura l si nce i t is at the politicians that the proposal 
is a' me d . On t e other hand the Cabinet Hini s ters a n d the 
others i n the o pposice c amp re not all so disinterested as 
migh t app ear , s i ce it is n ot unfair to say that some at l east 
see ~n the proposal an attractive and patriotic d e vice for 
keeping their o wn party i n powe r and completing the ruin of 
thei r pol it ica l opponen s . These might have different views if 
the COI11Jnission It.Jere co be comp os e d of outsiders . 
~T~is doc ume t is fr om the McGrath papers , Reel 2 , 
"t1i sce llaneous ." It is signed by P . A . Clutterbuck with a note 
that it was p resent ed 1 5 Sept. 1933 . 
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Individual suggestions as to the fo rm whi c h Commission 
Governmen t might t ake have naturally varied with the angle 
f rom which the prob lem has b e en appro a ched. But for che 
purpose s of t his no te it will b e conven iene t o cons ide r t he 
suggescions un ' e r two head s: (A) Those which wo I d not 
necessar i ly impair t he sta t u s o f t h e Island as a Dominion and 
(8) t hose wh ich would do s o . 
A. Commission Governme t in a f o r m which wo u ld no t necessar-
ily impair che stat s of t he Is land as a Dominion . 
It may be taken as axioma tic that any proposal wh ich involved 
the disappearance of the Legislature would be incon s i stent 
with the existing constitutional instruments . The Constitut ion 
of Newfou ndland is somewhat c omplicated, being partly written 
a nd par tly nwrit ten, the former being contained part l y in 
Letters Pa t ent and Royal Instructions , partly in Act s of [he 
U.K. Parliament and partly in Acts of the Newf oundland 
Legis lature . The main instrument is the Letters Patent of the 
28th March , 1876 which constitute the office of Governor and 
define t he Gove r nor ' s powers and authoriti e s. Clause III . of 
the Let t ers Paten t deals with the Constitution of the Legis-
lative Council and Clause IV . empowers the Governor " to summon 
and cal l together the Ge neral Assembly and also , from 
t ime to time , in the lawful and accustomed manner , to pro rogue 
the Legislative Co uncil and the House of Assembly and 
from e ime t o t ime to dissolve the said House of Assembly ." 
Clause V. a ut hor i s es and empowers the Governor , wi th the 
adv ice and c onsent of the Legislative Council and Assemb l y , to 
make aws for the public peace , we l fare and good government of 
Newf o ndland . 
Detail e d provisions regarding the House of Assembly are 
contained not in the Letters Patent but in Newfoundland Acts , 
bu t it is c lear from the above Clauses that the Letters Patent 
post l at e the existence of a Legislative Council and House of 
Assembly and further that the Governor has now power of 
l egislation except with the advice and consent of the two 
Houses . Any proposal to enab l e the Governor to act indepen-
dently o f the Legislature, which would be dissolved for the 
t i me being, wou l d therefore seem prima facie to require 
amendme n t of t h e Letters Patent . 
On the other hand , it may be argued that the Letters Patent 
are o n l y a part of Ne wfoundland ' s written constitution , and 
must be read sub j ect to her unwritten constitution , namely to 
the a van c e in cons it tiona l usage and practice which has 
tak en place s ' nce 876 . At the time that the Letters Paten t 
were is sued and fo r many years afterwards Newfoundland was a 
Co lony and , a s s uch , subject in the last resort , to control 
fr om the Unit e d Kingdom . In h e c ourse of time her pos i t ion 
became t hat o f a self-governing Colony wi t h Dom nion status 
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(which would be r et ained in being on a purely honorary basis) 
bu t wou ld be i mmune rom interference by that body except and 
in so far as fresh legi slation might be r equired . The wea ness 
of the scheme lies in the f a ct that s i nce most e xec ti ve wo rk 
depends in the l ast r esort o n fina n c i al provi sion a n d s ince 
financial provision r equ ires l e gi slative sanction , t he fr eedom 
of acti on gran ted co the Commis s ion mi g t prove to b e i llus -
ory . 
2 . The Gove rnme t to pass an Ac r econstituti g the Exec tive 
Council (as they are fully entit led to do under Cl ause II. of 
the Letters Patent of 1 876) . They might f o r instance, decide 
that the Execu ti ve Council , i n stead of consisti ng o f t welve 
members as at present , shoul d in future consist of the Prime 
Ministe r and t he Secretary o f State , and four membe rs to be 
nominated by t h e Govern or (the understanding being that two 
would be select ed fr om Canada and two from the Uni ted Ki ng-
dom) . They cou d furthe r provide by legi s lation tha t those 
members of the Execut ive Council who were not already members 
o f the House of Assembly should be ex-officio member s o f the 
body. The Execut ive Council would then proceed , just as t h ey 
do today , to ~ ake c h r g e of t h e executive business of the 
Island and t h e me mbe rs wo Id between them be responsible for 
r unn ' ng the var io u s Government departments , for framing pol icy 
and for carrying t hrough the necessary reforms . The Executive 
ounci l woul d i f act be the "Commission ", with the Prime 
Mi nist er (sub j e ct to the Governor) at the head of it and the 
Prime Mini ste r wou ld depend on his majority in Parliame t for 
putting through the fresh legisl a tion on which the Comm ission 
might decide . This mi ght work very well but the weakness of 
the scheme lies i n t h e fact that all members of the existing 
Executive Counci l , o ther than the Prime Minister and the 
Secretary of State would be thrown out of off ice and whil e 
they wou l d no doub t behave themselves at first they might 
before long constitute a disgruntled bloc in the Hou se . The 
scheme could onl y work satisfactorily as long as the Prime 
Minister was absol u te ly sure of his majority . 
B. Commi ssion Goverrunent in a form wh ich would impair t he 
statu s of Npwfoundland as a Domi nion . 
It is to be e xpected t hat neither of the forgoing s cheme s 
would be sati sfactory to t h e advocates of Commission Govern-
ment si nce ne ither woul d i n te rfere with the mach i nery of 
Parliament , still le s s prov ide for its suppression. It wo u l d 
t h us be p oss ib le f o r e w Government to reverse the action 
taken by t he pr e s ent Go vernment and to restore the status quo 
with all it s d a ng e r s . If it should be desired to safeguard t he 
country F.l gainst ch is poss i bility , it wo uld be necessary to 
suspend the present P r l iamentary s y stem and this wou l d 
involve t h e altera t i on o f the Letters Patent . 
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Assuming the at t h e Government wished to go to t h e se lengths , 
the appropriate procedure from t h e constitutiona l standpo int 
would be the submission of an Addr ess to t h e Sovereign f rom 
both Hou ses of t h e Newfoundland Legislature setting out t he 
groun ds on which t he provis ion of the Letters Patent was 
desired and praying f or t h e issue of new Letters Patent under 
which both the e xe ut ive and t h e legislative power would be 
vested in t he Gove rnor who woul d be assisted by an Ex ecut ive 
Council cons i stin g of x members to be nominated by him. It 
could be recommended t hat x/2 should b e chosen from Newfound -
land, x/2 from the Un ited Kingdom , a nd x/ 2 from Canada , or 
such other proport ions as the Government might see fit to 
suggest. Alternatively , if it we re desired to do so, it might 
b e recommended that all the members should be chosen fr om 
outside Newfoundland . Further recommendations might be that 
there should be an Advisory Counci l composed of prominent men 
in Newf oundland (who would serve in an advisory capacity) and 
t hat the new regime should be subject to review either at the 
end of a stated period or when Newfoundland was again able to 
pay her way . On t h e ass umption that these recommendations were 
adopted by His Majesty , arrangements could then be made for 
the issue of new Letters Patent revoking the existing Letters 
Patent and containing provisions in the sense desired. The 
e x isting Royal Instructions would also have to be revoked and 
fresh i n structions issued , and it would further be necessary 
fo r a new Commission to be issued to the Governor . 
But while from the standpoint of procedure no special diffi-
culty would seem to arise (though action of this kind is of 
course unprecedented) the implications of such a course would 
undoubtedly be far-reaching. 
In the first place , it lS clear that, both executive and 
legislative power having been invested in the Governor, His 
Ex cellency could not be left in the air as a virtual dictator. 
But, it may be said, Newfoundland is a Dominion, and, as such, 
able to dispose of her own destiny. Why then should she not 
have a dictator if she wished? I f the Sout h African Parliament 
for instance chose to abdicate its functions and place all 
executive and legislative power in the hands of the Governor 
General, would there be any cause for interference? Whatever 
the answer to this last question (which would be a nice 
e x ercise in constitutional theory) it is clear that Newfound-
land would, in any case, be regarded as in a di f ferent 
p osition from that of any of the larger Dominions. It will not 
h ave escaped nocic e that the Governor is a Governor, and not 
a Gove rnor-General . It may be taken as axiomatic that a small 
and backward community li k e this could not be left to the 
tender mercies of a Governor appoint e d from home without 
supervision of some sort.. At the p r esent time the I sland 
enjoys fu ll "resp o n s ible g overnment", i.e ., a system of 
gov ernment under wh i ch Ministers elected by the votes of the 
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p eop le are respon sible to t h e people for t h e g ood governme n t 
o f the c o u n t r y , t h e Governor b eing a c onst i tuti on a l fi gu r ehea d 
who is r equ ired (ex cept possib l y in c ertain conti n g encies int o 
wh ich it is not nec essary to en t e r h e re) to a c t o n his 
Minister's advice. If t here c eased to b e elected Mi n isters a n d 
the Governor and the Gove rno r was given c omple t e freedom o f 
action (either al on e o r a s "Go v"e rnor-in-Counci l ), it would be 
necessary for him t o b e ac c o un table t o s ome a u thority f o r his 
a ctions a nd (un l ess t h i s form o f gove rnment could be made t o 
f it in with some wh olly n ovel scheme o f p o liti c al u n i on wi t h 
Canada) t h is authority cou l d only be the U. K. Gov t . I t follows 
that the introduction of "Commiss i on Government" in this form 
would a utomatically deprive Newfoundland of Dominion status 
and wo ul d degrade he r to that of a Colony under U.K. contro l . 
In other words the Governor would be respons ible to the 
appropriate Secretary of State i n London for the good gov-
ernment o f the I sland and the Secretary of State would be 
responsi bl e to Parliament, who in turn would be responsible to 
the U.K. electo r a t e. 
I t follows from this reasoning that the issue of new Letters 
Pa t e n t would n o t in itself be sufficient to secure the end 
desired. If the U.K. Parliament is to assume the responsibili-
t y, i t wo uld be n ecessary to obtain its consent. In view of 
he recent l y pas sed " Statute of Westminster", Sectio n 1 of 
wh ich de f i n e s t h e e x press i on "Dominion" as including New-
foundla n , the a ppropriate procedure would doubtless be the 
passage o f a further Act of Parliament (which would be 
s pec if ica lly stated to have been passed with the request and 
to t h e c onsent of the Newfoundland Government) providing for 
t he administ r ation of Ne wfoundland, as a Colony. 
Th e ass umption by the U.K. Government of responsibility for 
the good government of Newfoundland would in turn involve 
responsibility for its finances. This would necessitate a 
grant-in-aid equivalent to the amount of the annual deficit. 
The novelty of the situation (vis., the demotion of a Domin-
ion), the size of the deficit, and the nocorious mis-man-
a gement, not to say corruption of previous Newfoundland 
Governments, would all combine to attract attention and there 
would no doubt be many to say that the United Kingdom had 
already shouldered enough responsibilities. It would be idle 
to pursue speculation too far, but the conclusion naturally 
s u g g ests itself t hat, if the U.K. taxpayer were to be saddled 
with this addi t ional burden, the least that could be done to 
pacify h i m wou l d be to l i nk the Colony to sterling and to 
revise t he tariff o n a preferential basis. 
A furt h er poin t which ought not to be overlooked is that the 
p osition o f the present Gove rnment would be affected. Under a 
regime o f th i s k ind, a Governor of the administrative type 
wo uld b e r e q ui red (as Mr. Du n field has already acted) and the 
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present Governor , who se train ing a nd experien ce have lain i n 
o ther directions, wo ld no doubt f eel hi mself un fitted f or the 
post. 
If such a form of Government were s uccessfully introduc e d, 
could it las t? I f it were possible to include i n the Exe c utive 
Council (i .e. the "Commiss i on) t h e leaders of both polit ica l 
par ties, there might be a chance of it doing so, bu t th is is 
unfortunately not the c a se . Given the exclusion of Sir R. 
Squires, the changeable a n d temperamental nature o f the 
people, and the f ac t that t he "Commission" would have to 
indulge i n unpopu lar refo rms, it is difficult not to share the 
b e li ef of those who affirm t hat the position of the "Commis-
sioners" would soon become i ntolerable. If the people were to 
be stampeded b y e x -politicians, as they might quite easily be 
in def a u l t of a quick recovery, a garrison might even be 
needed. But apart altogether from such possibilities, agita-
t ion for a return to the status quo could on l y be a matter of 
time; the more drastic t he change the more violent the 
reaction. In the face of popular sentiment not even a garrison 
would avail. 
The fo r egoing c o nsiderations wou l d apply to al l the suggested 
forms 0 f "Commiss ion Government" which wou l d involve the 
s upp ressi on of the Legislature. The danger of the country 
being s t ampeded by Sir R . Squires and his associates would of 
course apply also to those whi c h would allow of the Legisla-
t u re being retained in being. But it would seem from the above 
a na lysi s that if some such form of Government should be con-
s idered essential for t h e immediate future, the safest form 
and t hat which could be introduced with the least embarrass-
ment bo t h to Neli'lfoundland and the United Kingdom is t hat 
discussed under paragraph (2) of head (A). This would not 
i nvol ve the suppression of Parliament, and would be fully 
consistent with the constitutional instruments; and though it 
would theoretically be liable to reversal by a new Ministry 
the danger could, if necessary, be countered by an extension 
of the life of the present Parliament for such period as might 
be considered appropriate in the light of the then prevailing 
political conditions. But whether even this comparative ly mild 
form of "Commission Government" could be introduced without a 
referendum i s of c o u r se a matter which the Government alone 
would be competent to decide. 
PRO . 
Monroe (if first put to 
the country by party formed 
on that basis) . 
Taylor - dictators fr om 0 t side 
Stafford - outsiders 
Bowring - some form o r o ther 
Baird - U. K. to take over 
Newfoundland for a few years . 
Gushue - if Confederation not possible 
Sir M. Winter (but with Parliament 
still continuing) 
Angel - schoolmaster government 
Ayre - Commission of 3 from outside 
and Advisory Board (hon . ) of 10 or 12 . 
Emerson - 7 or 8 ; 2 f rom U. K. , 
1 or 2 from Canada , remainder local . 
Dunfield (Commission of 6 presided over 
by Governor of C . O. type, cf . Niger ia ; 
Mr . Alderdice & Lieut . (Emerson) , Sir R. 
Squires & Lieut . (Sir T . Cook) and two 
men of standing from U. K.) 
Lake - as leading to Confederation 
(Commission of 5 - 3 local , 1 U. K. , 
1 Canada). 
Archibald - Bell Island - absolute 
control for the time being . 
H. Mitchell - if referendum first. 
160 
ANTI 
Cas h in . 
Walsh . 
Horwood . 
McNamara 
H. Winter 
Sir R. Squires 
W. J . Browne 
L. Outerbridge 



